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9Oiva Kuisma, sanna Lehtinen & harri mäcKLin
INTRODUCTION: FROM BAUMGARTEN TO 
CONTEMPORARY AESTHETICS
Contemporary philosopher-aestheticians with varying backgrounds such as Arnold Berleant, Richard Shusterman and Wolfgang Welsch have drawn attention to the 18th-century philosopher 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten as a thinker still worthy of scholarly 
attention.1 Generally, Baumgarten is known as the person who invented, or 
rather formulated, the term aesthetics and introduced it to the academic 
world: first in the Greek form episteme aisthetike (sensory knowledge) in 
his brief academic dissertation Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad 
poema pertinentibus, § 116 (1735)2 and later in the Latinized form aesthetica 
in his systematic but unfinished Aesthetica (two volumes published: I 1750; 
II 1758).3 The introduction of a methodically useful term and concept is 
an achievement in itself,4 but what Berleant, Shusterman, and Welsch 
want to emphasize is the content of Baumgarten’s definition of aesthetics: 
aesthetics is a science surveying “sensory cognition”, “scientia cognitionis 
sensitivae” (Aesthetica, prol. § 1). Noting that along with sense-perception 
sensory cognition also covers imaginary sense-perception (or simply, 
imagination), Baumgarten’s definition is a conspicuously wide one. It does 
not, in principle, rule out anything perceptible from the scope of aesthetic 
research.
1 Cf. Welsch, Undoing Aesthetics, 39–41; Tr. By Andrew Inkpin. London: Sage Publications 
1997. Shusterman, Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art, 263–267. Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2nd ed. 2000. Berleant, Sensibility and Sense: The Aesthetic 
Transformation of the Human World, 12–13; 20–21. imprint.academic.com 2010. E-book.
2 Baumgarten, Alexander G. Reflections on Poetry: Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad 
poema pertinentibus. Text and translation by K. Aschenbrenner and W. B Holther. Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press 1954.
3 Modern edition with German translation: Baumgarten, Alexander G., Ästhetik I–II. 
Herausgegeben von Dagmar Mirbach. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 2007.
4 The introduction of the term aesthetics (episteme aisthetike) was a significant achievement 
especially in the sense that Baumgarten (born 1714) was only 20 when he used the term in his 
thesis Meditationes in 1735.
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Baumgarten formulated the episteme aisthetike on the basis of the 
Greek term aistheta, signifying things perceived in distinction to objects of 
intellection, noeta in Greek (Meditationes § 116). To recognize, analyse, and 
classify objects of perception, however, is not what primarily is at stake in 
aesthetic research. That would be the objective of, say, biological research, 
which aims to survey objects and phenomena objectively, i.e. as physical 
objects and phenomena. In distinction to this, aesthetica in Baumgarten’s 
derivation does not aim only to the survey of aistheta, objects of perception, 
but also and eminently to the study of the subjective side of perception, 
i.e., to personal experience and its advancement. Aesthetic cognition does 
not signify only neutral registration of objects of perception but also the 
emotional and cognitive tone attending sensory perception. A simple 
example may clarify this point: if a person recognizes that a bird singing 
in a tree is a blackbird, s/he is making an observation belonging to the 
domain of ornithology. But if s/he looks with admiration at the beauty of 
the blackbird and listens with enjoyment to its singing, s/he has entered 
the domain of aesthetics. In this sense, Baumgartenian aesthetics does not 
aim at the truth of cognition – which is the end of logica in Baumgartenian 
terminology – but at the beauty of sensory cognition. In Baumgarten’s own 
words: “The end of aesthetics is the perfection of sensory cognition. And 
this is beauty (pulcritudo).” (Aesthetica § 14). In distinction to properties 
studied by natural sciences such as height, breadth and weight, beauty is 
not a character or property to be recognized by neutral observation but 
through personal experience. 
The introduction of beauty as the fundamental value of sensory cognition 
is not, however, a thoroughly innocent move in determining the domain of 
aesthetic research. It has various consequences, of which one is that it is a 
step toward narrowing the broadness and openness of Baumgarten’s own 
definition of aesthetics as the science of sensory cognition. The notion of 
beauty narrows the scope of aesthetics for the simple reason that beauty as 
a value so easily comes to be attributed only to the cognition of visual and 
audible objects of perception. This means that objects of olfaction, physical 
taste and sense of touch tend to fall out of the scope of aesthetic research. 
A consequence, though by no means a necessary one, of the neglect of 
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these “lower” senses is that aesthetic research focuses on artworks at the 
cost of also attending to and surveying nature’s multi-sensorial aesthetic 
features. This is what in practice happened in aesthetic research after the 
age of Baumgarten. In this regard, G. W. F. Hegel’s influence was to be of 
crucial importance: he defined the domain of aesthetics as the philosophy 
of fine art, “Philosophie der schönen Kunst” (Ästhetik I, 13).5 Hegel explicitly 
removed natural beauty from aesthetic research because in nature there 
is no self-consciousness apart from human activity. In contrast to natural 
beauty, artistic beauty addresses human beings because it is produced 
by human beings characterized by self-consciousness. (Ästhetik I, 13–15.) 
Human beings can understand artistic beauty produced by other human 
beings, and one of the tasks of the philosophy of fine art is to help people 
cultivate the ability to understand art. 
Hegel’s great predecessor, Immanuel Kant, did not underrate the value 
of natural beauty but neither did he make of it the prime subject of aesthetic 
research, since his focus in the Kritik der Urteilskraft was on the general 
analysis of judgements concerning beauty, sublimity, and teleology. Kant’s 
notion of the aesthetic judgement, especially because of his emphasis 
on disinterestedness (Kritik der Urteilskraft § 2),6 was easily adapted to art 
critical discourse, having repercussions even in the promotion of the art for 
art’s sake ideology in the 19th century. But from the standpoint of promoting 
the appreciation of the aesthetic dimension of one’s environment, both 
natural and cultural, the notion of disinterestedness has been criticized 
because it demands distancing oneself from the object of appreciation.7 
Disinterested distance-taking does not work practically in the case of one’s 
environment, because we are necessarily in some place and environment. 
We can change our position with regard to particular objects such as trees, 
stones and animals, but we cannot move away from the environment 
surrounding and permeating both us and trees, stones and animals. In 
the case of art (excepting environmental art), the situation is the other 
5 G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I–III. Werke 13–15, red. E. Moldenhauer und K. M. 
Michel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 2001–2004 (1970).
6 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft. Werkausgabe X. Herausgegeben von W. Weischedel. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1990 (11. Aufl.).
7 Cf. Berleant, Art and Engagement, 12–31. Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1991.
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way round: we cannot move into the world of an artwork, be it a painting, 
film or poem, even if we attempted it with all the force of our imagination. 
We can imagine being in the Ithaca of Homer’s Odyssey or in the Dublin 
of James Joyce’s Ulysses, but we cannot enter those imaginary worlds in 
reality. From the opposite point of view, we can imagine not being in this 
or that environment, but we cannot imagine being absolutely nowhere. We 
necessarily are somewhere and we necessarily imagine being somewhere, 
even if the environment were an imaginary empty space.  
Conscious attention to the fact of being necessarily situated in some 
place and environment has been one of the motives that have led to a 
growing scholarly interest, first, in environmental aesthetics from the 1960s 
onwards and, secondly, to everyday aesthetics from the 1990s onwards. 
This broadening of the scope of aesthetic research accords well with the 
original idea of Baumgarten’s project of the science surveying sensory 
cognition. However, as noted above, Baumgarten himself narrowed the 
domain of aesthetics by adjusting it to the traditional aesthetics of beauty. 
Moreover, much of his Aesthetica is dedicated to traditional humanistic 
and art theoretical issues. He, for example, demands from aestheticians 
erudition in matters concerning God, universe, and man (Aesthetica § 64). 
This is certainly a very grandiose goal for any scholar; so grandiose, that 
Baumgarten a couple of paragraphs later moderates it in saying that he 
does not demand polymath (polyhistora) or pansophic (pansophum) learning 
from aestheticians (Aesthetica § 67). But in any case, aestheticians seem to be 
very learned persons in the Baumgartenian view.
Contemporary aesthetics does not aim – at least, not usually – to such 
heights of learning which would comprise not only man (humanities) but 
also the universe (cosmology) and even God (theology). Contemporary 
aesthetics has become more secular compared with the 18th century, but on 
the other hand it has broadened its domain to cover not only the traditional 
subjects of art and beauty but also, in the spirit of Baumgarten’s broad 
definition of aesthetics, the most common and ordinary phenomena of 
the environment and everyday world. This broadening does not lead only 
to theoretical discussion but also to some kind of practical benefit: proper 
attention to the aesthetic dimension of our everyday world may enhance 
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the quality of our everyday life. The aesthetic quality of our everyday life 
receives an opportunity to grow when we pay attention to the aesthetic 
dimension of our everyday world and when from this attention grows an 
ethical responsibility to take care of our aesthetic environment. Hence, one 
might say that aesthetics is a very practical branch of learning.8
The possibility of improving our everyday aesthetic life can also be 
linked to Baumgarten’s original project of aesthetics, especially to his 
notion of felix aestheticus, the happy aesthetician (Aesthetica §§ 27–37, etc.). 
Felix aestheticus is literally a very positive notion, referring to the growing 
happiness or well-being to which learning and practice in aesthetics can 
lead aestheticians. The happy aesthetician is a learned person, who knows 
much about art and beauty as well as about the aesthetic dimension of our 
everyday world. Thinking about this optimistic prospect, we got the idea 
of editing a collection of new surveys showing some aspects of the paths 
leading from the aesthetics of art to everyday aesthetics. We dedicate these 
surveys to a felix aestheticus, Professor Arto Haapala, on his 60th birthday. 
*** 
The intriguing interlacing of the central themes of art and the everyday is 
one of the guiding lines of this collection of invited essays. As the title of this 
collection – Paths from the Philosophy of Art to Everyday Aesthetics – indicates, 
the following essays represent the way in which the traditional emphasis 
on art is giving way to a more all-encompassing aesthetic investigation 
in which the aesthetic issues of everyday life are gaining prominence 
alongside questions related to art. In the first part of the collection, the 
essays by Morten Kyndrup, Lars-Olof Åhlberg, Markus Lammenranta, and 
María José Alcaraz León all in their turn outline a series of contemporary 
issues in the philosophy of art. In addition to discussing art philosophical 
issues using terms such as the modern and the commonplace, these essays 
8 From this practical point of view, aesthetics can be compared to ethics in the Aristotelian 
sense: the aim of ethics is not only to study virtues but also to become personally good, 
agathos (Nicomachean Ethics 1103b26–29). Nicomachean Ethics. Tr. by H. Rackham. The Loeb 
Classical Library. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press 
1990.
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refer to our lifeworld, to the everyday, which is discussed more thematically 
in the second part of this collection.
The collection begins with Morten Kyndrup’s essay “Were We 
Ever Modern? Art, Aesthetics, and the Everyday: Distinctions and 
Interdependencies”, in which he argues intriguingly that the answer to 
this question might not be as obvious as it might seem. By “we” Kyndrup 
refers to the community of aestheticians and by “the Modern” a process of 
division where individual systems of knowledge gain increasing autonomy. 
Using the theories of Jacques Rancière and Bruno Latour, Kyndrup 
traces the way the notions of “art” and “the aesthetic” emerge within the 
overall development of modernity and argues that from the start, art and 
aesthetics have been intimately linked together, though the effects of this 
co-determination have not been sufficiently understood. In Kyndrup’s view, 
art and aesthetics are still in the process of “becoming modern”, where 
they are increasingly understood separately from one another. Kyndrup 
proposes that an interrogation of the interdependence of art and aesthetics 
in modernity can open up unthought of possibilities for a broader notion 
of the aesthetic that exceeds its determination in relation to art. In this way, 
Kyndrup suggests, we can get a clearer picture of what is at stake in our 
aesthetic theories.
Lars-Olof Åhlberg takes a critical look at Arthur Danto’s seminal work 
Transfiguration of the Commonplace (1981) in “Everyday and Otherwordly 
Objects: Dantoesque Transfiguration”. Åhlberg focuses on Danto’s use 
of the term “transfiguration” as well as other theological terms, arguing 
that Danto’s analogies to Christian religion are based on conceptual 
misunderstandings. Most importantly, Åhlberg argues that Danto’s 
central term “transfiguration” actually refers to transubstantiation, thereby 
introducing a confusion into the heart of his theory of art. By contrasting 
Danto’s writings with theological literature, Åhlberg examines how Danto’s 
mistaken analogies affect his theory and how these analogies, when 
properly amended, can illuminate his theory in ways that his own writings 
fail to articulate. A deeper understanding of Danto’s theory can shed light 
on the way art can transform the commonplace – the ordinary, the everyday 
– into something extraordinary.
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In “How Art Teaches: A Lesson from Goodman”, Markus Lammenranta 
inquires if and how artworks can convey propositional knowledge about 
the world. Lammenranta argues that the cognitive role of art can be 
explained by revising Nelson Goodman’s theory of symbols. According to 
Lammenranta, the problem of Goodman’s theory is that, despite providing 
an account of art’s symbolic function, it denies art the possibility of mediating 
propositional knowledge. Lammenranta claims that Goodman’s theory can 
be augmented by enlarging it with an account of direct reference developed 
by Bertrand Russell and contemporary philosophy of language. On this 
basis, an expanded version of Goodman’s theory can explain how artworks 
can express propositions even without being linguistic, representational, or 
non-fictive. Lammenranta explicates his theory by explaining how abstract 
paintings and literary fictions can mediate propositional claims about the 
actual, everyday world.
In addition to propositional knowledge, engagement with artworks 
can afford other kinds of cognitive value. One of these is discussed by 
María José Alcaraz León in her article “Aesthetic Intimacy”. She surveys 
aesthetic intimacy as a notion that aims to offer a deeper understanding of 
important features of encounters with art and other aesthetic phenomena. 
However, as Alcaraz León shows, the notion of aesthetic intimacy proves to 
be difficult to define satisfactorily. After analyzing several ways of defining 
the concept, she concludes that aesthetic intimacy affords a special kind 
of understanding of someone else’s aesthetic choices. When this kind 
of intimacy is experienced in the case of art, we become aware of the 
aesthetic choices of an artist in a way that affords us a possibility of feeling 
togetherness with the artist’s work. 
In the latter part of the book, the emphasis of the essays turns from the 
sphere of art towards the realm of the everyday. In this transition, Martta 
Heikkilä’s and Knut Ove Eliassen’s essays function as a bridge between the 
philosophy of art and everyday aesthetics.
Knut Ove Eliassen’s “Quality Issues” focuses on the notion of quality in 
its contemporary and ubiquitous use. Continuous assessment and concern 
about measurable or experienced quality seems to have taken a central 
place in the prevailing discourses of affluent contemporary societies. 
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Eliassen pays close attention to the historical development of the quality 
discourse. He depicts the implicit and increasingly debatable ideology 
behind the fixed focus on quality assurance, which in itself is symptomatic 
of the self-defeating yearning for total control. 
In her article “Work and Play – The Built Environments of Terry Gilliam’s 
Brazil”, Martta Heikkilä discusses how Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive 
notion of architecture can help us rethink the way buildings sustain our 
everyday lives. Built environments are often understood in terms of their 
way of supporting our everyday lives and our meaningful engagement 
with the world. By studying how a totalitarian society is portrayed in the 
cinematic environments of Terry Gilliam’s dystopian film Brazil (1985), 
Heikkilä shows how easily the functionality of ordinary places, such as 
apartments, offices, and streets, can become dysfunctional, meaningless, 
and oppressive. Heikkilä argues that Heidegger’s well-known analyses of 
the notion of dwelling do not exhaust our possible relationships to the 
built environment. Turning to Derrida, Heikkilä claims that every place 
harbours within itself the possibility of inverting its presupposed meaning 
and becoming antithetic to meaningful human dwelling. By way of a 
detailed analysis of Gilliam’s Brazil, Heikkilä demonstrates how Derrida’s 
deconstructive notion of architecture can offer a new possibility of thinking 
about the relationship between architecture and everyday life in a way that 
exceeds the notions of functionality and dwelling.
Finally, the remaining essays by Kalle Puolakka, Ossi Naukkarinen, 
Mateusz Salwa, and Francisca Pérez-Carreño concentrate more specifically 
on the problematics of the everyday.
Some aestheticians, such as Arto Haapala and Ossi Naukkarinen, have 
argued that the ordinariness, routines, and familiarity which constitute the 
“everydayness” of our everyday lives are integral and fundamental aspects 
of human existence. In his article “Does Valery Gergiev Have an Everyday?”, 
Kalle Puolakka opposes this “restrictivist” account of everydayness by taking 
a look at the hectic life of the Russian conductor Valery Gergiev. Puolakka 
argues that Gergiev’s extraordinary lifestyle, which is filled with constant 
travelling and conducting the leading orchestras of the world, lacks the 
ordinariness that the restrictivists take as a necessary and unavoidable 
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dimension of human life. By showing how Gergiev’s everyday life cannot 
be accommodated by the restrictivist account, and thereby arguing that 
ordinariness and familiarity are not necessary components of everydayness, 
Puolakka makes way for an “expansionist” account of everyday aesthetics, 
where the aesthetic value of everydayness is found by learning to see the 
extraordinary hidden in the ordinary itself.
Francisca Pérez-Carreño pays attention to the less obvious facets of 
everyday aesthetics in her essay “The Aesthetic Value of the Unnoticed”. 
Pérez-Carreño uses a rich array of examples to illustrate her argument and 
makes evident how aesthetic pleasures of all kind are intrinsincally present 
in the everyday life of human beings. Taking a different point of view, i.e. 
the standpoint of garden aesthetics, Mateusz Salwa in “Everyday Green 
Aesthetics” sets out to investigate the aesthetic value of everyday nature 
surrounding our everyday life. According to Salwa, this has been a largely 
neglected area of inquiry, which nonetheless has obvious potential to 
unite more concretely environmental aesthetics with everyday aesthetics. 
Salwa applies Rosario Assunto’s notion of garden aesthetics to show how 
and when, in the form of gardens, nature is intentionally appointed the 
object of aesthetic attention instead of serving as a mere background for 
quotidian activities.
The contributions of Ossi Naukkarinen and Richard Shusterman 
widen the scope of inquiry to include topics that have so far been of 
only marginal interest in philosophical aesthetics. Naukkarinen aims at 
introducing contemporary technologies into the discussions on everyday 
aesthetics with his “Feeling (With) Machines”. The theme is approached 
through focusing on how networked computers are changing the sphere of 
the everyday and how this, in turn, affects the study of everyday aesthetics. 
Naukkarinen speculates on the likely possibility that taking everyday 
technologies into proper consideration might ultimately affect the whole 
academic discipline of aesthetics. 
From the promises and perils of technology, Richard Shusterman 
directs his attention to the human body. His “Pleasure, Pain, and the 
Somaesthetics of Illness: A Question for Everyday Aesthetics” concludes 
the selection of essays with a reflection upon the experiences of pain and 
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illness. Shusterman shows how somaesthetic awareness in particular could 
help to face the inevitable pains and ailments that everyone must at some 
point of their life encounter. The somaesthetic project is thus proven to 
show its potentiality for soothing instead of solely focusing on optimizing 
pleasure. 
The collection of essays is followed by an epilogue by Jos de Mul. 
“These Boots Are Made for Talkin’: Some Reflections on Finnish Mobile 
Immobility” is an exhilarating depiction of how national qualities are paid 
close attention to by philosophers working in the field of aesthetics. Full 
of lively reminiscences of an academic visit to Finland, de Mul’s narrative 
demonstrates practically how aestheticians see and experience the everyday 
world – and sometimes a little bit different world – around us.
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mOrten Kyndrup
WERE WE EVER MODERN? ART, AESTHETICS, AND THE 
EVERYDAY: DISTINCTIONS AND INTERDEPENDENCIES
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the conceptual and historical preconditions of 
the notions of aesthetics in a “broader” sense, i.e. thus also including 
“aesthetics of the everyday”, “environmental aesthetics”, etc. This 
implies a critical re-description of backgrounds, contexts, and functions 
of the initial, early Modern developments of the two concepts, “art” 
and “aesthetics”, respectively. Approaches and interpretations by 
Bruno Latour and Jacques Rancière, among others, are discussed 
in that connection. In conclusion, the paper argues that a distinctive 
acknowledgement of the initial interdependency between “art” and 
“the aesthetic” is the decisive precondition for subsequently separating 
them properly – the latter being what seems to be needed in order to 
eventually becoming Modern.
We all know that “art” and “the aesthetic” are inextricably inter-connected concepts and phenomena. They are connected in their historical backgrounds of engendering in a modern 
sense, especially during the 18th century, and they are connected in their 
subsequent histories of development, respectively. However, the question 
about how they are connected, and how they have developed in relation 
to one another, leads to a difference of opinions. Both in aesthetics, in 
the singular art sciences, and in the disciplines connected to the history 
of ideas, there is anything but consensus about how this connectedness is 
based, and how it has developed. This especially means that the question 
about, whether dealing with “aesthetical” qualities outside the area of 
art makes any sense, is approached under utterly different premises, and 
accordingly, provided with extremely diverging answers.
We probably also all of us know that we are living at a civilization 
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historical stage, which may rightly be referred to as “Modern”, in an overall 
sense. By Modern in this sense, we understand, above all, a qualitatively 
higher level of the societal divisions of work, the steady increase of which 
characterizes all developments in the history of civilization. In the Modern, 
these developed divisions of labour get a qualitatively different character 
of becoming real differentiations, even into relatively independent ways 
of understanding and naming the world, and ourselves. In the Modern, 
e.g. politics, ethics, religion, science – and art, are separated to becoming 
autonomous areas or systems with each their own rules of exchange and 
delimitation. And above all, by the Modern, the basis for legitimation 
of everything is switching towards the mundane, towards what we call 
immanence. In Modernity, any phenomenon, approach, or difference 
needs to be legitimized from below, in and by themselves. Substantiations 
can no longer take place with reference to powers or authorities outside the 
world, in which we live.
But beneath this general consensus at a supreme level, we here also 
find several utterly different notions about how to understand this Modern 
space, especially about how it has developed, and where we are actually 
situated today, in relation to this space. Is the Modern chapter done with, 
as it has been claimed by voices among the so-called Postmodern? Has the 
Modern been a sort of conceptual illusion or utopia, which we have actually 
never been able to reach, and perhaps never wanted or ought to reach, so 
that we have actually never been Modern, luckily or unfortunately? And 
this to an extent that perhaps we never can nor will become Modern in 
this sense? Anti-Modern, non-Modern, alter-Modern, para-Modern? The 
concepts swirl around, and along with them the attitudes to where we 
actually are situated in relation to this allegedly Modern space, modally, 
mentally, historically. 
But in spite of the differences in approaches, there is more or less 
agreement about the fact that the constitution and extension of “art” and 
“the aesthetic”, concepts as well as phenomena, are intimately linked with 
the entire complex of problems of the Modern. In general, this consensus 
also includes the fact that the development of differences, of areas, and 
of the complex horizon of the Modern as a whole, are emergents, using 
21
a metaphor from biology. This means that what is at hand cannot be 
reduced to its components, to the stages or phenomena from which it was 
developed. Modern natural science can no longer be thought of within a 
unified system of “arts” based on defined, learned skills, which were the 
horizon of the Middle Ages. The court of Louis XIV would be unable to 
acknowledge John Cage’s “4’33” as legitimate music of divertissement, as 
“art”. Therefore, even if de-differentiations may take place here and there, 
the overriding picture is absolutely the opposite. Differences develop, they 
are deepened, and they are consistently irreversible.
This essay attempts to critically redescribe the general development 
of “art” and “the aesthetic” within this Modern. Its particular purpose is 
to qualify the discussion of potentialities and boundaries of a possible 
so-called broader concept of the aesthetic, i.e. a concept that includes our 
dealing with the phenomena also outside the specific area of art. This will 
take place in five paragraphs. First, we will have a look at the complex 
mutual interdependence of art and the aesthetic in their histories of 
engendering, dating back to the 18th century. From there, we will outline 
the main elements of the history of development, since then. Next step will 
be an inclusion of some important positions within theory and history of 
modernity in an analysis of the situation today, within this problematics. 
On that background, the extension of an adequate, analytically productive, 
broad concept of the aesthetic will be outlined. Finally, this discussion will 
be added to the contemporary stance of the question about where we are in 
relation to the Modern – and where we seem to be heading.
THE GENESIS
The history of genesis of the modern concepts of both art and aesthetics is fairly well known. In the case of art, it is about its gradual detachment from 
crafts and from its defined functions in terms of representational symbolic 
character, towards constituting its own completely particular sphere, 
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as described in e.g. Paul Oskar Kristeller’s influential scholarly studies.1 
During the 18th century, this development eventually leads to a situation, 
where “art” may be described and conceived of as a collective singular of 
a quite distinct character. Above all, as something so historically peculiar 
that, by definition, it has no purpose outside itself. Art in that sense has 
become autonomous. With this new general concept it also becomes possible 
and natural to operate with a system of ”artforms” with a joint reference to 
a supreme substance, c.f. Batteux’s famous treatise from 1742.2 Moreover, 
differences and similarities may now be discussed in a comparative ranking, 
as done by G.E. Lessing in 1766.3
Aesthetics as a concept, equally well known, is named by A.G. 
Baumgarten in the 1730s, and is codified as the discipline about (a 
particular kind of ) sensuous cognition in his Aesthetica from 1750.4 But prior 
to Baumgarten’s specific definition of the concept, still more widespread 
considerations about the preferences of an audience had arisen, about 
good and bad taste, and in general, about the specific functions in the sense-
based perception of distinctive types of phenomena, as e.g. in Hume.5 And 
shortly after Baumgarten’s work, the “aesthetic relation” and the particular 
conceptual physiognomy of the judgment of taste is analysed by Immanuel 
Kant, in his Kritik der Urteilskraft from 1790, an important work which is 
basically still adequate.6 
It has, however, been less known, or at least less recognized that the 
separation of the two conceptual fields of “art” and “the aesthetic” not only 
takes place in the same process, but that the two concepts, in addition, 
actually presuppose and precondition each other. Jacques Rancière, in his 
Aisthesis, 20117, accurately analyses how the very separation of production 
from reception, of poiesis from aiesthesis, constitutes the possibility for 
their respective independence and thus for their diverging directions of 
1 Paul Oskar Kristeller. 1980. See also Larry Shiner. 2001.
2 See Charles Batteux (”Abbé Batteux”). 1746. Les beaux arts réduits à un même principe.
3 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. 1766. Laokoon oder Über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie.
4 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten. 1750. Theoretische Ästhetik. Die grundlegenden Abschnitte aus 
der “Aesthetica”, 58. Translated by Hans Rudolf Schweizer. 1988.
5 David Hume. 1757. Of the Standard of Taste.
6 Immanuel Kant. 1790. Kritik der Urteilskraft. See also Morten Kyndrup 2018. 
7 See Jacques Rancière. 2011. Jacques Rancière. 2013.
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development to come. Historically, this separation takes place during 
a long process. In aesthetics, it is about the gradual formation of an 
audience, including the subjective feeling or experience of being a part of/
belonging to an audience like that – and by this, the legitimation of being 
able to experience and to express oneself on behalf of this audience. This 
new independency of the perception side and the receiver position can 
also be detected for instance in language. Raw nature may now become 
a landscape, i.e. something that is clearly experienced as addressing 
somebody. And such a landscape may even be positively characterized as 
picturesque (that is as something, which looks like a picture of a landscape). 
The addressedness is made explicit, and anybody’s feeling of oneself being 
the target of this address is strengthened, and eventually resulting in an 
increased inclination towards personal evaluation, judgment of taste.
On the production side, the artists are gradually changing orientation 
towards the production of works, no longer referring to specific commissions 
for predefined purposes by a materially privileged client/patron, but now 
towards a still more generalized (art)market, in which the preferences of an 
anonymous audience are becoming materially significant too. This means 
that artworks are now produced in anticipation of a subsequent judgment (of 
taste), the outcome of which the artist is unable to know during the creating 
process. The break or the detachment between production and reception 
therefore becomes absolute in a completely new sense, historically. The 
artist is unable to produce according to anything but his/her own feeling 
of quality (a feeling, which then soon after comes to be characterised as an 
inner necessity). Art, which panders to the supposed taste of an audience, is 
downgraded because it violates the dictum of art as “purposiveness without 
a purpose”. In that way, the separation seems absolute, although, historically, 
to a high extent, the two sides have produced each other. The artistic genius, 
according to Rancière, becomes the hazardous bridge stretched between two 
heterogeneous kinds of logic – the concept implemented by art, and beauty 
without a concept.8 “And” he continues, “it is exactly this separation between 
the reasons of art and those of beauty, which makes art exist as such, as its 
own world, and not simply as a skill of the artist.”
8 Rancière. 2011, 30. 2013, 11.
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From the beginning, the mutual complex interdependency of these 
concepts is thus completely literal and concrete. The modern concept 
of an autonomous art would not have arisen without the segregation of 
a historically new particular approach to this art from a “somebody” to 
which it addresses itself, i.e. without a distinctively separate aesthetic 
relation. No art without aesthetics. Conversely, no aesthetics without art 
either. The nurturing and the development of a specific area, “art”, that 
can offer us an arsenal of singular artefacts, created for no other purpose 
than for being purposeless objects for our judgment-oriented perception, 
historically becomes the greenhouse of aesthetic relationality. From being 
mainly just a passive registration of the fact that something may be to one’s 
taste, it develops into the concise evaluative relation, which establishes an 
actual passage from “me” over “that” to (the notion of ) a “we” – the way we 
have known it since Kant.9
It is, however, also important to notice that, in its point of departure, this 
sensuous perception – which later was to become the aesthetic one – was 
not limited to art only. This is true already of Baumgarten’s very definition 
of the concept. 
In general, the basic separation of production and reception could 
evidently never have taken place outside the space of a developing Modern, 
in which differentiation of access and values, in terms of independency 
and interrelationship, made it possible at all to conceive of that kind of 
differences also asymmetrically. The good, the true, and the beautiful 
are no longer parallel values. A system of differing regimes is about to be 
created, making e.g. the beautiful not necessarily true – nor good.
The creation by the Modern of an independent area of “science”, during 
the same process and time, opens a new flank in the complicated interplay 
between art and the aesthetic. By now, the art sciences too are born, both in 
terms of independent areas concerning especially visual arts and literature, 
but later concerning all the art forms, one by one. On top of that, a scientific 
9 Concerning the ”passage”, see Morten Kyndrup. 2008, esp. p. 36; 105ff. Parts of this book’s 
points of view have been published in English. See Morten Kyndrup. 2013. ”Art, Aesthetics – 
Divorce?” in: Site, no. 33, 107–118. And in German, see Morten Kyndrup. 2012. ”Ästhetik, Kunst 
und Kunstverstandnis. Die Kunst und das Kunstwerk”, in Neue Rundschau Heft 1. 187–200. 
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approach to the general concept of “art” is created, thus paving the way 
for general theory of art and comparative arts as perspectives. As we will 
see, the rise of the art sciences implies an even more complex system of 
theoretical boundaries in the history of development to come, in particular 
as regards the boundaries of aesthetics as a discipline.
THE SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT
Born during the same process and possibly out of the same topos but irrevocably separated thereafter: art and the aesthetic are now historically going to refer to something different. At least to two 
different aspects of the “same” – if the production by an artist, and the 
perception by a receiver of an artwork can be designated as one and the 
same. Decisive, however, is the difference in modus. 
“Art” comes to designate an area (system, institution) which, above all, 
contains artworks, each and every one singular. This area basically has its 
own rules and its own (absence of ) purpose in relation to society as a whole. 
It is exempted from the general purpose rationality of the Modern. Its 
inhabitants are creating artists, but also acting intermediators, critics, and 
even a number of permanent institutions, such as museums, concert halls, 
etc. The area has boundaries (and accordingly, keepers). Its boundaries 
separate it from other, discursive areas. 
“The aesthetic”, on the other hand, refers to a distinctive kind of 
evaluative subject-object relation, to a specific kind of relationality. In 
principle it is always singular, but of course this singularity includes the 
fact that aesthetic appreciations do produce (and are produced by) history 
and tradition, which thus form part of the actual properties of any given 
relation. The aesthetic has its boundaries as well, but they are separating it 
from other types of relation. An aesthetic relation is a potentiality; an offer 
to every one of us, among other kinds of relations, we may enter into. 
The separation, as it were, did not result in two “similar” or even 
congruent formative concepts in terms of mode or logical extension. This 
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observation is important to maintain, also when analysing the long-term 
consequences of the separation of both sides. For example, as noted by 
Jacques Rancière, it is important to recognize, that the previous alliance 
or harmony between poiesis and aisthesis in the premodern was what 
provided mimesis with its necessary space of function.10 And conversely, 
the mimetic operation was able to guarantee this harmony or close 
connection. The separation breaks down this representative order in favour 
of a new “opposition” between individuality (the artist) and collectivity (the 
audience). However, it also marks the end of any mimetic commitment of 
the artwork, and in the long run, during the 20th century, this, in extreme 
cases, leads to the end of the expectation that an artwork should possess 
any immediate sensuous appeal, and even have any (permanent) character 
of a stable object at all. 
During the further historical development, the profound character 
and irreversible consequences of the separation, however, were not always 
respected by the dominating traditions of understanding, or perhaps 
rather: in many cases, the separation was referred to and made use of for 
other kinds of purposes. 
It would take us too far here to just even outline the genesis and 
development of the varying traditions of understanding within aesthetics, 
from late 18th century and up to now, or to analyse the complex reasons 
for the widespread, non-stringent understanding of the physiognomy 
and consequences of the original separation. This absence however, of 
consistency and stringency, is evidently not coincidental, and it is intimately 
linked to a general ambivalence towards the Modern differentiations, an 
ambivalence which is and has been true of greater parts of societal thinking, 
ever since the Enlightenment. 
However, one tradition worth mentioning here is one, which 
subsequently was to become the by far most dominating one in the thinking 
of art and the aesthetic, in the western Modern. Namely the one, which, 
based on the quest for unity in Romanticism, makes art and aesthetics 
reconcile in a particular “marriage” (as it has been called in another 
10 See Rancière 2013, 11. 
27
context11). In this tradition, aesthetics becomes “philosophy of art” schlicht 
und einfach, i.e. it becomes the discipline about what art is, so G. F. W. Hegel 
in his lectures on aesthetics, from the 1820s.12 Aesthetics is here made the 
servant and the master of art, at the same time. It becomes the master ratio, 
which, on the one side, is able to reinscribe art into the societal standard 
discourse (by being capable and willing to describe it philosophically). On 
the other side, it serves by helping to keep art outside and “autonomous”, 
by formulating and thus representing its unbridgeable particularity. But 
up against the original modal separation and our question here about a 
broader concept of aesthetics, this tradition is surprisingly blind. It is blind 
when it comes to developing a further understanding of what aesthetic 
value and relationality actually is and is able to, and it is particularly blind 
to the mere thought of even considering aesthetics as something, which 
might refer to anything but the area of art.
This “speculative” tradition, as it has been critically characterized by e.g. 
Jean-Marie Schaeffer in his crusade against it, remains dominating during 
the centuries to follow, and it is still immensely influential – probably 
also where the development patterns of art itself are concerned. Schaeffer 
even asserts that this tradition has ruined important qualities of art by 
imposing on it a permanent cognitive bias. This aesthetics’ demand for 
(true) cognitive content has historically resulted in an overload of artworks 
aiming at exactly this.13 A good example is the entire tradition within art, 
which is feeling evoked to primarily reflecting the question about what art 
basically is, culminating e.g. in the gesture of conceptual art, completely 
devoid of any immediate sensuous qualities. 
Probably, this development cannot be conceived of as simply as narrated 
by Schaeffer. No doubt, this continental tradition (as it was eventually 
called, in the broadest sense) for one thing has been able to contribute 
decisively to the analysis of what art, within the Modern, is capable of. And 
on top of that, in many cases it has incarnated a broader substantial critique 
11 See Morten Kyndrup. 2013.
12 See Hegel, G.F.W. 1986. Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik. 
13 Jean-Marie Schaeffer. 1992. L’Art de l’âge modern. Translated into English as Art of the Modern 
Age. Philosophy of Art from Kant to Heidegger. 2000.
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of society and modernity with art as its privileged perspective (as in e.g. 
Theodor W. Adorno).
However, this tradition has not been capable of setting aesthetics free 
of its partnership with art, let alone of aesthetics’ (inadequate) status of 
being “only” a philosophy (about art). It has even actively tried to resist any 
attempts of understanding aesthetics in a broader sense and in a different 
modal position towards art. As late as in 1993, and with contemptuous 
arrogance, Karl-Heinz Bohrer characterises the attempts to broaden out 
the concept of aesthetics like this, ”Ein Terror liegt über dem land: Die 
Acceptanz des Ästhetischen”.14 And, accordingly, in e.g. his considerations 
about a general “aestheticization”, Wolfgang Welsch carefully distinguishes 
between bad (surface) aestheticization, and phenomena, where the 
aesthetic qualities are supposed to lie deeper (in accordance with the 
Hegelian “depth model”).15 
In the perspective of theories of modernity, this “speculative tradition” 
in aesthetics may be characterized, with some justification, as anti-modern, 
although probably ‘wider Willen’. It has refused to take the initial separation 
seriously, and thereby refused to conceive of the differentiation in terms of 
something, which also necessarily produces actual emergent and irreversible 
differences: different perspectives, different analyses, and different discourses. 
The ambition of being able to survey and thus “own” art, by verbalizing 
its properties, may be construed as a lack of real acknowledgement of the 
particularity of art, of its autonomy. Concordantly, the rejection of investigating 
aesthetic relationality in its singularity, through analyses of artefacts, within 
as well as outside art, has contributed to a weakening of the separation itself. 
From time to time, this weakening has led said tradition into a dead end of 
critical self-sufficiency, in which the artworks themselves became reduced to 
mere examples of the adequacy of theory and critique.
Against that, the art sciences have worked intensely and successfully 
on developing the analyses and the understandings of the potentials of 
14 See Bohrer, Karl Heinz. 2–5 Sept., 1992. “Die Grenzen des Ästhetischen“, in Die Aktualität des 
Ästhetischen [Der Kongress „Die Aktualität von Ästhetischen“]. Hrsg. von Wolfgang Welsch 
in Zusammenarb. mit Ivo Frenzel. 1993. München: Fink.
15 See for example Wolfgang Welsch. 1997.
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singular artefactual functions, ever since the latter half of the 20th century. 
This has resulted in radical improvements of the analyses of the functional 
mechanisms of artworks, but has also implied a further increase of the 
distance between aesthetics and the art sciences, respectively, concerning 
what art is and does. This distance is an important component of the 
complex scenery within theory today.
THE CURRENT SITUATION
This scenery includes a significant number of different agencies, some of which are in close mutual dialogue and corporation, others not in contact with each other at all. Besides art itself 
(with the inhabitants of the art system from artists to mediators, and 
administrators) this scenery includes a wide range of aesthetic traditions 
led by the continental “speculative” one, but the analytical tradition with 
its background in the particular Anglo-Saxon founded philosophy is also 
important. In addition, we have the art sciences, traditionally focusing on 
each of their own art form, but many of them steadily working themselves 
into problems that are more common; from general theory of art, and i.e. 
comparative arts, to more substantial transversal issues, such as political 
art, post colonialism, feminism, and many others.16
One might ask, whether considering these agents as inhabitants of the 
same general landscape of theory actually makes sense at all? Does a basic 
notion of a Modern space of signification make sense in terms of a shared 
point of departure?
This is evidently a matter for discussion – and it is indeed being dis-
cussed. A philosopher, such as Bruno Latour, resolutely claims that we 
have actually never been modern, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes, is 
the title of his influential book from 1991.17 To Latour, the notion of the 
16 For specific institutionally historical reasons, this centrifugal motion away from the 
individual art form particularly took place within literary science. See Morten Kyndrup. 
2011. 
17 Bruno Latour. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Transl. by Catherine Porter 
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Modern is an illusion, with which we should settle. From his perspective 
(the notion of ) the Modern introduces “a constitution”, with the intent of 
realizing a purification, a sort of ‘clean-up’, meant to sort out everything 
as belonging either to the social (the human beings), or to the nature (the 
things). This illusion is nourished by the claim of being able to understand 
and to market the Modern project in terms of an ongoing process, through 
which everything can be assigned, gradually, to these poles of distinction. 
Meaning that anything not included, is something that has just not yet 
been assigned to its pole. 
But this constitution, Latour points out, is unable to realize its totalizing 
pretention, because it leaves large amounts of so called hybrids. The 
constitution does not want to conceptualize these hybrids as such, but 
hybrids do in fact make up a substantial part of our lifeworld. The Modern, 
in Latour’s interpretation, is thus a primitive and tendentially repressive/
reductive framing. Instead, we should see ourselves as non-modern, 
in a world leaving space for the hybrids in their own right. Towards the 
conclusion of his book, Latour even proposes a systematic distinction 
between those values and approaches, which we should, respectively 
should not, include (in our understanding) from the various modern, 
postmodern, premodern, and anti-modern positions.18 
The space of signification that Latour’s preferences suggest is, however, 
hard not to interpret as Modern in a broad sense, a fact already documented 
by his reflexive discussion of that space. The basic notion about a totalizing 
Modern, with which he intends to settle, is actually rather narrow per se, 
and to some extent, it appears to have been outlined rather rigidly for the 
actual purpose of his critical discussion. 
But Latour’s point about the hybrids is important. Although the 
Modern may produce distinctions and differentiations, phenomena in real 
life are still composite and not necessarily observing the institutionalized 
differences. If we go back to the problem of separation in the relation 
between art and the aesthetic, and to the above theoretical scenery, one 
might ask whether this is not characterized by exactly that kind of hybrids? 
Hybrids, which perhaps should not necessarily be purified in order to 
18 Latour. 1993, 142. 
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make themselves assignable to the poles of a claimed distinction?
On the one hand, the hybrid traditions within aesthetical thinking 
have undoubtedly one by one produced valuable contributions to 
the understanding of our world too. None of these hybrids have been 
coincidental. Therefore, history and its achievements could by no means 
be rolled back. On the other hand, though, the theoretical scenery of today 
is characterized by almost absurd procrastinations and by an absence of 
dialogue to such a massive extent that at least some cleaning up seems 
absolutely appropriate.
Examples are plentiful. One can meet philosophers from various 
aesthetic traditions who ‘from above’ categorize and evaluate the entity of 
meaning-engendering components within a single art form, completely 
without addressing the relevant art scientific discourse, and obviously 
without any scholarly insight into the art form in question. Shortly after 
the turn of century, the influential American art historian, James Elkins, 
found it appropriate to arrange a dialogue between art historians and 
aestheticians under the title, “Art History versus Aesthetics” (resulting in a 
book of the same title from 2006).19 This initiative turned out to demonstrate, 
above all, a considerable absence of insight into the respective disciplinary 
paradigms on the other side. In the American context, aesthetics was of 
course primarily represented by the particular analytic approach, which 
is already, by its view on history, quite far from that of most art historian 
platforms. However, a real inclusive point of view in Elkin’s roundtable 
discussion remained almost solely represented by Thierry de Duve, who 
has a foot in both art history and aesthetics. De Duve is quoted for a point 
of view, which considering the object identity should be self-evident, “art 
history without aesthetics is inconceivable to me” – and adding,”…because 
art history is first of all constituted by the evidential record of previous 
aesthetic judgments”.20
The absent dialogue between aesthetics and art sciences is partly 
caused by the unresolved scientific status of that “philosophy”, in which 
greater parts of the aesthetic traditions today are rooted. Different notions 
19 James Elkins, ed. 2006. Art History versus Aesthetics. 
20 Thierry de Duve quoted in Elkins. 2006, 60. 
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exist about the extent to which philosophizing is committed to empirical 
contextualization and documentation, in the same way as other sciences. 
But in itself this should not necessarily hinder dialogue and exchange of 
results.
Especially within the art sciences, a considerable theoretical 
armament of direct relevance, also to the aesthetic traditions, has taken 
place since the latter half of the 20th century. This is of course true, not 
least of the so called “Rezeptionsästhetik”; theory of reception, which in 
spite of its pleonastic name in German, is anything but self-evident and 
self-repeating in its uncovering of genuinely aesthetic function potentials 
within the singular artworks. Although it developed through literature, 
it has subsequently spread out to the other art forms too. Semiotics, 
especially its further development into a pragmatic semantics in Émile 
Benveniste, among others, constitutes another important contribution. 
The analysis of the very act of engendering meaning in an artwork, 
“enunciation”, encompasses all the acting communicative instances 
around the work, including the embedded impressions in the work of 
both its sender and its receiver. This is of relevance to aesthetics too, 
and in an overall sense, it is also an important contribution concerning 
the initial separation of art and the aesthetic, which we are pursuing 
here. Substantial contributions in theory and analysis and altogether 
within comparative theory of mediality (as in W. J. T. Mitchell) should be 
mentioned in this connection, as well. 
All this could and should of course be made productive, jointly, and 
through dialogue between the traditions. There are good reasons for 
accepting differences in approaches, and this is also true, for instance 
between the aesthetic traditions. Varying focal lengths in the approach to 
the “same” phenomena may be extremely profitable. 
This, however, presupposes the presence of the will and the ability 
to establish dialogue. The closure around itself, which many traditions, 
especially among the aesthetic ones, establish by insistently defining 
their own private playground, is not fruitful. Immunizing oneself against 
dialogue and exchange, and establishing even formalistic demands 
to empirical data, in order for these to be accepted as valid basis for 
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argumentation, leads to “camp-thinking”. And that, once again, leads to 
situations, where potentially obsolete and inadequate constructions and 
approaches to concepts are defended to the last drop of blood on behalf 
of “one’s camp”.
 
A BROADER CONCEPT OF AESTHETICS?
Concerning the original question about the separation, about the relationship of the concept of aesthetics to art: Is there actually a space for a broader concept of aesthetics, one to include something 
more than just our relationship to art? “Space” here understood both in 
terms of the architecture/logics of the concept and empirically, measured 
against the disparate theoretical landscape. Is there a need for such a 
concept, scientifically and pragmatically? Do out there phenomena exist 
which we would be able to better understand and describe, if we had such 
a concept? If so, how should such a concept be coined? What should it 
include? Which analytical potentials should it possess? Which negative as 
well as positive consequences would it have concerning the current bunch 
of understandings of the aesthetic? And finally, how would it cope with the 
notions of a developed, respectively worn out Modern? 
To start out with the concept itself: it seems appropriate to reach back 
to the notions of the aesthetic the way these originally arose, during the 18th 
century. They arose (i.e. in Baumgarten and Kant) on the basis of the initial 
separation of the production of art and its reception. And already then, “the 
aesthetic” explicitly exceeded the boundaries of “art” – a concept which, 
at that time, was only about to be formed and therefore had a completely 
different character from the one it has today. 
On that basis, “the aesthetic” today might designate a distinct kind of 
relation, being at disposal for us in our dealings with our surroundings. 
A kind of relation distinctly connecting me with a perceived object to 
make me assess the value of this object, for-me, all the while I conceive 
of this value as something referring to a community concerning that 
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kind of values, as if everybody else shared or ought to share this 
assessment with me – knowing that this is not the case. And relating 
me in a way so that this value for me has no other motivations than 
the sheer existence of the object for-me, i.e. independent of all other 
kinds of value, ownership, practical needs, etc. Aesthetic value, the way 
it is engendered in this judgment of taste, is consequently singular in its 
substance – but still, it is a part of the community to which it appeals. 
In that way, an aesthetic judgment is also always connecting us to our 
surrounding world. It creates a passage from an “I” over an “it” to (the 
imagination of ) a “we” – a passage, in which the arrows of implication 
may point in both directions. 
Although, in principle, aesthetic value is generated singularly and 
contextually, pronounced judgments of taste of course create traditions, 
conventions, and communities, all of which become part of the dispositive 
of any judgment of taste under pronunciation – just like the objects 
themselves offer specific possibilities; cf. the analysis of their embedded, 
implied, or enunciated enunciation.21
In such a concept of aesthetics, the status of the object is imperative. 
On the one hand, the concrete object is always decisive. However, on the 
other hand, it is decisive for-me exclusively, and through its sheer existence, 
exclusively. There can be no aesthetic judgment without exactly the object, 
against which it is directed. Just like there can be no aesthetic judgment 
without the very “I” pronouncing it. 
This status of the object is not least interesting in connection with the 
so-called de-objectualization of art in our times, the fact that an artwork 
may be just a situation, may be something completely unmanufactured, or 
even objectually simply absent. The aesthetic judgment may, in these cases 
(as noted by Thierry De Duve22), be transformed more in the direction of an 
assessment of whether or not the (non-)object in question belongs to “art”. 
The mechanism however, appears to be basically the same. 
Would such a concept be useful and functional outside art as well? Are 
21 A thorough discussion of this would take us too far in this connection. See Morten Kyndrup 
2008, 92ff. 
22 Thierry de Duve. 1996, 301ff.
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that kind of relations to be found empirically in our dealings with objects 
outside the area of art too? 
The answer is affirmative. Relations outside art are not completely 
similar to the artwork-oriented ones, the distinct area of art guarantees a 
kind of double autonomy. The similarities, however, are more significant 
than the differences: objects of perception, from say design, do call for 
similar relations in our dealings with them. We are quite easily able to 
separate the aesthetic value of objects from their utility value (or their 
financial value) – even in cases of obvious contradiction. We may actually 
buy a beautiful car, although we know that technically it is very bad. To 
an exponentially increasing degree, the world of objects surrounding us 
is actually produced (“designed”) directly in order to engender aesthetic 
relations and, consequently, judgments of taste. This is what we call 
the general aestheticization.23 However, this extension is not just true 
concerning actual artefacts. Landscapes, scenic beauty, sunsets, are also 
still evoking relations, and consequently, calling for aesthetic judgments 
of this type. In those relations, nature is perceived as exactly “addressing” 
me, and its beauty as being there for-me. Apropos nature and landscape, 
our physical surroundings are also in general to an increasing degree being 
designed, being created in order to establish calculated “meetings”, definite 
produced ‘addressednesses’ in relation to us. Here as well, aesthetic analysis 
based on the act of enunciation may be helpful. 
There is, however, a lower limit to when relations may be called 
aesthetic, held up against other kinds of preferences in our dealings 
with things. Reflexivity might be a criterion, not only do I enter into this 
assessment for-me, I also see myself as the one doing this here and now.
Relations, which might be labelled as aesthetic in this sense, thus 
undoubtedly do exist also outside art. So there is a distinct need for a 
concept like that and not least for an associated analytics as well.
Aesthetic value and aesthetic relations inside and outside the area of 
art are not totally alike, though. They appear similar in terms of structure, 
mode of unfolding, and not least exactly in their explicit “purposelessness”. 
However, as said, the autonomy of art constitutes a further guarantee of the 
23 See Morten Kyndrup 2016, 419–438.
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distance between its aesthetic value and the ordinary rules of conduct of 
our world. On that background, will a broader concept of aesthetics entail 
a risk of flattening out the aesthetic value of art? Perhaps even to a serious 
weakening of the position? After all, distinct approaches and values are 
drawn into a community of things and objects that has been made with 
completely different intentions than those of the artworks, which, as we 
know, have no intentions beyond themselves.
This of course is a relevant question, and especially within the 
continental aesthetic tradition there has been reactions of consternation 
against and protest towards such a profane or secular, broader conception 
of the aesthetic. Admittedly, there may be reasons for those kinds of worries. 
On the other hand, we should not exaggerate. First of all, as stated above, 
what is at stake is the installing of a concept of the aesthetic into the very 
position that it already held during the initial separation of the production 
of art from the reception of art. That separation was one of the possibility 
conditions of even developing the autonomy of art in a modern sense. 
Contrary to being extraneous to the constitutive basis of art, this concept 
is thus actually part of its original possibility conditions. Secondly, the art 
system today has such institutionally strong boundaries that it appears as 
being anything but threatened in its particularity.
Finally, the intention with a broader concept of aesthetics is not to 
cancel the general reflection over the constitution and unfolding of art – a 
reflection, which in certain traditions has taken place under the disciplinary 
headline of aesthetics. If so, such reflection of course would be missing. But 
instead we might choose to call it what it is: theory of art. By that, we might 
also bridge the gap between the perspectives and results of philosophy and 
the art sciences, respectively.
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MODERN?
Were we ever Modern? Are we ever going to become Modern? Is the notion of a Modern space of signification in fact just a suppressive effort to establish order, to clean up the mess of 
mixed forms and contingencies, i.e. a project about power, as Bruno Latour 
apparently believes in his critique?
There is a difference between criticizing certain paradigms of under-
standing, the way Latour does it, and rejecting the entire basic notion about a 
self-secularizing, immanent, mundane modern space – a space in which we 
are unconditionally thrown back on ourselves, and in which meticulously 
differentiated systems of understanding are matching a still higher societal 
division of labour, at all levels. We are beyond any doubt part of a Modern 
like that. Without differentiations and division of labour within this space, 
our material wealth had never developed the way it has. The space includes 
science, politics, religion, justice – and art, among others.
The separation of “art” from the “arts” of the Middle Ages, the 
distinction between the material production of art from the perception 
of art, the creation of substantially different ways, by which we can relate 
to our world: all this is part of the Modern. The differentiation as a whole 
of course makes our lives complicated. It forces us into constantly making 
specific choices as individuals. We may freely choose to acknowledge a 
work of art as a cognitive contribution to our understanding of the world; 
as a political statement about how the world should be; as a document 
of illuminating an individual experience of life. Or aesthetically, as a 
produced artefact which in its own right, in itself, for me, is of a distinctive 
value. In some sense, any work will of course be all of this at the same 
time as well, but our very capability of distinguishing, by means of 
differentiated systems of understanding, should basically be conceived 
of – not as a problem, but rather as a privilege. This privilege makes it 
possible for us to appreciate a work of art as outstandingly good, even 
if we deeply disagree with e.g. its political attitude, its moral stance, or 
maybe its evidently false statement about the world. The differentiation 
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provides us, both as individuals and on a societal level, with the possibility 
of negotiating the meaning of phenomena, and to negotiate not just as 
an either-or, but also as a both-and, leading to possible assignments of 
endlessly complex character as well.
Yet, this possibility and this privilege include a commitment as well, 
because our space of meaning is a joint condition. For one thing, we 
have a commitment to acting communicatively distinct among these 
differentiations and to taking seriously their framings and the negotiation 
as such. But we also have a commitment to approaching critically the 
framings themselves. Are they productive? What are their capabilities? Are 
they keeping us locked up in obsolete conflations with implied resistance 
against taking the differences and their perspectives seriously, thus blocking 
up exchange and development? In the Modern space of signification, 
everything is potentially subject to negotiation. But obviously, we do not 
choose our own world individually; it is created and populated by human 
beings, it is modelled, and it is under constant change. But still, it exists as a 
historically produced condition.
Bruno Latour is right in criticising a system of understanding, which 
he finds narrow and inadequate. That we have never ever been Modern, 
however, is only partly true. The entire modern times from the Renaissance 
and up through the Enlightenment and the establishing of the societies 
we know today, may perhaps most precisely be characterised as a constant 
becoming-modern through a process of permanently increasing divisions 
of labour and self-motivated differentiations. Still, admittedly, also with 
insistently visible lacunas or even overtly anti-modern approaches and 
backlashes in all spheres, religiously, politically, and socially. The Modern, 
in the sense in which we understand it here, is an ongoing process and it will 
never ever be completed or concluded (or for that matter “surpassed”24). On 
the other hand, though, the separation of forms and levels of understanding 
within the individual and the societal spheres cannot be rolled back just like 
that. Individuals may one by one choose to see the whole world from e.g. a 
24 As it was proclaimed by post-Modern proponents, at some point. In this connection, ‘post- 
Modern’ should be understood as a critique of certain totalizing tendencies in the Modern, 
i.e. critique of Modernity.
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fundamentalist religious perspective (but may also choose to change their 
choice). One may choose to disregard the separation between art and the 
aesthetic, between production and reception, and thus e.g. choose to believe 
in a frictionless transition between the production and the signification of 
artefacts. But this does not change the fact that the societal systems overall 
support and reconfirm this separation, including those at the institutional 
levels (museums, the critique, the market). Specific shortcuts, however, are 
flourishing – also in the societal debate. Like for instance, when someone 
proclaims that white artists should no longer be allowed to make use of 
topics concerning a black tradition, because this would be a violation of the 
historically suppressed people of this tradition. Or like when a heterosexual 
cis-gendered actress cannot be allowed to play a movie character as 
transgendered, also here because this would potentially violate the actual 
trans-gendered persons by marginalising their proper experiences.25 There 
are good reasons for criticising that kind of conflations, not only based on 
individual disagreement, but also more generally by pointing out their 
implied contradictions and their anti-modern perspectives.
So we are, by all means, Modern indeed, or: we are situated helplessly 
in a permanent state of becoming-modern. This also applies to science, 
including art science and aesthetics. Also here, Modern means to take 
on ourselves this condition. We could be better at that. Among other 
things by more precisely, more distinctively taking into account the 
supreme framings of the space of science to which we belong. And in that 
connection, in particular by critically addressing all kinds of non-modern 
fundamentalism – including those in the landscape of theories.
25 See Artnet News. Summer 2018. “Dana Schutz’s Painting of Emmett Till at Whitney 
Biennial Sparks Protest.” https://news.artnet.com/art-world/dana-schutz-painting-emmett-
till-whitney-biennial-protest-897929 about the protests against Dana Schutz’s painting. The 
actress in question was Scarlett Johansson.
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Lars-OLOf ÅhLberg 
EVERYDAY AND OTHERWORLDLY OBJECTS: 
DANTOESQUE TRANSFIGURATION
ABSTRACT
Arthur Danto’s treatise The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A 
Philosophy of Art (1981) is one of the most influential contributions to the 
philosophy of art in the past thirty years. “Transfiguration” in the title 
of Danto’s treatise refers to the biblical notion of transfiguration. This 
notion, while not just employed as a vague metaphor, has theoretical 
and explanatory import in Danto’s theory. Danto invokes the notion 
of transfiguration in explaining how an ordinary everyday object such 
as the commercial Brillo box can attain arthood and become Warhol’s 
Brillo Box, which is ontologically radically distinct from its non-artistic 
counterpart. The essay argues that transfiguration is an inept and 
misleading metaphor for explaining the attainment of arthood. The 
theological notion of transubstantiation and the liturgical practice of 
consecration would have provided somewhat more adequate analogies. 
“To see something as art requires something the eye cannot decry”
Arthur Danto 1964
“With me, what you see is what you get”
Tracey Emin 2002
“Words might bless everything”
Graham Swift 2016 
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I 
INTRODUCTION
 
T he Transfiguration of the Commonplace is generally recognized as “one of the most important works of philosophical aesthetics of the twentieth century”, Hans Maes and Kalle Puolakka note 
in their presentation of Danto’s treatise (Maes and Puolakka 2012, 161). 
Danto’s trilogy, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (1981), After the End 
of Art (1997) and The Abuse of Beauty (2003), is according to them,“one of 
the most ambitious philosophical accounts of art within any strand of 
contemporary aesthetics”, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace offering 
“a general philosophical theory of art” (Maes and Puolakka 2012, 164). True, 
Danto claims to offer a general philosophy of art, including an essentialist 
definition of art, but it would be more correct, it seems to me, to say that 
what he offers is an account of a particular and peculiar state in the visual 
artworld, which by no means is to be identified with the artworld as such, 
or with art in general. Hans Maes exaggerates when he claims that Danto in 
The Transfiguration of the Commonplace manages to make “a game-changing 
contribution” to the debates about art (Maes 2017, 49); it is true, however, 
that Danto’s philosophy of art is admired by many and is regarded as a major 
contribution to contemporary philosophy of art. Paul Guyer, for example, 
devotes considerable space to Danto’s philosophy of art in his magisterial 
history of modern aesthetics, A History of Modern Aesthetics (2014). 
 
II 
TRANSFIGURING THE BRILLO BOX
T he Transfiguration of the Commonplace, was, Danto admits, in a sense a celebration of Pop art, which he interpreted as “a transfiguration of the commonplace”, Warhol’s Brillo Box being “Brillo box 
transfigured”. Pop art, he claims, “was the transfiguration of the everyday 
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world” (Danto 2013e, 668). Clearly, the notion of transfiguration plays an 
important role in his account of art although it does not enter his definition 
of works of art as symbolic expression embodying their meanings (Danto 
1992, 41). Transfiguration has, however, a role to play in constituting an 
object as a work of art. An object is, he says, a work of art only under 
an interpretation, where the interpretation is a “sort of function that 
transfigures” the mere thing into a work (Danto 1981, 125).
Warhol’s Brillo Box has been important to Danto’s philosophy in a way 
that Duchamp’s readymades never were because “[i]t entered my life and 
thought and transformed them both”, as he explains (Danto 2012, 309). 
The Transfiguration of the Commonplace is the record of such an existential 
encounter with art. He appropriated the title from Muriel Spark’s novel, 
The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (1961), where one of the characters, Sandy 
Stranger, who becomes Sister Helen of the Transfiguration, wrote “an odd 
psychological treatise on moral perception”, entitled “The Transfiguration 
of the Commonplace” (Spark [1961] 2000, 35). Danto’s “revelatory moment 
in art” came when he went to the Stable Gallery on Manhattan in 1964 
and saw Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box (1964). Here was, at last, he says, “a 
philosophical question raised from within the art world” (Danto 1994, 6), 
that is, the question as to why Warhol’s Brillo Box is a work of art whereas 
a Brillo box in the supermarket isn’t. The answer, Danto claims, cannot be 
in terms of the perceptual properties of the Brillo Box in the gallery and 
the Brillo box in the supermarket. The eye, says Danto, “is incapable of 
determining the answer to this question” (Danto 1994, 6). The eye is of no 
value whatever, he says, when it comes to distinguishing art from non-art. 
If the Brillo Box is a work of art, it is a work of art in virtue of the prevailing 
theories and opinions in the artworld, the artworld being “an atmosphere 
of theory and of historical beliefs, relative to which things get constituted 
artworks” (Danto 1994, 7). 
What is so special about Warhol’s Brillo Box that so fascinated and 
impressed him, and what is the challenge to the philosophy of art 
that it presents? Warhol painted stacks of plywood boxes to resemble 
the cardboard cartons of Brillo scouring pads. The Warhol Brillo Box 
resembled the commercial Brillo box, but was not as Danto noted in his 
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original article, “The Artworld” (1964, 580), totally indiscernible from the 
commercial Brillo box. Warhol’s box(es) had been silk-screened by hand 
whereas the text on the ordinary boxes had been machine printed. A 
closer look at Warhol’s box and the commercial ones designed by the artist 
James Harvey would have revealed these minute differences between them. 
Danto’s point, however, is that the art status of the Warhol box is not due to 
any perceptible differences between his Brillo Box and the ordinary Brillo 
box. The commercial boxes could have been made out of plywood, and 
Warhol could have made his box out of cardboard without the Brillo Box 
ceasing to be art, Danto claims. The more general point is, that a definition 
of art in Danto’s view cannot be based on any perceptible properties of the 
works, but rather on certain relational and contextual properties. Danto’s 
discussion of perceptual properties seems, however, to privilege the visual 
arts, and casts doubt on the generality of his conception and his definition 
of art (Carrier 2012, 236).What are the perceptual properties of literature 
and architecture, we may well ask? 
Danto’s many critics and commentators have discussed and argued 
about most aspects of Danto’s philosophy of art offering thorough and 
thoughtful criticisms of his views, but very few have treated Danto’s notion of 
transfiguration at length. Several conferences and collections of essays have 
been devoted to Danto’s philosophy of art (Haapala et al. 1997; Carrier 1998), 
and more recently, Danto and his Critics (Rollins 2012) and The Philosophy of 
Arthur C. Danto (Auxier and Hahn 2013). The surprising thing is, given that 
practically every aspect of Danto’s philosophy of art has been examined, 
nobody, or, almost nobody, has questioned the adequacy and relevance 
of Danto’s notion of transfiguration and its use as a metaphor in regard to 
art. The only exceptions are to my knowledge two essays by Christel Fricke 
(one co-authored with Steinar Mathisen) in rather inaccessible publications 
(Fricke and Mathisen 2008 and 2010; Fricke 2008/9), and the present essay. 
The very title, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, of Danto’s first 
book in the philosophy of art, suggests according to Robert Solomon and 
Kathleen Higgins, “the centrality of religious images” in his philosophy of 
art. “Terms and concepts from theology”, they claim, “are also central to 
Danto’s account [of art]” (Solomon and Higgins 2012, 182), likewise Richard 
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Shusterman, who claims that “the metaphor of art as transfiguration” 
is of central importance in Danto’s philosophy of art (2012, 252). Danto 
declares himself a totally non-religious person, although he believes that 
“the concepts that come out of religion are just astonishing” (Maes 2017, 
78); apparently he has in particular the biblical notion of transfiguration 
in mind. Many critics take, like Maes in his interview with Danto, his talk 
of transfiguration at face value, for Maes claims that Tracey Emin and Carl 
Andre “are still transfiguring commonplace objects into art” (Maes 2017, 72). 
In his “Replies to Essays”, in Danto and his Critics, Danto underlines that 
he has been impressed by the extraordinary degree to which Christianity 
is imbued by the most abstruse kind of essentialist Greek metaphysics. He 
finds the fusion of “Greek essentialist metaphysics and Jewish historicism” 
irresistible and apparently of great value not only in the philosophy of art 
(Danto 2012, 310). 
The title of Danto’s first book in the philosophy of art, The Transfiguration 
of the Commonplace, is indeed catchy and suggestive as everyone interested 
in contemporary philosophy of art knows about the book, but very few 
realize the import of the term “transfiguration”. 
III 
TRANSFIGURATION VERSUS TRANSUBSTANTATION
 
Danto has appropriated, he says, the term “transfiguration” for forging his notion of the transfiguration of the commonplace, his use of “liturgical language is a façon de parler”(Danto 2012, 309). 
But talk of the transfiguration is hardly liturgical, but rather biblical. But 
what is the role of transfiguration in Danto’s theory of art and what does it 
mean? Let me begin with a quote from his seminal essay “The Artworld” 
(1964). Is the world full of “latent artworks waiting, like the bread and 
wine of reality, to be transfigured, through some dark mystery, into the 
indiscernible flesh and blood of the sacrament?”, he asks (Danto, 1964, 580–
1). His point is that the original, ordinary Brillo box, which was designed 
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by the abstract expressionist painter commercial artist James Harvey as 
a container for soap pads has a “transfigured” and all but indiscernible 
counterpart, Warhol’s Brillo Box, which is a work of art, a transfigured Brillo 
box. In The Transfiguration of the Commonplace and later writings Danto 
explicitly refers to the biblical narrative of Jesus’ transfiguration as a model 
for artistic transfiguration. 
It is, however, abundantly clear that “transfiguration” in the biblical 
narrative means a change in visible appearance, it is not a question of 
two perceptually indiscernible persons. Jesus of Nazareth and the Christ 
is the same person whose face and clothes underwent a perceptible 
change, referred to as “the transfiguration” in St. Matthew and St. Mark. 
In the gospel of St. Matthew it says that Jesus’ “face shone like the sun, 
and his clothes became white as the light”(Matt. 17: 2–3), similarly in Mark 
9:3 his clothes became “dazzling white”, and St. Luke writes that “the 
appearance of his face changed and his clothes became dazzling white” 
(Luke 9: 29–30). Danto refers explicitly to this passage in St. Luke as a 
narration of “the original transfiguration” (Danto 1981, vi), although the 
term “transfigured” occurs only in St. Matthew and St. Mark. The Latin in 
the first two places has “transfiguratus est”, and the Greek “metemorfothe”, 
from “metamorfoo”, to transform. The Oxford English Dictionary lists 
under “transfiguration”, “[t]he action of transfiguring or state of being 
transfigured; metamorphosis” and “[t]he change in the appearance of 
Jesus Christ on the mountain”; “Transfiguration” refers more generally to 
a change in the outward appearance of something as well as the Church 
festival commemorating the transfiguration of Christ. Similarly the general 
meaning of the verb “to transfigure” is to change or transform the outer 
appearance of something. The biblical as well as the non-biblical figurative 
use of the notion of transfiguration does not imply a fundamental change 
in the nature or the substance of something; it does not suggest a change 
in ontological status. What the biblical narrative suggests is that the 
three privileged disciples, Peter, James and John, received, as it were, a 
visual confirmation of Jesus’ divinity, in particular since a voice from high 
proclaimed him to be his Son (Matt. 17:5 , Mark 9:8, Luke 9:35). According 
to common Christian belief Christ’s transfiguration is a confirmation of his 
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divinity, the “dazzling brightness which emanated from His whole Body 
was produced by an interior shining of His Divinity”, as one theologian puts 
it (Meistermann 1912). According to orthodox Christianity Jesus was the 
Son of God, the Second Person in the Trinity, from the beginning of time, 
quite apart from the transfiguration. Whereas transfiguration is in a sense 
accidental and instantaneous, transubstantiation is not: “Thus from the 
concept of Transubstantiation is excluded every sort of merely accidental 
conversion, whether it be purely natural (e.g. the metamorphosis of insects) 
or supernatural (e.g. the Transfiguration of Christ on Mount Tabor)” (Pohle 
1909).
 If one believes that the notion of transfiguration provides an apt analogy 
for the change in ontological status between an ordinary everyday object 
and its perceptually indiscernible artistic counterpart, one should note the 
following disanalogies. Even if an ordinary object acquires, by being taken 
up in the artworld, new contextual and relational properties, e.g. being a 
certain kind of work of art, making a statement, referring to something, 
being about something, being commented on by art critics, being seen as 
witty or provocative, giving rise to debates about the definition of art, there 
is no change in its perceptual properties (Davies 1991, 66–69). And that, of 
course, is the starting point for Danto’s analysis. Transfiguration in Danto’s 
analysis does not affect the perceivable properties of the objects in question, 
but by transforming their ontological status they acquire properties their 
untransfigured counterparts lack. For Danto it is a question of ontological 
change, not of “transfiguration”, taken in its biblical and ordinary sense. 
Now, it might be said that the notion of transfiguration can be used in new 
untraditional ways, but that is not the case with Danto since he explicitly 
refers to, and relies on the biblical notion of transfiguration. Danto’s talk of 
“the transfiguration of the commonplace” is not just misleading, as Christel 
Fricke and Steinar Mathisen have pointed out (Fricke and Mathisen 2008 
& 2010), it is based on a rather elementary confusion between the biblical 
notion of transfiguration and the theological concept of transubstantiation. 
In The Transfiguration of the Commonplace Danto claims that to learn that 
something is a work of art “means that it has qualities to attend to which 
its untransfigured counterpart lacks”, consequently our responses will 
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be different; “this is not institutional, it is ontological”, he claims as if 
transfiguration could affect the ontological status of something (Danto 1981, 
99). 
Danto’s confusion about transfiguration and his conflation of the notion 
of transfiguration with transubstantiation is apparent already in his essay 
“The Artworld”, as can be seen from the passage already quoted (Danto 
1964, 580–1). What happens in the sacrament of the Eucharist (the Last 
Supper) according to Catholic theology is that “by the consecration of the 
bread and wine there takes place a change of the whole substance of the 
bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the whole 
substance of the wine into the substance of his blood. This change the 
holy Catholic Church has fittingly and properly called transubstantiation” 
(Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1376). Now the appearance of the wafer 
that becomes the hostia and thus the body of Christ and the appearance of 
the wine that becomes the blood of Christ through transubstantiation does 
not change, there is no change in their visible properties, in other words, 
they are not transfigured. 
The transubtantiated elements of the sacrament have, of course, as do 
Danto’s “transfigured” works of art, other properties than their untran-
substantiated and “untransfigured” counterparts. That tran substantiation 
has occurred cannot be perceived by the senses, it is, to use Danto’s phrase 
about the art status of an everyday “transfigured” object — “something 
the eye cannot decry” (Danto 1964, 580), or, as Thomas Aquinas puts it 
regarding the Eucharist: “That in this sacrament are the true Body of 
Christ and his true Blood” is something “that cannot be apprehended by 
the senses”, it can be apprehended “only by faith, which relies on divine 
authority” (Aquinas, Summa theologica, III, 75, 1). Perhaps the recognition 
of an everyday object as a work of art does not require faith, but belief in 
Dantoesque transfiguration; one critic has, however, argued that Danto 
needs a leap of faith in his approach to art, a mysterious “transfiguration” 
for his theory to work (Rougé 2013, 296). Be that as it may, Danto’s view 
requires us to accept that artistic theory and artistic interpretation have 
transfiguring powers in turning ordinary objects into works of art (Danto 
1986, 44). Yet, in transfiguration something remains the same in essence 
49
but not in appearance and in transubstantiation something remains the 
same in appearance but not in essence. The metaphor of transfiguration in 
regard to art is thus an infelicitous and misleading metaphor. 
In After the End of Art (1997) Danto claims that it is characteristic of 
pop art as such that it transfigures “emblems from popular culture into 
high art”, Warhol “transfigured” according to Danto Marilyn Monroe 
“into an icon” (Danto 1997, 128). There may be some truth in this if we 
take “transfigured” in the second, and wholly figurative sense listed in the 
Oxford English Dictionary. “To transfigure” in a figurative sense means 
“[t]o elevate, glorify, idealize, spiritualize”. Warhol’s silkscreen paintings 
of Marilyn Monroe have a certain lustre that the original photograph 
they are based on lack, she is thus glorified or idealized, elevated into 
an icon. Warhol’s Brillo Boxes, however, are not transfigured in this 
sense. That would have been the case had he painted the Brillo Boxes in 
fluorescent colours, or in brighter colours than the original colours of 
the commercial Brillo boxes, but he didn’t. The commercial Brillo boxes 
and Warhol’s art boxes look (almost) the same, whereas the photograph 
of Marilyn Monroe is markedly different from Warhol’s triptych. In 
any case, transfigurativeness is for Danto a fundamental characteristic 
of pop art. He then goes on to explain what transfiguration means; it 
is a religious concept, he says, it means “the adoration of the ordinary, 
as, in its original appearance, in the Gospel of Saint Matthew it meant 
adoring a man as a god” (Danto 1997, 128–9). This is actually one of the 
very few places where Danto explains what he means by “transfiguration” 
— according to the index this is even a definition of transfiguration. 
Many things have gone wrong here. In the first place, the notion of 
transfiguration is above all a biblical one, not a common religious notion; 
what is more serious, the biblical notion of transfiguration has nothing 
to do with adoration of the ordinary, in fact, it has nothing to do with 
adoration at all. The three disciples present at the transfiguration on the 
mount did not adore “a man as a god”, they didn’t adore anybody at all; 
according to the biblical narrative they were in fact terrified during the 
transfiguration (Matt. 17: 6–7). It is, however, true that they later adored 
Jesus as the Christ, that is, as the Son of God; from a secular and non-
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Christian point of view one may of course say that they actually adored a 
man as a god, but adoring Jesus as the Christ, or, adoring the man Jesus 
of Nazareth as a god has nothing to do with the transfiguration. Danto 
has commented on Raphael’s Transfiguration on several occasions (Danto 
1964, 573; Danto, 2003, 89; Danto 2013b, 164; Danto, 2013d, 254). A closer 
look at that painting might have put Danto on the right track, for in the 
Transfiguration it is there for everybody to see — at least if one knows the 
biblical narrative of the transfiguration — that Christ is represented as 
having been temporarily transfigured. Biblical transfiguration is transient 
whereas Dantoesque transfiguration is permanent; also in this respect 
transubstantiation shows more affinities with the conversion of ordinary 
things into artworks, although transubstantiation is not an altogether 
felicitous metaphor, as I shall argue below (section VI). 
IV 
BAPTISM VERSUS CONSECRATION
Clearly transfiguration is the dominant religious metaphor that informs Danto’s theory of art. In one place he also employs baptism as a metaphor when speaking of interpretation as a transformative 
procedure bestowing a new identity on an object. The ordinary thing 
which has been taken up in the artworld is like the baptizand taken up in 
“the community of the elect”. Danto speaks here of a “religious analogy” 
which will deepen as the analysis proceeds (Danto 1981, 126), yet he does 
not return, as far as I remember, to this supposed analogy. Solomon and 
Higgins claim that Danto describes the “‘is’ of aesthetic identification on 
the model of baptism” (Solomon and Higgins 2012, 182), which is not quite 
accurate, for it is rather interpretation as “a transformative procedure” that 
he likens to baptism which bestows a new identity on an object. When a 
“transformative procedure”, consisting of what Danto dubs “constitutive 
interpretation” (Danto 1986, 39–46; Danto 2013c, 187–189), has been 
performed something becomes a work of art, constitutive interpretation 
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being “transfigurative”, transforming objects into works of art (Danto 
1986, 44). Now this transformation, which in Danto’s view is analogous 
to baptism, “depends upon the ‘is’ of artistic identification” (Danto 1986, 
44–45). It seems therefore that there must first be “artistic identification” 
and then constitutive interpretation which transfigures (Danto’s term) the 
object in question into a work of art (Danto 1986, 41–42); therefore Solomon 
and Higgins seem to be confused about the relation between interpretation 
and artistic identification in Danto’s theory. If so, that is perhaps not their 
fault since Danto’s pronouncements on the matter are far from clear, and 
may even be contradictory. Danto actually admits that he has not expressed 
himself very clearly about the notion of interpretation and its role in his 
theory (Danto 2013c, 187); this admission, however, does not concern 
the relation between constitutive interpretation and the “is” of artistic 
identification, which to my mind is obscure. Be that as it may, Solomon 
and Higgins should not talk about “aesthetic identification” when Danto 
speaks of “artistic identification” since there is in Danto’s thinking a radical 
difference between the artistic and the aesthetic, these terms not being 
synonymous for him (Danto 1986, 30–31; Danto 2003,1–15; Danto 2013a, 
47). Solomon and Higgins also perpetuate Danto’s confusions concerning 
transfiguration and transubstantiation, for they believe that “Danto’s image 
of the artwork as [. . .] something that is transformed by means of theory, 
also recalls the doctrine of transubstantiation” (Solomon and Higgins 
2012, 182). But Danto does not speak of transubstantiation here, objects are 
transfigured by theory and constitutive interpretation: “Interpretation in 
my sense is transfigurative” (Danto 1986, 44). Danto never says that a theory 
or constitutive interpretation affects the transubstantiation of anything. 
As we have seen that is the role of transfiguration in his philosophy of art. 
Solomon and Higgins know full well that theory has a transfigurative role 
in Danto’s theory (Solomon and Higgins 2012, 182), so why bring up the 
question of transubstantiation without considering the difference between 
transfiguration and transubstantiation? Since Danto wishes to use religious 
and theological language in analysing and explaining the arthood of works 
of art, he would have done better to ponder the possible relevance of the 
metaphor of transubstantiation for his endeavour. Incidentally baptism as a 
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metaphor may, in fact, be more apt than any other religious and theological 
concept. For “[b]aptism imprints on the soul an indelible spiritual sign, the 
character, which consecrates the baptized person for Christian worship” 
(Catechism of the Catholic Church § 1280), without changing the person’s 
outer appearance. In Dantoesque transfiguration an ordinary object 
is imprinted with an invisible and indelible spiritual sign, the sign of 
arthood. Danto has appropriated, as he puts it, the term “transfiguration” 
for forging his notion of the transfiguration of the commonplace, his use 
of “liturgical language is a façon de parler” (Danto 2012, 309). Well, the Feast 
of the Transfiguration is celebrated in most Christian churches, but talk 
of the transfiguration is not liturgical, in contrast to words of consecration 
in rituals of consecration. Also Danto’s references to the transfiguration 
amount to much more than a façon de parler, it has an important theoretical 
role to play in his theory of art. The important point, however, is that the 
uses of metaphors and analogies can be misleading, and even wrong, 
if they are based on weak or non-existing analogies, and that is the case 
with Danto’s discourse on the transfiguration of the commonplace. The 
Catholic notion and practice of consecrating images would have provided 
a more apt analogy. According to the Rituale Romanum (XI, ch. VII, § 16) an 
altarpiece has to be consecrated before it merits veneration and becomes 
capable of channelling the intercessory powers of the represented figures 
in the painting or sculpture. There is thus a necessary relation between 
the consecration and the effectiveness of an image. Whereas a religious 
image is consecrated by a bishop sprinkling it with holy water, perhaps an 
ordinary everyday object or a pop image is elevated into the Realm of Art 
by being sprinkled with artistic and philosophical theory. The consecration 
of pictures and sculptures is an ancient practice in all cultures (Freedberg 
1989, ch. 5). It is only in the fifteenth century in Western Europe that 
paintings and sculptures gradually became de-sacralized assuming new 
personal, social, political and “aesthetic” functions (Belting [1990] 1994). 
Danto’s theory of art is in a sense a secularized version of religious rituals 
of consecration. 
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V 
“IMMANENT TRANSFIGURATION” AND AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
Richard Shusterman is one of the few critics who has taken Danto’s use of religious language seriously. His contribution to Danto and His Hritics is tellingly entitled “Art as Religion: Transfigurations of 
Danto’s Dao”. There is, he claims, a “profoundly transcendental tonality” 
in Danto’s philosophical discourse, the “metaphor of art as transfiguration” 
being of central importance (Shusterman 2012, 252). It is of course true that 
the term “transfiguration” occurs in several texts by Danto and although it 
does not form part of his definition of art, it is easy to get the impression that 
for anything to be art it must have undergone some kind of transfiguration. 
Be that as it may, as regards Warhol’s Brillo Box, Danto’s thought seems to be 
that the box becomes art by being transfigured, and this is also Shusterman’s 
interpretation of Danto’s “transfiguration”, since he attributes to Danto the 
view that common cultural objects are transfigured into “otherworldiness, 
that is, artworldiness” (Shusterman 2012, 255). Shusterman speaks here 
of Warhol’s Brillo Box as Danto’s “inspirational icon of miraculous artistic 
transfiguration — in terms of the Catholic mystery of transubstantiation” 
(Shusterman 2012, 253), thus repeating Danto’s confusion in the “Artworld”. 
The Catholic dogma of transubstantiation does not mean that the 
elements in the Eucharist are transfigured, nor does the transfiguration 
on the mount to which both Danto and Shusterman allude imply 
ontological transubstantiation. Nor is it correct to speak of the “Catholic 
transcendentalism of Danto’s transfiguration theory” (Shusterman 2012, 
255), since transfiguration is not a specifically Catholic notion; it is a biblical 
notion and belief in Christ’s transfiguration is a common Christian belief. 
If one wishes to speak of Catholicism in this context, one should speak of 
the specifically Catholic dogma of transubstantiation and its purported 
relevance for Danto’s conception of art. Nor do I believe, as Shusterman 
does, that the discourse of Danto’s art theory is “distinctively theological” 
(Shusterman 2012, 257); what we find in Danto’s text is an indistinct and 
misleading use of the biblical notion of transfiguration. 
54
It is not surprising that Shusterman as a pragmatist, is critical of the 
“otherworldly dimension of [Danto’s] aesthetics”, which he believes 
to be “deeply Christian” (Shusterman 2012, 254). To claim that Danto’s 
philosophy of art — Danto himself avoids using the term “aesthetics” — is 
deeply Christian seems to me to be an overinterpretation of his views. It 
is, however, true that there is in a sense an otherworldly character to his 
approach to art, for he posits an unbridgeable ontological gap between 
real things and works of art, between the real world and the artworld. 
Although critical of Danto’s “transfiguration”, Shusterman himself speaks 
of “immanent transfiguration”, but in a non-art context (Shusterman 2012, 
260, 262). He recalls an experience of immanent transfiguration, which he 
underwent while engaging in Zen meditation; he fixed his contemplation 
on the beautiful sea, but after losing his concentration he turned his 
glance on some rusty barrels, which “suddenly transfigured into a vision 
of breathtaking beauty” (Shusterman 2012, 264). It was the overwhelming 
presence of the objects that he saw as it were for the first time that impressed 
him. Shusterman recalls that he himself felt transfigured without either the 
barrels or himself having undergone ontological change. The metaphor is 
apt in so far as the original biblical notion of transfiguration does not imply 
ontological change, as Shusterman seems to suppose. He could, equally 
well, or better, have talked about a transforming experience. There are 
to be sure such life-enhancing, even life-changing experiences to be had 
not only in our encounter with art, but also with natural phenomena, and 
perhaps even with plain everyday objects. As Nietzsche said, “bei tiefen 
Menschen dauern alle Erlebnisse lange”, “for deep persons experiences 
last long” (Nietzsche 1882). 
When some aspect of the world, or some particular object, as the case 
may be, suddenly appears in a timeless instant, out of context, by itself, 
as such as it were, without relating to other things, it can appear in a 
transfigured light. I am not suggesting that Shusterman’s experience and 
his account of his “transfiguring experience” was in any way inspired by 
Schopenhauer, it was as he said, evoked by Zen meditation. Nevertheless 
a “transfiguring experience” of the kind described by Shusterman is in 
some ways akin to Schopenhauerian aesthetic experience. Any object can, 
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in principle, give rise to this kind of disinterested, “objective” experience, 
Schopenhauer maintains, but it is the special office of art to facilitate this 
sort of contemplative, disinterested aesthetic experience (Schopenhauer 
[1819] 2010, § 37, 218). One becomes absorbed, Schopenhauer, says, “in 
a steady contemplation of the object presented, aside from its inter-
connections with any other object” (Schopenhauer [1819] 2010, § 34, 201).
VI 
BRILLO BOX VERSUS BRILLO BOX
Danto is obsessed with the so-called indiscernibility problem, the question as to why and how perceptually indiscernible objects can belong to completely different ontological realms. In regard 
to art it is “the Brillo Box/Brillo carton problem”, in Christianity it is, he 
says, “the Christ/Christ problem” — actually the Christ/Jesus problem — 
because to all outward appearances Jesus of Nazareth is a human being, but 
at the same time also the Christ, Christos, “the anointed one”. The difference 
between a human being and an incarnated god, Danto claims, is invisible, 
and Jesus’ divinity a matter of faith (Danto 2013f, 706).
Religious language, or, rather “religious description”, as Danto puts it, 
has had an “immense appeal” to him, particularly in discussing works of 
art, he confesses in a text written at the very end of his life. Here he again 
draws a parallel between transfiguration in religion and in art. “‘The 
transfiguration of the commonplace’”, is, “a transformation of an ordinary 
thing into a work of art”, and in religion (rather in Christianity) it is, “the 
moment when an ordinary human being is disclosed to his followers 
as a divine being” (Danto 2013f, 707). However, the analogy between the 
transfiguration of Christ in the biblical narrative and the transfiguration 
affecting Warhol’s Brillo Box limps badly. As regards the biblical 
transfiguration Danto claims that a human being is revealed — “disclosed” 
to his followers, as he puts it — as a divine being, whereas in the artistic 
case an ordinary thing is transfigured or transformed into a work of art; 
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but there is no question of an ordinary thing suddenly being “disclosed” 
as a work of art. That would be the case if Harvey’s commercial Brillo box 
were suddenly revealed to be a work of art, but the whole point of Danto’s 
theory is that there is a radical ontological difference between Harvey’s 
box and Warhol’s box. So, the Harvey box is certainly not transfigured, 
whereas the Warhol box, which is perceptually (almost) indiscernible 
from Harvey’s box, is. In the biblical narrative one and the same person, 
that is Jesus of Nazareth, appears first in an untransfigured state and then 
for a short instant in a transfigured state, whereas in the artistic case there 
are two objects, an ordinary untransfigured Brillo box and a Warhol’s 
Brillo Box, which has presumably been permanently transfigured into 
a work of art. Perhaps the most important disanalogy between biblical 
transfiguration and Dantoesqe transfiguration is this: transfiguration 
in the biblical case did not change Jesus’ ontological status, it did not 
transform a human being into a divine being, the transfiguration simply 
revealed him as the Son of God to three disciples, whereas in the artistic 
case the transfiguration is supposed to affect the ontological status of an 
object, transforming an everyday object into a work of art. I don’t think, 
however, that any transfiguration occurred in Warhol’s “Factory” when 
he had his Brillo Boxes made, for his boxes were not everyday things, they 
were just very similar to everyday objects, to wit, to Harvey’s commercial 
Brillo boxes. It seems to me that Warhol’s boxes were from the very 
beginning intended to be exhibited as works of art, and were perhaps 
works of art as soon as Warhol made them; if some sort of transfiguration 
took pace in Warhol’s workshop that would not in the least have affected 
the ontological status of the objects, since transfiguration in the biblical 
sense — and it is the biblical sense Danto relies on in his philosophy of 
art — reveals a previously acquired ontological status. 
In the text I have discussed above Danto offers a succinct summary 
of the role of transfiguration in his conception of art: “artworks are 
transfigured into a higher, sacred ontological realm wholly different 
from mere real things from which they may be visually or sensorily 
indiscernible” (Danto 2013f, 707). We should note that this is an exceedingly 
general claim about all works of art, or, perhaps it is intended to apply 
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only to works in the visual arts. In any case the overwhelming majority of 
his analyses and his examples are taken from visual art. As I have already 
remarked, it is not always easy to see whether Danto is speaking of art in 
general, of works of art in all artforms, or, whether he is thinking only of 
the visual arts. Leaving that question aside, I think it is not difficult to see 
that transfiguration cannot achieve what Danto claims it can, namely to 
transform the ontological status of a thing into a work of art. If there is a 
radical change in ontological status without a change in appearances — as 
is the case with indiscernibles belonging to different ontological categories 
— it is a question of transubstantiation. Danto’s conflation between 
transfiguration and transubstantiation runs through his whole œuvre. Now 
it might be said that I have taken Danto’s notion of transfiguration too 
literally, “transfiguration” after all being a metaphor in Danto’s texts. There 
is, according to The Oxford English Dictionary, a figurative sense of the verb 
“to transfigure”, it means “[t]o elevate, glorify, idealize, spiritualize”, and 
The Oxford English Dictionary of Difficult Words says that “transfiguration” 
refers to “a complete change of form or appearance into a more beautiful 
spiritual state” offering the following sample sentence: “in this light the junk 
undergoes a transfiguration; it shines”. Incidentally, this sentence has been 
used as a motto for an internet photo exhibition by the Indian photo artist 
Kunaal Bose (https://www.behance.net/gallery/19740427/transfiguration). 
Danto’s transfiguration, however, does not involve a change in appearance 
but in essence; after Dantoesque transfiguration a piece of junk does not 
begin to shine, it still looks like a piece of junk but is elevated to the spiritual 
category of art. 
What transfiguration achieves, according to Danto, is something that 
only the miracle of transubstantiation is capable of achieving. I have 
argued, and so have Fricke and Mathisen, that when Danto speaks of 
transfiguration he should have taken transubstantiation as a more apt 
metaphor for art. Yet, that does not seem to be quite right. Consider the 
following: in the biblical transfiguration Jesus is revealed to be what he was 
and is, the Christ; in Dantoesque artistic transfiguration something that 
was an ordinary thing is supposed to be transfigured into a work of art; but 
it is not the case that an ordinary thing is suddenly revealed to be a work 
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of art. There is thus no/Brillo Box/Brillo box, or, Warhol/Harvey problem 
as a parallel to the Christ/Jesus problem. Warhol did not, nor did anybody 
else, transfigure the Harvey box into a work of art. What Warhol did, it 
seems to me, was to represent a Harvey Brillo box, to produce an artistic 
representation of a Brillo box. He did not present an ordinary Harvey box to 
the artworld. The fact that a thing that looks almost identical to an ordinary 
thing can be a work of art has nothing to do with transfiguration, nor is the 
metaphor of transubstantiation strictly speaking apt, since Warhol did not 
consecrate an ordinary Harvey box by presenting it to the artworld, thereby 
affecting a transubstantiation of the ordinary box into a work of art. He 
presented a thing almost identical to the Harvey box as a work of art. But 
the Harvey box and the Warhol box were not numerically identical, they 
were just more or less perceptually indiscernible or qualitatively identical. 
In contrast to Warhol’s Brillo Box, which is not the real Brillo box, Duchamp 
presented a real bottle rack as a work of art; similarly Tracey Emin exhibited 
her real bed as My Bed as a work of art at the Tate Modern in 1998, the bed 
that was in her bedroom is numerically identical with the bed in the Tate 
Gallery. To use Danto’s terminology, one might say that there is the problem 
of Tracey Emin’s Bed/Tracey Emin’s bed, one and the same thing being an 
ordinary bed and a work of art. In one of his last texts, a reply to criticisms, 
Danto says, in relation to the transfiguration of Jesus that “[t]ransfiguration 
is metamorphoses [sic], a change of form — but the transfigured has to 
be recognizable” (Danto 2013d, 253), thereby recognizing that the notion 
of transfiguration presupposes that the transfigured person or thing is 
recognized as identical with the previously untransfigured person or thing. 
When in Strauss’ tone poem, Death and Transfiguration (1889), the dying 
poet is finally reconciled with his fate, his consciousness is “transfigured”, 
but he is still identical with the person with a previously untransfigured 
consciousness, and in Schoenberg’s string sextet, Transfigured Night (1899), 
later scored for string orchestra, the lovers are “transfigured” in forgiveness 
and reconciliation, but the whole point is that they are the same individuals 
previously unreconciled. When Danto claims, quite rightly, that the 
transfigured has to be recognized as the previously untransfigured, this 
claim seems to be in stark contradiction with his central thesis to the 
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effect that ordinary untransfigured objects are perceptually indiscernible 
from their transfigured counterparts. The Brillo box is not the Brillo Box. 
In mentioning Christ’s glowing face and blindingly white garments during 
the transfiguration, he adds somewhat curiously that “[i]t is possible to 
think that art has always been the transfiguration of its subject” (Danto 
2013d, 253). Curious, because now it is the subject, or theme, in a work of art 
that is being transfigured, not an untransfigured everyday object.  
VII 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Interestingly enough Danto actually foresaw in 1981 the possibility of Emin’s own bed being presented as a work of art. In discussing Rauschenberg’s and Oldenburg’s beds and their relationship to Plato’s 
bed in the Republic and to real beds, Danto fantasizes about the fictional 
artist J, who exhibited his own bed as a work of art thereby going the full 
distance in closing the gap between art and reality, as he puts it (Danto 
1981, 12–13). The artist J., says Danto, “constituted his bed as Bed and 
transfigured it into art” (Danto 1981, 133), but since the appearance of the 
bed would not have changed in the least, the metaphor of transfiguration 
is out of place. If J’s constitution of his bed as Bed had been successful 
his bed would have undergone a change in status; it would have been 
removed from the everyday world into the artworld, not by transfiguration 
but by being constituted by the artist, or the critics, or the theorists, as 
the case may be, as a work of art. As Tracey Emin put it, “This is my bed. 
If someone else installs it, it’s just dirty linen, if I do it, it’s art” (Evening 
Standard 12 September, 2000). 
It seems to me that the only transfiguration that occurred in regard to 
Warhol’s Brillo Box and Emin’s Bed is the transfiguration of the figures on the 
price tag on the materials of Warhol’s box and Emin’s bed. Warhol’s Brillo 
Box, signed by Warhol and authenticated by the Warhol authenticating 
board, was sold at Christie’s in New York in 2010 for over 3 million dollars 
60
(https://www.christies.com/lotfinder/Lot/andy-warhol-1928-1987-brillo-
box-3-5371695-details.aspx), and Emin’s My Bed, now on permanent loan 
at Tate Britain, was bought by a German businessman and art collector in 
2014 at Christie’s in London for over 2,5 million pounds (van de Walle 2017). 
“There is transfiguration for you”, as Humpty Dumpty might have said. 
I offer these reflections, which form part of a more extended farewell 
to Danto, as a tribute to Arto, wishing him success and satisfaction in 
investigating untransfigured aesthetic phenomena in the years to come. 
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marKus Lammenranta
HOW ART TEACHES: A LESSON FROM GOODMAN
ABSTRACT 
It is often thought that art teaches us and that we can learn from it. To 
learn that p is to come to know that p. So, art can teach us only if we can 
gain knowledge through art. How is this possible? Nelson Goodman 
tries to explain it by his theory of symbols. However, his theory just 
explains how works of art can refer to the world, and referring to the 
world is not enough for having knowledge about the world. Because 
knowledge is a matter of having true beliefs, in order to give us 
knowledge, works of art must say something that is true. It is argued 
that we can explain how they can do this, if we revise and supplement 
certain aspects of Goodman’s theory of symbols. Furthermore, we can 
even explain how our built and natural environment can teach us. 
INTRODUCTION
Artists typically think that they are doing research. They study the world and want to say something about it through their art. For example, in a recent documentary,1 Martin Scorsese was asked 
why Woody Allen has made so many movies. He answered: “Because he 
has so much to say.” One hears this sort of statement every day—even from 
abstract artists. They think they do research, study reality. If this is what 
artists do—if they say things through their art—then at least sometimes 
what they say is true, and we can know that it is true. So, art can teach us, 
and we can learn from it. We can attain knowledge through art.
Sometimes, philosophers seem to concur with this view, even 
enthusiastically, as Nelson Goodman does: 
1 Woody Allen: A Documentary – Manhattan, Movies & Me (2012), directed by Robert B. Weide.
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[T]he arts must be taken no less seriously than the sciences 
as modes of discovery, creation and enlargement of knowledge in 
the broad sense of advancement of the understanding. 
(Goodman 1978, 102.)
However, it is very difficult to explain how art can advance knowledge. 
For example, Goodman is forced to concede that it is not knowledge in its 
ordinary sense that he has in mind but understanding. I think we should 
not yet give up. Indeed, we can learn from Goodman how art can give us 
quite ordinary propositional knowledge if we make some changes in his 
view. 
Goodman’s attempt to explain how art can teach consists of three steps: 
The first is to explain how works of art can refer to the world, how they 
can work as symbols. Goodman does this in his influential book Languages 
of Art (1968). In this work, he provides a general theory of symbols and 
explains how works of art can refer in terms of it. It seems clear that they 
must refer to the world to give knowledge about it. 
He takes the second step in Ways of Worldmaking (1978), where he 
considers all uses of symbols—in art, science and everyday perceptions—
and argues that all our access to the world comes through the use of 
symbols, and that symbols are not devices for describing the world waiting 
to be discovered, but ways of making the worlds referred to. There is no 
ready-made world that exists independently of our ways of describing 
it. We make the world when we correctly describe it through symbols. 
Furthermore, because there are alternative and incompatible ways of doing 
this, there are many worlds if any, says Goodman. 
The third step, which he takes in his book with Catherine Elgin 
Reconceptions in Philosophy & Other Arts & Sciences (1988), is to replace our 
ordinary concept of knowledge with the broader concept of understanding. 
The problem with our ordinary concept of knowledge is that it applies 
only to declarative sentences that can be used to say something about the 
world, something that is true. The concept of understanding is supposed to 
cover also non-declarative uses of symbols—symbols that refer but do not 
say anything and therefore lack truth-value. So, because the scope of the 
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ordinary concept of knowledge is so narrow, we need the wider concept of 
understanding to explain the cognitive significance of all uses of symbols.
I think that the second and third steps are unnecessary, and it is best to 
avoid them. We can be realists and monists and believe that there is only 
one world that exists largely independently of us, and that art can give us 
knowledge about it in its quite ordinary sense. We can avoid these steps if 
we revise and supplement certain aspects of Goodman’s theory of symbols. 
I 
GOODMAN’S THEORY OF SYMBOLS: THE BASICS
Goodman’s theory has only two primitive (undefined) terms: “reference” and “denotation”. The term “symbol” is defined in terms of reference: 
A is a symbol for B if and only if A refers to B.2
An important type of reference is denotation. Denotation is illuminated 
by giving examples of it. The paradigm examples are singular terms and 
predicates of ordinary language: Proper name and singular term “Johnny 
Depp” denotes Johnny Depp. Predicate “tiger” denotes tigers. And predicate 
“red” denotes red things.
Goodman (1968, 3–19) argues that pictorial representation or depiction 
is a form of denotation. It is not a matter of resemblance or imitation. 
Pictures do not copy the world. They are symbols that denote their 
subjects. He thinks also that a picture can work, like a proper name, and 
denote uniquely one particular thing. For example, the picture of Johnny 
Depp denotes Johnny Depp. But he also thinks that a picture can work, 
like a predicate, and denote multiply each of a whole group of objects. For 
example, the picture of a tiger in a dictionary denotes all tigers. 
Symbols belong to a symbol system, which connects the symbols of the 
2 There are symbols that do not refer, such as letters, syncategorematic terms and symbols in 
fiction. In their case, we use the word “symbol” as a one-place predicate. This is a derivative 
use of the term, because even these symbols belong to symbol systems that have a referring 
function.
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system with their referents (objects referred to). When we know the system, 
we know what its symbols refer to. Goodman takes symbol systems to be 
kinds of conventions. They are based on our practices of using symbols of 
different kinds. For example, styles in the visual arts, such as impressionism, 
realism and cubism, are examples of pictorial symbol systems (Goodman 
1968, 127–173).
II 
EXEMPLIFICATION
A great innovation of Languages of Art is its explanation of how purely abstract works, such as abstract paintings and pieces of instrumental music, can refer and thus symbolize. Goodman calls 
this symbolic function exemplification (Goodman 1968, 45–95).
Because abstract works represent nothing, it is their own properties 
that are important. Goodman’s idea is that these works refer to their own 
properties. They exemplify their properties. The idea is not trivial, because 
objects do not exemplify all their properties.
As an example of exemplification, Goodman (1968, 53–54) gives a 
sample in a tailor’s sample book. It exemplifies color, weave, texture and 
pattern but not size, shape or weight. In the same way, an abstract painting 
exemplifies forms, colors, structures and feelings but not weight or value. It 
only exemplifies properties that are important to it as a work of art.
As a nominalist, Goodman (1968, 54–57) thinks that strictly speaking 
there are no properties. So, in careful language, we must replace the talk of 
properties with the talk of predicates or other denoting symbols, which he 
calls labels. We can therefore define exemplification in terms of denotation 
and reference.
A exemplifies label B if and only if B denotes A and A refers to B.
For example, instead of exemplifying the property of blueness, a painting 
exemplifies the predicate “blue” that denotes it. Or, if the painting is sad, 
it exemplifies the predicate “sad” that denotes it. Of course, the predicate 
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“sad” cannot denote a painting literally. A painting is a physical object that 
lacks feelings, yet it can be metaphorically sad. The predicate “sad” denotes 
paintings and other works of art metaphorically. When a painting exemplifies 
the predicate “sad” metaphorically, Goodman (1968, 85–95) says that it 
expresses sadness. Expression is a matter of metaphorical exemplification. 
There are also complex referential relations that consists of steps of 
denotation and exemplification. For example, when a painting exemplifies 
the predicates “blue” and “sad” that, in turn, denote other blue and sad 
things in the world, the painting indirectly refers to those things. Therefore, 
even abstract works that represent nothing can refer to things outside them 
and contribute to worldmaking (Goodman 1984, 61–63).
III 
KNOWLEDGE AND SYMBOLS
Now we can understand why Goodman wants to replace our ordi-nary concept of knowledge with the concept of understanding. Knowledge—in its ordinary sense—is a propositional attitude. It 
has a propositional content that is expressed by a that-clause. For example, 
I know that it is summer. I know that we are in Helsinki. “That it is summer” 
and “that we are in Helsinki” express propositions or thoughts (as Frege 
called them). Let’s assume that S stands for a person and p stands for a 
proposition. We get the following definition.
S knows that p if and only if 
S believes that p,
p is true and
x (justification, reliability, sensitivity, safety or . . .)
There is a debate about x—the condition that converts true belief into 
knowledge—among epistemologists, but we need not worry about that. 
We can just assume that, if the first two conditions are satisfied, the third 
condition is often satisfied as well. If art can give us true beliefs, it can most 
likely give us knowledge as well. 
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According to Goodman, works of art refer to the world, but they do 
not say anything true about the world. What is said is a proposition. Some 
works of art do not express propositions or thoughts about the world: 
Pictures, abstract paintings and musical works do not have propositional 
contents at all. Though fictional literary works have propositional contents, 
their contents are false according to Goodman (1984, 123–126), because there 
are no fictional entities. So, art cannot give knowledge, because it does not 
give us true propositions that are necessary for knowledge.
A further problem is that Goodman (1972, 221–238) does not accept 
propositions at all. They are abstract and intensional entities that 
he does not accept into his worlds. For him knowledge is an attitude 
toward declarative sentences or statements rather than to the contents of 
sentences—propositions. The scope of knowledge is therefore restricted to 
what can be articulated in language, which already rules out visual arts and 
music as sources of knowledge.
Goodman’s (1988, 153–166) move is to suggest that the concept of 
knowledge should be replaced with the broader concept of understanding 
and to argue that merely referring, non-declarative, symbols can advance 
understanding. As I said, we should avoid this move.3 The problem is not in 
our concept of knowledge. It is part of Goodman’s philosophical program, 
which does not allow propositions. If we can appeal to the existence of 
propositions, we can explain how art of all kinds can express propositions 
and say something and advance knowledge. Propositions, unlike sentences, 
are non-linguistic. So, also nonverbal symbols, in visual arts and music, can 
in principle express propositions. We just need one further move.
3 It may also be useless, because understanding appears to be a propositional attitude as well. 
For example, I understand why John is angry. Anyway, Goodman does not provide sufficient 
explication of his concept of understanding.
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IV 
DIRECT REFERENCE 
AND SINGULAR PROPOSITIONS
John Hawthorne and David Manley write in their Reference Book (2012, 4): “The discovery of the twin categories of [direct] reference and singular thought [proposition] is widely felt to be one of the 
landmark achievements of twentieth-century analytic philosophy.” Both 
categories derive from Bertrand Russell’s philosophy, and they are widely 
accepted in current philosophy of language. The problem of Goodman’s 
project is that it rejects both categories. I suggest that we follow Russell 
and contemporary philosophers of language and add an account of 
direct reference to Goodman’s theory of symbols and that we also accept 
propositions, properties and relations. Then we can explain how all art can 
express propositions and thus advance propositional knowledge.
The Russellian idea is quite intuitive. The content of a sentence is a 
proposition. This is what we say or assert when we utter the sentence. The 
content of a proper name is the object it refers to. Its semantic role is simply 
to pick out the object we want to talk about. So, this is what it brings to the 
content of a sentence. The content of a predicate is a property or relation it 
expresses. The role of a predicate is to express what we say about the object—
what properties we attribute to it. This is what it brings to the proposition. 
Thus, a singular (Russellian) proposition consists of objects and properties or 
relations. For example, the sentence “John is tall” expresses the proposition 
that John is tall, which consists of John and the property of tallness. The 
sentence “John loves Mary” expresses the proposition that John loves Mary, 
which consists of John, Mary and the loving-relation.
Russell (1956, 201) thought that only demonstrative pronouns “this” 
and “that” are genuine proper names (or singular terms). Contemporary 
philosophers of language typically take directly referring expressions to 
include also ordinary proper names, like “John” and “Mary”, and indexicals, 
such as “here”, “now”, “you”, “I”, “he”, and “she”. (What indexicals refer to 
depend on the context, in which they are used). 
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There is a dispute about what direct reference is based on. Russell (1956, 
201) thought that it is based on direct awareness of the object referred to. 
Saul Kripke (1980) thinks that there must be a causal or historical connection 
between the object and our use of the term. At least, when it comes to art, 
we can be rather liberal: it is something in the context, in which we use 
the symbol, that determines the referred object—perhaps it is some causal 
relation to the object or just our intention to refer to it. So, in order to know 
what a symbol refers to, it is not enough to know the linguistic conventions 
or the symbol system, as Goodman thinks. We must also know the context, 
in which the term or symbol is used.
We can now see that propositions are non-linguistic: they consist of 
real objects and properties or relations that are bound together. So other 
symbols than sentences can in principle express propositions and thus 
say something.4 This is possible, if we could just find the semantic roles of 
singular terms and predicates in the symbols. I think we can.
V 
THE PROPOSITIONAL CONTENTS OF PICTURES 
AND ABSTRACT WORKS
Because propositions are non-linguistic, there is no problem for non-verbal symbols, such as pictures and samples, to express propositions and to say something about their objects. Instead of Goodman’s 
single symbolic function, denotation, we just need a double function: 
each symbol must both pick out an object and attribute properties to it 
(both refer to an object and describe or characterize it). Then the referred 
object and attributed properties constitute the proposition that the symbol 
expresses. I think that our ordinary practice of using symbols supports this 
view of their content.
4 This is true even if propositions are understood as sets of possible worlds rather than 
Russellian structured entities. See, for example, Lycan (2008, 126–129).
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Suppose there is a photograph of one of two identical twins. Nobody can 
distinguish the twins from each other just by looking. Which of them does 
the photograph depict? It seems that Goodman would have to say that it 
denotes both, because both have the properties that the photo attributes to 
its object (or, in Goodman’s words, both are denoted by the photo according 
to the relevant symbol system). This cannot be right. Of course, we say that 
the photo is only of one of them, the twin whom it is taken of. It is of the 
one who was present when the photo was taken and reflected the light 
that went through the lens of the camera. We must therefore distinguish 
between the object that the photo directly refers to and what the photo tells 
or shows about that object. So, we have here the double symbolic function 
of referring and describing that determines the proposition expressed by 
the photo. It is the causal relation to the object that determines the referent.
With paintings, things are somewhat different. It may be plausible that a 
portrait refers to the person who sat for the artist and tells something about 
her. However, the object (or subject) of a painting is not always the sitter. For 
example, an artist may use a prostitute as a sitter for a painting about Virgin 
Mary. Yet, the painting represents Virgin Mary rather than the prostitute. 
It seems that here it is the artist’s intention that determines the depicted 
object. Typically, this is also disclosed in the title of the work. Once again, 
we have the double function of picking out an object and saying something 
about it and thus a proposition expressed. 
A picture, like a sentence, can therefore have a propositional content. The 
content is just much more complex and fine-grained than the content of a 
sentence. The number of properties that a picture attributes to the subject 
is huge, and we cannot completely express them in words. We simply lack 
words for all those properties. A picture is worth of thousand words.
The same is true of samples–Goodman’s exemplifying symbols. For 
example, swatches of cloth in a tailor’s sample book do not just exemplify 
certain of their own properties. They also refer to the ready suit and say 
that it will have those properties. This is the whole point of the sample. It 
gives information about the suit that does not yet exist.
Also, abstract works of art can express propositions. It is just required 
that they somehow pick out objects, to which they attribute the properties 
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they exemplify. Sometimes the title of the work discloses the object. 
Sometimes artists themselves tell us what their works are about. For 
example, Dmitri Shostakovich tells that all his symphonies beginning from 
the fourth are about Soviet life under the rule of Stalin (Volkov 2004).5 Even 
purely instrumental music can exemplify feelings and other properties that 
it attributes to an object. It can express propositions, which once again are 
hard or impossible to express in words or in any other way.
So, pictures and even abstract works can express propositions and 
advance our knowledge about the world. However, there is a problem. 
Works of art, not only in literature but also in other arts, are typically 
fictional. There are no objects referred to, because there really are no 
fictional entities, such as Sherlock Holmes or Anna Karenina. Neither are 
typical abstract works thought to refer to anything: the artist gives no hints 
about the referred object; neither do the receivers look for it. I have two 
solutions to these problems: First, the use of a symbol that expresses an 
incomplete or false proposition can pragmatically implicate a proposition 
that is true. Second, abstract works that do not refer to the world outside of 
them can refer to and say something about themselves.
VI 
FICTION
Because there are no fictional entities, fictional names are empty or meaningless and fictional sentences (and pictures) do not express complete propositions. A part of the proposition, the object referred 
to, is missing. Fictional sentences say nothing; they are neither true nor 
false. This is a problem, if we think that fiction can teach us something 
about the real world.
Kendall Walton (1990) suggests a solution. By using fictional sentences, 
we do not really say anything, but we pretend to say something. Fiction is a 
5 I don’t deny that we can listen to those symphonies without knowing this and without taking 
them to say anything about matters outside music. See below!
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matter of make-believe. However, this solution does not yet answer our core 
question: How can fictional works say anything about the real world? I think 
they do tell about the world. They just do not say it directly or literally. They 
pragmatically imply or implicate it. This is a common feature of ordinary 
language. Suppose somebody asks me about my student Tom, whether he is 
good in philosophy, and I reply: “He has a nice handwriting.” Even if I don’t 
say it literally, I implicate that he is not good in philosophy (Grice 1989, 22–40). 
Not only true sentences–or the utterances of these sentences–can 
pragmatically implicate something. Uttering a false sentence can implicate 
something that is true. Metaphors are like this. They are literally false, but can 
implicate something true. For example, if I say, “My love is a rose”, I literally 
say something that is false. My love is not a plant. But this is not what I want 
to convey to you. I want to inform you about some of her characteristics. 
If a false sentence can be used to pragmatically implicate something 
that is true, so can sentences, by which we pretend to say something and 
which lack a truth-value. Though fictional sentences and pictures do not 
literally say anything, they can pragmatically implicate something that is 
true about the real world.
The Bible gives a nice example of this: King David saw beautiful 
Bathsheba, send for her, slept with her, and made her pregnant. After 
failing to get her husband, Uriah, to think he was the father of the child, 
David arranged for Uriah to be killed. Then the prophet Nathan came to 
David and told the following story about a rich man and a poor man:
The rich man had many flocks and herds; the poor man had 
only one lamb, which grew up with his children, ate at his table, 
lay at his bosom and was like a daughter to him. The rich man had 
an unexpected quest. Instead of slaughtering one of his own sheep, 
he slaughtered the poor man’s only lamb and served it to his guest.
King David exploded in anger: “The man who did this deserves to die!” 
Then Nathan turned to David, pointed to him and declared: “You are that 
man!”6
6 This version of the story is from Alvin Plantinga (2000, 452) who uses it for a different purpose.
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This is a fictional, make-believe, story, but it is supposed to tell or 
implicate some truths about David. It does not explicitly say what those 
truths or propositions are. Perhaps, it is something obvious (that David did 
something morally wrong). Perhaps, it is difficult or impossible to put into 
exact words. Anyway, the story tells David something about him: it conveys a 
singular proposition about him (perhaps a moral proposition). He attains new 
knowledge about himself. Fiction is here used as a source of self-knowledge. 
This is surely an important kind of knowledge that fiction can give us.
The story also illustrates the fact that what fiction implicates is context-
sensitive. To somebody else, the story may tell something different—
perhaps some general propositions about rich people and poor people or 
about life generally. Aristotle thought so. He said in Poetics: “Poetry is more 
philosophical and more elevated than history, since poetry relates more of 
the universal, while history relates particulars” (Aristotle 1995, 1451b).
People have a strong tendency to generalize on the basis of a few 
particular cases, perhaps just one. Some psychologists and philosophers 
take this tendency to be irrational, but if nature works in a law-like manner, 
this way of forming beliefs may very well be quite rational and reliable 
(Kornblith 1993, 87–96). This tendency extends to merely imagined cases 
and explains how and why we can learn not just singular but general truths 
from fiction. It is equally important that fiction can give counterexamples 
to generalization and prejudices that we already have. Fiction advances 
knowledge also by correcting our mistakes.
VII 
LEARNING FROM ABSTRACT WORKS AND ENVIRONMENT
It is true that many abstract works—paintings, pieces of music and buildings—are not thought to refer. Goodman says that also these works refer by exemplifying their own properties. This is true, if 
exemplification is a form of referring, but this does not explain how such 
works can say something. However, it is quite natural to understand these 
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sorts of exemplifications as a form of saying. We interpret these works as 
referring to themselves and saying that they have these properties. For 
example, sad music does not just refer to sadness; it says that it is sad. Of 
course, the properties need not be so obvious as sadness. They can be very 
complex and delicate, and it can require expertise to detect them.
So, some works of art teach us something about themselves. We learn 
that they have certain properties. This can hardly be denied, but does 
this not trivialize the idea that art teaches or advances knowledge? It does 
not, if the truths that art teaches are important. A work of art does not say 
about all its properties that it has them. It only says this about some of its 
properties—the important ones. 
To Monroe Beardsley’s criticism that the whole idea of exemplification 
might be dropped without loss, that mere possession of properties is all 
that matters, Goodman gives the following response: 
Surely he does not suppose that critical comment consists 
of random listing of properties a work possesses, or that 
understanding a work amounts to noting such properties 
indiscriminately. A vital part of aesthetic understanding, 
especially but not exclusively in the case of abstract works, is 
determining which among its properties the work not only 
possesses but also conveys. The significant properties of a work, 
we might say, are those it signifies. This must be taken fully 
into account in one way or another, and my way is in terms of 
exemplification. 
(Goodman 1984, 84.)
We can follow Goodman and say that understanding a work does not 
consist of noting random facts about it. It consists of grasping what it says. 
This is something that we learn when we understand the work. Moreover, 
this is not restricted to worldly facts represented, but includes also some 
facts about the work itself. It is these facts that, according to Beardsley (1981, 
530–531) himself, are the source of aesthetic value: recognizing them causes 
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us to have experiences that have intrinsic aesthetic value.7 This should also 
satisfy the toughest formalists, who insist that only the form matters in a 
work of art, not its content. The form can constitute the only content that 
the work has.
When I take works of art to say and tell things or to speak to us, I don’t 
mean that it is the artist that does these things through his or her art, 
though this may be true. I follow Goodman by thinking that it is not always 
the intention of the artist that determines what his or her work tells us. 
Neither does the work itself, independently of us, say anything. It is we who 
use works of art to tell things to ourselves. It is something in us, something 
in the way we use works of art that gives them the power to speak to us.
This being the case, there is no need to restrict these insights to art. In 
addition, even the built and natural environments can speak to us. Perhaps, 
it is art that has taught us to look at our environment in this way.
7 I said in an earlier paper that Goodman’s response is unilluminating, because it does not tell 
why the exemplified properties are the significant ones (Lammenranta 1992, 344–351). Now, I 
think that those properties may have a purely aesthetic significance in Beardsley’s sense, and 
that this does not compromise the idea of art saying things. I want to thank Hanne Appelqvist 
for this change of mind. She also pointed out that Wittgenstein may have something similar 
in mind. See her discussion of the relevant passage from Wittgenstein (1958, 166) in Appelqvist 
(forthcoming).
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AESTHETIC INTIMACY1
ABSTRACT
Aesthetic intimacy has attracted little attention compared to other 
sorts of aesthetic experience. However, specially when dealing 
with literary works, it seems that this experience is not only easily 
acknowledged but also highly valued. Arto Haapala, whose attempt 
at understanding aesthetic experience in connection to existentialist 
concerns is well established, has tried to clarify this experience and to 
expand the range of artworks with respect to which one can experience 
aesthetic intimacy. In this chapter, I explore some alternative ways of 
understanding aesthetic intimacy, and I aim at providing a narrower 
but, in my view, a more precise conception of this form of experience 
and of the value we attach to it.
While not every significant and valuable experience with artworks is accompanied by a sense of intimacy with the author or the work’s perspective, it seems that at least sometimes this 
experience of proximity or closeness may endow artistic appreciation with 
a particular tone. As Arto Haapala has noted (2006), aesthetic intimacy is 
rare, but when it occurs it seems that a particular work or author becomes 
to play an important role in the appreciator’s life. Among other things, the 
encounter with some particular artworks or authors seems to enhance 
the reader’s self-understanding and her awareness of having a particular 
perspective. 
In what follows, I would like to expand on our understanding of this 
1 This paper has been possible thanks to the financial support from the research projects 
(FFI2015-64271-P) “Aesthetic Experience of the arts and the complexity of perception 
(Ministerio de Economía y competitividad and (20934/PI/18) “Beyond Beauty: The Nature 
and Critical Relevance of Aesthetic Qualities” (Fundación Séneca, Agencia de Ciencia y 
Tecnología de la Región de Murcia) 2016–2020.
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experience and to clarify what makes it aesthetically important. In order 
to do so, I will try to examine different ways in which we can think of 
aesthetic intimacy. Some of them do not, in my view, provide a sufficient 
characterization of this experience; I will try to offer a tentative explanation 
based on the expressive2 character of art. This approach can, in my 
view, provide a better explanation of the aesthetic worth of this peculiar 
experience and its role in our life as aesthetic appreciators. 
I 
ARTISTIC EXPERIENCE 
AND AESTHETIC INTIMACY
Arto Haapala (1995, 1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2003) has devoted some attention to aesthetic intimacy and to the connection that it reveals between aesthetic and ordinary experiences as part of his 
approach to art and aesthetic experience from an existentialist concern. 
But how exactly should we understand aesthetic intimacy? What is the 
specific value afforded by this form of intimacy? And, finally, what can we 
say about art and aesthetic experience more generally from the fact that 
it sometimes can provide this kind of experience? Haapala’s contribution 
to these questions is the starting point of my own attempt at clarifying an 
issue that, in spite of its clear importance, has not been the focus of much 
philosophical attention. Albeit I will at some points depart from Haapala’s 
own perspective on this issue, I think it is crucial to keep in mind one of his 
insights with respect to aesthetic intimacy. As I see it, Haapala’s approach 
is dominated by an overall interest concerning the place this experience 
occupies in our constitution as aesthetic appreciators and subjects more 
generally. In this sense, his concern is not merely aesthetic. He aims at 
making explicit the relevance that this particular aesthetic experience 
2 By the expressive character of art, I refer here to the aspects of the artwork that are to be 
grasped as expressing the artist’s or the intended author’s mind. I will expand on this issue 
in section 2.
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has within our conception of life experience more generally understood. 
In this sense, he has paid much attention to the importance of aesthetic 
experience in its capacity for providing certain patterns of experience that, 
in turn, constitute our relationships to the world and to those who inhabit 
it. My aim will be, thus, to offer some further thoughts on aesthetic intimacy 
while keeping what I regard as one of Haapala’s clear contributions to 
this issue: the acknowledgment that a proper understanding of aesthetic 
intimacy has to provide some elucidation of its significance within those 
practices conducting to making the world and our life intelligible.
I will proceed by exploring three different modes in which aesthetic 
intimacy can be understood3. Although each seems to provide some 
insight into this experience and can partially explain the sense of proximity 
that typically accompanies it, I will try to show that neither can offer a 
comprehensive explanation of aesthetic intimacy. In my view (section 
2), a better way to approach this experience is by locating it within an 
expressivist understanding of art practice. According to this approach, we 
feel aesthetic intimacy with a particular work or artist when we relate to 
the expressive world4 that the work affords in a certain way. Finally, I will 
conclude with some tentative suggestions about the broader importance 
that this experience has.
3 The first two can be found in Haapala’s own approach to this experience. They point to 
a particular mode of knowledge or understanding afforded by art in its experiential and 
aesthetic dimension.
4 Although I will develop this claim in section 2.1., the idea I would like to introduce at this 
stage is that we experience aesthetic intimacy when in the process of appreciating a particular 
work we feel a certain proximity with the expressive character of the work, that is with the 
way in which the artist or the intended author of the work expresses herself in the work. 
The expressed content is understood here in a broad sense encompassing different sorts of 
mental states such as emotions, beliefs, attitudes, desires, etc. 
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I.1 
AESTHETIC INTIMACY 
AND THE EXPERIENTIAL NATURE OF ART
A first way of characterizing aesthetic intimacy is by appealing to the experiential nature of art and the way we understand it. Artworks have been often conceived of as affording a particular, experiential, 
form of understanding. Particularly, when considering the representational 
arts, it seems that engagement with artworks characteristically affords a 
special way of grasping certain perspectives and of experiencing what it is to 
be in a particular situation. We can become acquainted with certain scenarios 
or with the experiential dimension of certain situations by ‘entering into’ 
a particular artistic or fictional world or by visually experiencing certain 
scenes. Thus, it is often said that we do not only learn about a particular 
situation through engaging with a novel or a film, we also come to see or 
experience how that situation evolves and which aspects become relevant 
for its proper understanding. This experiential quality is often put in terms 
of a contrast between propositional knowledge and practical knowledge or 
know-how. We experience a certain intimacy with the characters – their 
personalities, motivations and thoughts – and their situations thanks to 
the kind of presentation that mimetic artefacts typically afford. We come to 
know about the aspects that govern the fictional characters’ behaviour and 
to understand their relationships by directly seeing them in play. In general, 
we can endow mimetic representations with a certain cognitive value due 
to their experiential dimension; that is, to the fact that they prompt certain 
experiences as part of their proper understanding5. 
5 Although there is an on-going discussion concerning the epistemic validity of the beliefs we 
can form out of our engagement with artworks, I will assume for the sake of the argument that 
we can obtain some form of experiential knowledge from engaging with (fictional) artworks. 
What is important with respect to the issue of aesthetic intimacy so understood is not so 
much whether the beliefs formed are epistemically valid as the kind of experiential access we 
have to certain contents. On the problem of getting knowledge from literary appreciation see, 
among others, Haapala (2014), John (1998, 2007, 2013), Mikkonen (2015, 2018), or Stock (2016). 
For a recent defence of the possibility of gaining knowledge from imagination see Dorsch 
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Haapala (2006) has rightly pointed out that both physical and imaginative 
factors are involved in this form of aesthetic intimacy. Typically, our 
imaginative engagement with a fictional work allows for the sort of intimacy 
we may experience with respect to a character. But other forms of non-
representational art, like architecture, may engage us in a more physical way. 
Our actual physical responses to the spatial patterns, the play with the light, or 
the material qualities displayed by the architectural work may be the source 
of a special form of intimacy with it. This does not mean that imaginative 
engagement and physical involvement are mutually exclusive modes of 
aesthetic intimacy. Sometimes, both forms of engagement may cooperate. For 
example, in a theatrical play certain aspects related to the stage setting and the 
way in which the dramatic space is presented may invite certain responses with 
a strong physical component; but the play can also engage us imaginatively in 
displaying a character’s actions and psychological evolution. Alternatively, in 
attending to a musical performance there may be aspects of the concert space 
that invite a certain form of attention one may describe as physically intimate6 
and aspects of the musical work we may attend to imaginatively and that can, 
in their own way, also contribute to an overall experience of intimacy. 
Thus, we can locate a specific source of aesthetic intimacy in artworks’ 
capacity to experientially engage us both imaginatively and physically 
with certain representational and non-representational contents. However, 
we might be drawing conclusions too fast. If aesthetic intimacy simply 
followed from the experiential dimension of engagement and appreciation 
of art, we should conclude that aesthetic intimacy is a much more general 
experience. In fact, we should expect that any artwork would – in its own 
way – afford an experience of aesthetic intimacy. But I think that when we 
talk about this sort of experience we do not think of a general aspect of 
artistic experience, but of a much narrower experience. Something that 
only certain artworks seem to be able to provide.
Thus, the experiential sort of engagement that some artworks typically 
afford may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for aesthetic 
(2016).
6 For example, the performers may be located very close to the audience or in a space that 
prevents the sense of frontality that often characterizes the concert house. 
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intimacy. It seems that we need something more than the mere capacity 
of art to engage us both physically and imaginatively, something that helps 
us identifying the special character of that experience that only certain 
artworks seem to provide.
I.2 
AESTHETIC INTIMACY AS LIVING WITHIN AN AESTHETIC PERIOD
Another way in which aesthetic intimacy could be approached is by paying attention to Hegel’s conception of Art as a mode of expression or manifestation of the Idea or Spirit (Geist) and to 
the special immediacy that artistic forms had for those who belong to the 
period of their production. Two aspects of Hegel’s view on art are relevant 
for this way of understanding aesthetic intimacy. Firstly, Hegel regarded 
artistic forms as expressions of the Spirit in its dialectical relationship 
with matter or sensible reality. Artistic forms are not thus arbitrary, their 
validity was given by their intimate relationships with the Idea they were a 
manifestation or expression of. 
Secondly, thanks to this expressive role, Art also contributed to self-
understanding and, therefore, to the evolution and constitution of the 
Spirit. By providing the Spirit an image of itself, the Spirit could recognize 
itself and, as a result of that recognition, develop towards a different stage 
on the way to its own self-knowledge. 
An important aspect of Hegel’s understanding of the expressive role of 
art is that art forms are to be regarded as manifestations of the Spirit. It is 
this spontaneity which guarantees the expressive and constitutive value of 
those forms. They are not produced out of reflection or thought; nor are 
they resulting from capricious choice. They convey the spiritual content in 
a direct, spontaneous manner. This spontaneity also explains that certain 
forms possess a certain vitality and immediacy at the moment in which 
they are produced that is no longer available once the Spirit evolves into 
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a further stage of development. Those forms are so to say ‘transparent’ to 
those who first produced them and they only become proper ‘forms of 
expression’ – that is, expressive options among others – for those that no 
longer live within them. 
Thus, we can distinguish at least two forms of understanding and 
relating to art within Hegel’s view on Art. On the one hand, there is a more 
immediate but also, to some extent, unreflective way of engaging with art 
forms. On the other, there is a mediated form of understanding according 
to which we perceive certain artistic forms as expression of a culture we 
no longer belong to. Also it seems that, after this view, the genuine mode 
of understanding art coincides with the perspective of those who lived 
in a particular period and therefore were familiar with the artistic forms 
produced at that period. The art forms produced within a particular period 
were grasped and understood with an immediacy that is no longer available 
for those who contemplate them from a different historical perspective. The 
sort of understanding that an appreciator that belongs to a different time 
can aspire to can only be indirect or mediated. We can maybe understand 
Greek or Medieval art but we cannot feel at home within those forms: they 
have lost their vitality, naturalness or spontaneity. These forms were once 
the very representational and aesthetic constellation through which Spirit 
understood – or, following Hegel’s jargon, acknowledged – Itself, but they 
are mere objects for aesthetic contemplation once the Spirit has evolved 
and distanced itself from them. 
This view about artistic and aesthetic understanding has survived to our 
days and many art historians still endorse a similar view of the symbiotic 
relationship between aesthetic forms and the historical and social 
milieu from which they arise7. As a consequence, aesthetic and artistic 
understanding is conceived of in a way that distinguishes between the 
producer or participants’ perspective and the mere observer’s perspective. 
Although we approach those forms with certain tools that can make them 
intelligible to us, the way in which we relate to them is different. 
7 See, for example, Baxandall (1985). In chapter IV he elaborates the differences in 
understanding that arise between the participant and the observer of a cultural period and 
its products. 
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After Hegel’s view of art in its historical role, we could characterize 
aesthetic intimacy as a matter of feeling at home within a certain aesthetic 
constellation8. Thus, the notion of aesthetic intimacy that one could derive 
from Hegel’s understanding of Art is a strong one for it invokes the possibility 
of living in or through certain aesthetic forms not as something one can freely 
accept or reject but as the very condition for (aesthetic) intelligibility. The 
notion of transparency will both serve to explain aesthetic intimacy and to 
emphasize the fundamental role that certain aesthetic or conceptual forms 
may play at a particular time. Those forms are transparent to those who live 
within them because, at least for some time, they cannot be substituted or 
translated into something different. They provide the very medium through 
which understanding takes place. The subjectivity they serve to express is not 
something distinct from the very forms through which it is embodied. They 
play in that sense an expressive and constitutive role.
As we have seen, one immediate consequence of this mode of 
understanding aesthetic intimacy is that it seems no longer possible to 
feel it unless one actually belongs to the corresponding period or culture. 
Aesthetic intimacy can be thus crafted in terms of a particular form of 
aesthetic understanding that is only available to those who actually inhabit 
an aesthetic world. But it could not be possible to enjoy this experience 
when appreciating artworks that belong to a different time or to a different 
culture9. One could be at most an artistic tourist looking at others’ aesthetic 
patterns with wonder and curiosity, but without being able to enter into an 
intimate relationship with those forms. 
In “Existential Aesthetics and Interpretation” (2003) Haapala explores 
the notions of artistic understanding paying attention to the kind of 
misunderstanding that can be grounded in our distance10 from the aesthetic 
8 Albeit for Hegel that possibility was no longer available once art’s historical development 
had reached its end, it is possible to explore the implications of Hegel’s way of understanding 
artistic forms with respect to the issue of aesthetic intimacy.
9 The relative currency of this idea can be identified within a recently developed debate 
concerning the wrongdoing implied in cultural appropriation. The underlying idea has to 
do precisely with this way of regarding certain cultural manifestations or forms as intimately 
linked to a particular cultural o group identity. For some recent philosophical reflection on 
this issue see Young and Brunk, 2012, Nguyen and Strohl, forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
10 We understand here the notion of aesthetic distance not as it is normally understood in 
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constellation to which the object under appreciation belongs. Even if there 
are limits to a possible scepticism with respect to our ability to aesthetically 
understand artworks that are remote to us, it seems that we cannot simply 
address these works as we do when appreciating the products of our own 
cultural environment. There may be key aspects that are crucial and basic 
for properly aesthetically understanding a work that may be missing in our 
current situation or of which we may be ignorant.11 Still, Haapala thinks 
that aesthetic understanding can be possible with respect to works whose 
original environment is now remote. However, given this picture of aesthetic 
understanding, it may be more difficult to defend that our experience 
could be possibly described as an experience of aesthetic intimacy. Even 
if we accept that aesthetic understanding is possible across different times 
and cultures, it seems that the undeniable specificity of each period will 
introduce a distance that could likely undermine one’s possible sense of 
proximity with respect to those works. 
In relation to this way of conceiving aesthetic understanding, Haapala 
has also noticed a more fundamental role that aesthetic forms play 
in our lives. Following Heidegger’s characterization of “existentials”12, 
Haapala (2003) pays attention to what he calls the “existentials” of the 
artworld, or of the practice of art considered as a mode of being. As well 
as “existentials” play, in Heiddeger’s view, a certain transcendental role 
in our understanding of any form of human practice or existence, the so-
called “existentials” of the artworld are to be considered as the minimal 
requirements or conditions without which the practice of art would not 
be possible as it is13.
the philosophical literature concerning the proper conditions for aesthetically appreciating 
an object, but as a temporal and cultural distance that may negatively affect our aesthetic 
understanding.
11 For example, one may not get the expressive force of a particular inflection of a Nô actor 
unless one is familiar enough with that practice and with the world it belongs to.
12 Haapala also uses the term ‘existentialia’. Some of these existentialia are the notions of 
‘being-in’, ‘being-with-others’, ‘being-alongside’ and ‘care’.
13 Haapala identifies those ‘existentialia’ with the notions of ‘artist’, ‘artwork’, ‘interpreter’ 
and ‘artworld’. These notions will be differently instantiated and developed within different 
artistic practices but without them our most basic approach to art as an intentional practice 
wouldn’t even be possible.
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Although Haapala does not expand much on the Heiddeggerian 
idea that it is in the actual and concrete practices that those existentials 
become normatively constituted14, we can draw, following Haapala’s 
own initiative, an analogy between the way human practices become 
normatively constituted and the artistic case. What in each artworld or 
practice becomes normative – setting the pattern for the continuation 
of a particular artistic practice – is not given a priori or from a reflective 
consideration of that practice, but by its very constitution within the 
practice itself. In this sense, deep aesthetic understanding requires being 
aware of the contingency and fragility of each aesthetic proposal, as well as 
of the importance of its role in determining future aesthetic possibilities. 
An important aspect of this way of understanding aesthetic intelligibility 
is both its temporality and its self-constituting character. Nothing can 
grant that a particular, contingent, aesthetic development will speak to 
those who receive it. Its normative character, its persuasiveness as an 
aesthetic achievement, can only be confirmed within the very practice 
that produces it. 
Aesthetic intimacy may be, in this light, understood as the experience 
of deeply understanding the normative appeal or proposal that a particular 
aesthetic attempt offers. The intimacy involved here has deeply to do 
with the fact that the work’s aesthetic proposal succeeds in reaching the 
audience although there might be no explanation or rationale that can 
explain its actual achievement. And yet, the appreciator feels the aesthetic 
form is accomplished, that it is an aesthetic achievement.
However, this way of understanding aesthetic intimacy may be 
undistinguishable from a characterization of aesthetic understanding 
simpliciter. So, as we saw with the first way of understanding aesthetic 
intimacy, we seem to require something more in order to be able to provide 
a more refined characterization of aesthetic intimacy. 
I would like now to explore a third form of aesthetic intimacy that may 
be linked to the aforementioned experience of aesthetic understanding. 
That is, with the experience that one correctly responds to a particular 
artistic form, or responds to it with understanding. 
14 See, for example, Pippin (2005).
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I.3 
AESTHETIC INTIMACY AND THE (IM)PERSONAL 
EXERCISE OF OUR REFLECTIVE ABILITIES
A third distinctive way of understanding aesthetic intimacy can be cashed out in terms of sharing a taste or finding one’s judgements of taste to be echoed by others’ judgements. Aesthetic intimacy 
in this sense will not so much refer to a common, shared worldview or 
perspective – be it conceptual or aesthetic – as to sharing certain aesthetic 
preferences or judgements. 
Sharing a taste seems to be an especially bonding phenomenon. We feel 
at home with those who share a similar taste. This intimacy can be explained 
precisely in terms of certain features that are peculiar to the aesthetic 
judgement. That one finds oneself sharing her aesthetic judgement with 
others enhances one’s sense of proximity to them because the judgement is 
supposed to be based not on reasoning or on the following of a certain rule, 
but upon a sentiment of pleasure which arises freely – without conceptual 
determination – out of the spontaneous exercise of one’s reflective capacities. 
That we precisely concur in those judgements that are supposed to result 
from the free spontaneous exercise of our abilities to judge reinforces the 
sense of commonality with those who issue the same judgements that we 
do. If our agreement had been based on a conceptual determination or 
in the acceptance of a rule, we would not feel as united. So, the intimacy 
experienced is deeply connected to the kind of judgement involved15. 
However, following this mode of understanding aesthetic intimacy, 
a certain paradox seems to appear once we bring into consideration 
the alleged universality of the aesthetic judgement and, hence, its anti-
parochialism. Aesthetic intimacy, insofar as it invites the adoption of a 
15 It is not merely a matter of shared feeling. Sentiments can be educated, promoted and 
manipulated, but aesthetic judgements – albeit grounded upon a sentiment – are not merely 
a matter of being disposed to emotionally react to certain things in a certain way, but a matter 
of freely exercising our judgemental abilities and, hence, of determining autonomously 
whether something merits our applause.
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personal perspective16, seems contrary to the universal character that 
aesthetic judgement aspires to. Something in the acceptance of this view 
of aesthetic judgement – which I am invoking in order to characterize 
aesthetic intimacy as a matter of shared judgement – runs paradoxically 
against the idea of aesthetic intimacy. 
As I see it, the aspect suspect of causing the air of paradox has to do 
with Kant’s view that aesthetic judgement is in some sense impersonal.17 
The aspiration to universal validity that accompanies one’s judgement has 
precisely to do with the fact that its grounding is not determined by one’s 
idiosyncratic features; the judgement could have been issued by anyone 
who had disinterestedly and freely exercised her judgemental capacities. 
Since it is a requirement for the correct exercise of the aesthetic judgement 
that it is based in a disinterested pleasure, my judgement is not ‘mine’ as 
much as anyone else’s. Kant rendered this aspect of aesthetic judgement in 
terms of its aspiration to universal validity. Our aesthetic judgements are 
thus ones that anyone who freely exercised her reflective abilities would 
expectedly have come to. So the idea of a community of taste becomes so 
inclusive – and, hence, so universal – that there seems to be little room for 
talking about the experience of aesthetic intimacy in this context.
Thus, it seems that the very source of a special sort of intimacy in the 
exercise of aesthetic judgement – its free, spontaneous, nature – leaves us 
16 I think that this personal dimension is also reflected in the fact that when we experience that 
a work is aesthetically intimate, we do not expect that everyone else shares that experience.
17 In § 6 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant emphasizes the idea that the aesthetic 
judgment is not the expression of personal taste and that, when properly issued, it aspires to 
universal validity. In Kant’s words: “For one cannot judge that about which he is aware that 
the satisfaction in it is without any interest in his own case in any way except that it must 
contain a ground of satisfaction for everyone. For since it is not grounded in any inclination 
of the subject (nor in any other underlying interest), but rather the person making the 
judgment feels himself completely free with regard to the satisfaction that he devotes to the 
object, he cannot discover as grounds of the satisfaction any private conditions, pertaining 
to his subject alone, and must therefore regard it as grounded in those that he can also 
presuppose in everyone else; consequently he must believe himself to have grounds for 
expecting a similar pleasure of everyone. Hence he will speak of the beautiful as if beauty 
were a property of the object and the judgment logical (constituting a cognition of the object 
through concepts of it), although it is only aesthetic and contains merely a relation of the 
representation of the object to the subject, because it still has the similarity with logical 
judgment that its validity for everyone can be presupposed.” (5:211; pp. 96–97)
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simultaneously unable to accommodate the phenomenon we are trying to 
clarify. If we focus on the universality of the aesthetic judgement, it seems 
that nothing personal and, therefore nothing intimate, can be really at stake. 
Our sense of proximity with those with whom we share our judgement 
is not with anyone in particular but with anyone simpliciter18. Although I 
think there might be ways to get out of this impasse19, I will try to look at 
a different aspect of artistic appreciation that may offer a more promising 
way of dealing with aesthetic intimacy.
II 
AESTHETIC INTIMACY AS INTIMACY WITH AN 
ARTIST’S EXPRESSIVE REPERTOIRE
So far, we have explored aesthetic intimacy as (i) imaginative involvement or physical participation with a particular (fictional) character or work; (ii) a transparent relationship between a certain 
community and the aesthetic forms they spontaneously produce; and (iii) 
a convergence in our aesthetic judgements and, consequently, a feeling of 
commonality with those who share our judgement.
18 I think Haapala (2006) is very much aware of a similar tension between acknowledging the 
possibility of aesthetic intimacy and the problematic assumption that aesthetic appreciation 
involves some kind of (psychological) distance. In his view, psychological distance is not only 
innocuous with respect to the possible emotional engagement that certain works prescribe or 
demand, but a requisite for this emotional engagement to take place. Psychological distance 
properly understood merely involves preventing that certain personal stories, desires, or 
motivations interfere with our aesthetic engagement and with a proper appreciation of the 
work. However, psychological distance does not preclude that the appreciator engages with 
the work in an emotional way or that she emotionally responds to it.
19 I suggest, that the apparent tension between the universal aspirations of aesthetic 
Judgements and the possibility of aesthetic intimacy can be solved by paying attention 
to the importance of the first personal character of aesthetic Judgement. In “Beauty and 
the Agential Dimension of Taste” (Philosophia Verlag, Munich, forthcoming) I have tried 
to show that we can give due place to the personal dimension of the aesthetic Judgement 
without giving up on its intrinsic universal aspiration. In my view, if we do not take into 
account the first personal character of aesthetic Judgement, certain phenomena, such as 
aesthetic alienation or the importance of aesthetic coherence, cannot be fully explained.
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Although these alternative ways of explaining aesthetic intimacy have the 
virtue of clearly focusing on certain distinct aspects of aesthetic experience 
and creativity, they seem to point to a form of proximity or familiarity 
that falls short of an accomplished and more refined characterization of 
aesthetic intimacy. It may be true that the aforementioned phenomena 
are to some extent involved in the experience of aesthetic intimacy, but 
my impression is that we refer to something more specific, and more 
exceptional, than the phenomena referred above. Aesthetic intimacy seems 
to be related to a form of deep understanding that goes beyond the forms of 
proximity examined so far.
In this section, I would like to offer an alternative or complementary 
view of aesthetic intimacy. I will first locate aesthetic intimacy in relation to 
a particular way in which appreciators relate to the expressive world of an 
artist. That is, I will try to defend that aesthetic intimacy occurs when we 
feel a certain familiarity, correspondence or affinity with a particular artist 
as she expresses herself in her work. Secondly, I will reject that the best way 
to understand this experience requires anything like identifying with the 
artist or empathising with her in any substantial sense. Finally, I will revise 
Haapala’s considerations concerning the role that one’s personal history 
allegedly plays in the occurrence of aesthetic intimacy. Although there is a 
sense in which one’s personal history is relevant for this experience, I claim 
that its role is much less prominent than Haapala thinks; or, rather, the 
personal dimension involved plays a different role.
As a final remark I would like to clarify, taking as a starting point this 
view on aesthetic intimacy, the specific value that this kind of experience has 
both from an aesthetic point of view and from a more general consideration 
on its value. 
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II.1 
INTIMACY AND THE IMPORTANCE 
OF EXPRESSION
I began this chapter with the remark that aesthetic intimacy is not a pervasive experience within art’s appreciation. We certainly experience art with different degrees of proximity and I think some of the 
phenomena pointed out above can illustrate how our relationship with art 
can sometimes require a special sort of involvement. However, I think that 
the experience of aesthetic intimacy is unusual and does not necessarily 
involve the senses of proximity that we have referred to above. As I see it, 
aesthetic intimacy takes place when we feel certain proximity and esteem 
with respect to an artist’s expressive repertoire or world.
Aesthetic intimacy is not merely a matter of particularly liking an 
author or an artistic genre20, but a more prized and personal experience. 
My suggestion is to consider it as an episode in which we experience that 
the artist as she is present in her work – that is, in her way of constructing 
a fictional world or in producing a visual image, or in putting together an 
aesthetic whole – is someone we feel as close, or as someone whose mode 
of being and of looking at things we would share. Her expressive world is 
one we feel particularly close to.
Although this way of characterizing aesthetic intimacy does not 
presuppose that the artist actually expresses herself in her work, I think 
this may be possible and that when it occurs our sense of intimacy is 
even greater or deeper. I have no space to expand on the issue of artistic 
expression as a distinct phenomenon and on the right way to understand 
20 Haapala (2006) considers at some point that each appreciator may be conditioned in her 
experiences of aesthetic intimacy by certain tendencies or dispositions to enjoy certain 
artistic forms or genres over others. I think that this is an important remark because it is 
necessary to consider the role that our familiarity or knowledge of a particular art form, 
genre, or style may play in the occurrence of the experience of aesthetic intimacy. However, 
I think we must be careful not to reduce aesthetic intimacy to this kind of familiarity or 
disposition towards certain objects of appreciation. 
93
the relationship between the work and the artist, but I will assume that it is 
possible that an artist expresses herself through her work21.
Albeit I think aesthetic intimacy should not be understood as pertaining 
only to certain art forms, I believe it may be more clearly exemplified by 
looking at our understanding of an artist’s expression in literary works22. 
In literature it seems much easier to have the feeling of encountering a 
specific person who talks and thinks in a particular way and who offers us 
a specific mode of dealing with the world. Her expression is directly given 
through her linguistic behaviour and this makes the literary case very much 
like ordinary expression23. We can become acquainted with the particular 
mental set of the writer (or, less problematically, of the implicit narrator) by 
paying attention both to her explicit judgements and statements and to her 
implicit choices and modes of linguistically organizing the events. Tone, 
detail in describing a particular setting, or the way in which that setting 
determines the character’s mood, poetic resources, ways of construing a 
character, and so on, permit the reader to become acquainted not merely 
with the contents of a particular fictional world but with the author’s way 
of building it up24. 
Assuming that aesthetic intimacy has its home in a certain experience 
of the artist as expressed in her work, how should we characterize this 
21 This does not imply that there can be cases where a work’s expressive tone is something 
construed by the artist and that, therefore, it does not express the artist herself. In those 
cases, what we experience as the expressive character of the work is analogous to the implicit 
narrator in a literary work, where the perspective through which we enter into a particular 
fictional world is part of the artistic artefact and does not need to be the artist’s own. This 
must be granted because there are many occasions in which an artist’s working conditions 
do not allow for enough space to make artistic decisions that would be truly constitutive of 
an act of expression. However, I think that when an artist’s choices are her own, it is part of 
the understanding of her work that we grasp it as resulting from those choices and hence as 
manifesting or expressing the artist’s mind.
22 I cannot offer any conclusive argument or data to support this claim and it may be that I 
just take my own personal experience as paradigmatic in this respect. In any case, and if my 
suggestion that aesthetic intimacy is rooted in a certain relation to the artist’s expressiveness 
is on the right track, there is room for other experiences of aesthetic intimacy beyond the 
literary case. 
23 Ordinary expression, at least in its simplest cases, relies to a great extent on linguistic 
behaviour. Other important expressive resources are non-linguistic behaviour – such as 
gesturing – or simply acting. 
24 Haapala’s view on the possibility of seeing the artist in her work is elaborated in 2003.
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experience? Is aesthetic intimacy a matter of sharing the artist’s expressive 
perspective or attitude? Is it necessary that one identifies with that particular 
mode of expression or, at least, that one feels some kind of empathy 
towards it? How shall we understand the appreciator’s relationship with 
the expressive dimension of the work for it to count as a case of aesthetic 
intimacy? 
In a sense, aesthetic intimacy seems like intimacy with another person 
in that a feeling of proximity is involved. However, it is not clear how 
shall we understand this proximity. One natural place to look at could be 
identification or empathy. Aesthetic intimacy will be thus understood in 
terms of identifying oneself with the artist as expressed in her work or in 
a feeling of empathy towards her world. These notions have become very 
popular in the literature that focuses upon the different modes in which a 
reader or a spectator engages with artworks. Moreover, they have become 
very handy for solving other more general problems, such as the problem of 
knowing others’ mind or understanding other cultures or groups, which, in 
a sense, precede the issue of aesthetic intimacy or even the problem of art’s 
interpretation. In fact, identification and empathy have been increasingly 
considered as the key for overcoming a number of problems related to the 
alleged interpretative gap that hinders understanding among different 
groups and cultures. 
However, there are some reasons to be sceptical about the need for 
these notions or, at least, about their actual role. Following Constantine 
Sandis (2009) this overabundance of empathy and identification, rather 
than solving the problems they allegedly help to overcome, assumes and 
dramatizes the very sceptical position that originates the interpretative gap 
in the first place. In his view, empathy or identification can be understood 
more as a consequence of successfully understanding others than as a 
condition for it. In fact, the magic trick that empathy is supposed to perform 
in opening and disclosing the others’ mind only seems compelling if we 
initially assume that others’ minds are closed boxes whose contents are not 
available by someone who is outside the box. But if we accept that those 
alleged hidden contents are not so hidden and that they partly constitute 
themselves through the ways in which they are expressed, there is no need 
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to resort to a psychological trick in order to make understanding other 
mind possible. Understanding others is simply a matter of making sense 
of their behaviour with a deep concern for what it may be important and 
significant for them25.
Following Sandis’ reasoning, it is not obvious that understanding others, 
even in an intimate way, necessarily involves sharing a feeling or adopting the 
same perspective, as identification seems to require. Sometimes, those with 
whom we feel intimacy are not – and need not be – in the same predicament 
or situation as we are, nor is it required for intimacy that those who engage in 
that relation share a particular set of beliefs or attitudes. In fact, it may be that 
neither empathy nor identification is necessary for aesthetic intimacy to take 
place26. This may sound odd given the prominence and currency that these 
notions have in contemporary aesthetics and psychological approaches to art 
and fiction, but I think it is possible to show that a proper understanding of 
aesthetic intimacy repels these notions by paying attention to what intimacy, 
in more ordinary contexts, amounts to27. 
If neither identification nor empathy is the key, how shall we understand 
the sort of proximity involved? Haapala is certainly right in underlining 
the significance of one’s personal identity in determining which particular 
artworks we feel intimate with. As I have insisted above, aesthetic intimacy 
25 Sandis does not reject that psychological identification and empathy may be useful tools 
to reach cooperative behaviour or to other practices where feeling can actually play a 
motivating role. His concern is rather with those who consider empathy and psychological 
identification as necessary for understanding others. In his view, the need for empathy or 
identification is only pressing if we assume a sceptical attitude towards the possibility of 
understanding others “merely” by paying attention to what they do. But if we assume that 
people do express themselves in their behaviour, there is no need for a distinct method 
involving mental identification for overcoming doubt or ignorance. Uncertainty about how 
to understand someone’s behaviour does not vanish through engaging with psychological 
identification but through a closer and more concerned attention to her behaviour. 
26 Actually, adopting an identification stance may ruin the experience of aesthetic intimacy 
because it may display the author’s own perspective under the appreciator’s own light in a 
manner that stops paying enough attention to the author’s particular perspective.
27 One could argue that even if identification or empathy may not be necessary for 
understanding – or even intimate understanding – it may be required for the experience of 
intimacy. One thing is to understand someone else, even intimately, and another to share 
some intimate experience. Maybe intimacy requires identification or empathy in a manner 
in which mere understanding does not. Nevertheless, I hope to show that we can clarify 
aesthetic intimacy without resorting to them.
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goes beyond accurate artistic understanding or experiencing the work 
from an insider’s perspective. As with other experiences of intimacy, 
understanding is necessary but it cannot fully explain the special character 
of this experience. So, there seems to be something about us, considered 
as individuals, that partly explains aesthetic intimacy and that Haapala 
characterizes in terms of personal identity, history or circumstances.
I would like to pause here and examine how exactly this aspect is to be 
understood. When we pay attention to experiences of intimacy with other 
people, it seems that a precondition for this experience is that the subjects 
involved shared an important or significant lifespan; that they know each 
other in the way one knows someone who belongs to the same family or 
friendship. However, when we think about aesthetic intimacy – as the 
peculiar closeness an appreciator experiences with respect to a work or an 
author – the conditions are different. First, aesthetic intimacy often occurs 
when engaging with works we encounter for the first time and without 
knowing much about the author – or her work – in advance. So, a history 
of acquaintance with the work that elicits that experience does not seem to 
be a precondition for aesthetic intimacy. In fact, when we experience this 
sort of intimacy with works that we encounter for the first time we are, as it 
were, taken by surprise. Secondly, the experiences of intimacy with others 
are – at least in the paradigmatic cases – reciprocal28, but reciprocity cannot 
be a feature of aesthetic intimacy for obvious reasons. So, if we consider 
the role that a shared lifespan, familiarity, and reciprocity actually play in 
paradigmatic cases of intimacy, we soon realize that when we talk about 
the importance of one’s personal history in the occurrence of aesthetic 
intimacy we cannot simply draw an analogy from the non-aesthetic case. 
The role that our personal history plays in episodes of aesthetic intimacy 
must be different29. 
28 Maybe if we think of possible experiences of intimacy with objects (one’s childhood 
bedroom or playground) this condition is not necessary. But I think that it would be hard to 
find an intimate relationship between two people if one of them was not able to engage in 
the experience. There may be exceptions, as in some experiences of baby-care.
29 I think that a similar problem arises when we consider works that seem to elicit a nostalgic 
feeling in the appreciator. Since nostalgia seems to be intimately related to one’s personal 
history, it seems paradoxical that nostalgia is properly experienced in responding to a work. 
A recent exploration of this theme with respect to the emotion of nostalgia can be found in 
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So far I have been trying to remain as close as possible to our ordinary 
understanding of intimacy in order to illuminate the notion of aesthetic 
intimacy. Deep understanding – without necessarily feeling empathy or 
identification – proximity or familiarity, and a sense that something related 
to one’s own identity is at stake seem to be part of this experience. As I have 
tried to show, this last aspect seems hard to explain given that the sense of 
familiarity and proximity experienced towards an author does not seem to 
be grounded upon the actual acquaintance with the author. And yet when 
we experience aesthetic intimacy with a work there seems to be something 
intimately related to us as individual or particular subjects30. Maybe one 
way in which we can conceive this personal aspect is by considering the 
manner in which we relate to the expressive world of an artist or to the 
artist as expressed in her work. The works that we aesthetically experience 
in an intimate way are those in which we experience that a particular 
way of expression or a particular perspective could be our own – without 
actually having to be so – or that a deep understanding of that expressive 
endeavour is part of one’s experience of the work. It may be difficult to 
make explicit the personal aspects that make us feel that certain expressive 
world is familiar or close. But whatever these aspects are, the experience of 
aesthetic intimacy seems to be partly grounded upon the sort of proximity 
we experience with respect to that particular expressive world.
II.2 
AESTHETIC INTIMACY AS AN AESTHETICALLY 
VALUABLE EXPERIENCE
Finally, following this tentative characterization of aesthetic intimacy, I would like to draw some conclusion concerning the value that this special form of experiencing artworks may have as an aesthetic and 
as a more general experience. I think one way in which the aesthetic value 
Martínez Marín (forthcoming in Debates in Aesthetics).
30 See note 16 above.
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of this experience can be characterized is by focusing on the possibility 
of feeling a certain proximity or closeness that is not merely explained by 
having shared a lifespan – as in ordinary intimacy – or by sharing someone’s 
perspective, set of beliefs, or attitudes. The key aspect of aesthetic intimacy 
is precisely that we feel certain proximity with someone’s expressive world 
or manner of producing artworks; that is, whose aesthetic decisions we 
experience as close. The intimacy is with the aesthetic dimension of the 
work and not with the author’s expressed beliefs or attitudes; that is, the 
intimacy is felt with the way in which the artist aesthetically works out 
the world presented in her work, with the artist’s aesthetic self.31 In this 
sense, aesthetic intimacy affords a special kind of understanding where 
the bonding tie lies precisely in the artist’s aesthetic choices and in their 
expressive dimension and not in a theoretical or moral partnership.
This may also serve to explain the significance of aesthetic intimacy 
more generally. Beyond its aesthetic importance, aesthetic intimacy offers, 
I think, a kind of experience where one discovers modes of expression 
that, albeit produced by others and therefore not one’s own, speak to us 
with a particular closeness. In this sense, I think aesthetic intimacy shows 
the possibility of achieving a deep understanding of others’ subjectivity 
that is not based on a prior common history, familiarity or friendship. 
Aesthetic intimacy, rare as it is, makes us aware of the possibility of a deep 
understanding and proximity that does not rely on a prior belonging to a 
particular group nor upon possessing a particular worldview.
31 By ‘aesthetic self ’ I refer to those aesthetic features that are perceived as constituting an 
artist’s style, that is, to those aesthetic choices that become characteristic of an artist and that 
end up constituting a way to acknowledge her artistic and aesthetic profile.
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Knut Ove eLiassen
QUALITY ISSUES 
ABSTRACT
Taking its point of the departure in examples drawn from marketing, 
quality assurance, and aesthetics, the article analyzes different historical 
configurations of the quality concept in order to demonstrate how the 
term’s semantics is intrinsic to the conceptual economies of which it 
is an element. Moreover, the article draws attention the “spillage” 
between the different modern quality discourses in the sense that the 
specific usage of the term in one context have come to influence, even 
“contaminate” the content of the concept in a different context. The 
effects of this is manifest in the contemporary neo-liberal phraseology 
of quality assurance where the word quality notoriously fluctuates 
between the normative and the descriptive. Identifying three different 
quality concepts in the contemporary discourse on quality, the paper 
argues that the analysis in the final account show how the temporality 
structures inherent to the three concepts reveal their possible political 
consequences.
I
Is there anything more quotidian than aesthetic quality? One defining feature of the affluent society is the permanent pressure exerted on the aesthetic faculties of its citizens. As consumers, we assess quality on 
an everyday basis. Thanks to life-long comprehensive training most of us 
have acquired the skills needed to navigate the abundance of commodities 
confronting us when we enter stores, turn on the television set, open our 
laptops, choose restaurants, plan the weekend getaway, etc. In the era of 
neo-liberalism and unbridled commodity fetishism – what Marx called 
the spectacle of die Warenästhetik –, the gold standard and common 
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denominator of these endlessly proliferating acts of judgment is that magic 
formula of the customer surveys, quality.
While the emphasis on quality has been a distinguishing feature of the 
rationality of 20th century marketing, during the last decades the term has 
migrated into the world of public service as an effect of the implementation 
of management philosophies originating in business studies. Total quality 
control, the now more than half a century old principle of American business 
guru, Armand Vallin Feigenbaum, is now a part of the very infra-structure 
of public administrations across the Western World. ‘Quality assurance’ is 
the order of the day due to the expanding implementations of the quality 
standards of ISO – International Standards Organization – and the increasing 
pressure exerted on public servants to provide a quality product, be it in 
social care, education, or for that matter the army. “Smaller, but smarter”, 
“better service for less money”, “more bang for the bucks”, are familiar 
mantras that clearly signal the semantic universe as well as the purposes of 
modern management philosophy’s notions of quality.
In the world of art, a third concept of quality still lingers, a reminiscence 
of modernist aesthetics’ claim that quality is recognizable by art’s capacity 
(the performance, the text, the object) to transgress the cognitive horizon of 
its audiences. Genuine artistic quality manifests itself against the backdrop 
of standards of taste. Modern art is thus fundamentally agonistic; its power 
to distinguish and establish hierarchies (new/old, good/bad, genuine/kitsch 
etc.) is an intrinsic and defining feature. However, to understand quality as 
the measure of works of art’s singular nature and its – by the very same token 
– capacity to transcend established aesthetic standards of artistic traditions 
implicated that true works of art assert themselves as such by negating that 
which precedes them. To the degree that the aesthetic verdicts of works 
contain appeals to higher reasons than art, applying measuring sticks such 
as taste, ideology or moral value, the aesthetic argument is suspended as 
the work is evaluated as a medium serving other purposes than art. Works 
of arts that appeal to criteria of evaluation external to aesthetic reason do 
not meet the modernist requirements of aesthetic quality.
Three different notions of quality, three different conceptual economies. 
The proliferating and ubiquitous user satisfaction queries that accompany 
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an increasing number of the consumer’s business transactions come across 
less a sign of concern for the quality of the product, than an indication of 
fear felt by service providers and retailers for the fickle nature of the easily 
seduced customer. Protocols of quality assurance are, on the other hand, in 
principle the practical application of certain standards in order to ensure 
that a product meets a set of required and expected specifications. Finally, 
the somewhat paradoxical modernist notion of quality is, so to speak, 
that of a standard that is not at standard. Contrary to how the quality 
concept functions in the world of commodity aesthetics and new public 
management, the transgressive nature of genuine works of art prevents the 
establishment of a positive class concept. Moreover, as long as the concept 
of transgression requires both the negation of the forms of tradition as well 
as the expectations of the audience, it is clearly at odds with the metrics 
principle of contemporary quality assurance.
In sum, the aesthetic spectacle of commodities, the metrics of quality 
assurance and the qualities of the experience of art, refer to irreconcilable 
and asymmetrical notions of quality. Not because one is normative and the 
others are descriptive – the normative and the descriptive are elements of all 
the three conceptual economies –, but because they articulate the relations 
between the normative and the descriptive in different ways. Thus, there 
is, strictly speaking, not one concept of quality, but several. In itself, this 
is hardly controversial; however, it is an insight of some relevance to the 
existing discourses on quality, where there is a tendency that these different 
concepts are confused. Due to their homonymy, they tend to blend into 
each other. Given the current topicality of the concept of quality in several 
disparate fields, a renewed discussion of the concept might yield insights 
that can shed some light both on the complex reasons for its popularity as 
well as the concept’s potential as an analytic tool. A historical analysis of 
the concept might provide some critical distance to the phraseology that is 
currently prevailing.
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II
“Quality is to a product, what character is to a man”. The slogan belongs to one of the pioneers of modern marketing, Johan Henry Heinz. Originally appearing in the 1890s on Heinz’ 
ketchup-bottles, the motto is symptomatic for the new challenges of 
marketing that arose in the early days of mass consumption. Mass produced 
commodities are uniform as they adhere to standards. While the absence 
of distinguishing features might be desirable from the point of view of the 
standardization protocols of production, they are less so in marketing; on 
display in the store, alongside other competing products, distinction is a 
precarious value. A visit to the nearest food store will confirm to what degree 
Heinz has succeeded in promoting the difference that makes a difference. 
Thanks to its fusion with Kraft foods, Kraft Heinz Company became the fifth 
largest food company in the world. Heinz’ slogan still appears on a large 
number of their products along with the number 57 in elevated types on 
the container. It is symptomatic of Heinz’ aesthetic approach to marketing 
that the claim that the company offers 57 different products never had any 
root in reality; the idea was that the number looked good on the container 
and better than other numbers. Still, his most revolutionary marketing idea 
was that the container had to be transparent in order for the customers 
themselves to see the quality of the product on display. There is an appeal 
to the gaze of the customer in the packaging of Heinz’ products; they are 
meant to seduce.
“Quality is to a product, what character is to a man”. Heinz’ motto has two 
elements. The first draws the customer’s attention to the producer’s awareness 
of the virtues of quality assurance. While it certainly contains an echo of 
a marketing rhetoric as old as the institution of the market place itself, the 
wording reveals the distinct modern industrial horizon of mass production. 
The second part establishes what is properly speaking an analogy: A is to 
B, what C is to D. What is at stake is not the truth claim of the analogy, but 
the particular phraseology of the statement. Heinz’ slogan and his marketing 
strategies are of interest not only as early testimonies of the simulacra of 
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modern marketing’s commodity aesthetics, but because they bring together 
two distinctly different modern concepts of quality: the technological notion 
of “product quality” (the A to B relation) and the aesthetic notion of “individual 
quality” (the C to D relation). The first concept originates in the benefits of 
protocols of standardization and quality assurance in early industrial mass 
production; here, quality is that which is conform with a set of standards, in 
other words, a defined minimum value. The second echo implies uniqueness 
and inherent value independent of external standards; “a man’s character” 
is rather a singular prototype than a quality product. Character is thus for 
Heinz a question of origin and provenance denoting singularity, that which 
sets the individual apart from the rest.
“Sell quality and the price doesn’t matter”, is another of Johan Henry 
Heinz’ bon mots that has been passed down as received wisdom in the world 
of marketing. Clearly not meant to be taken literally, the hyperbolic statement 
draws attention to how individual quality and product quality are distinctly 
different concepts both with regard to the way they are constructed and to 
the nature of what they articulate. The son of a German immigrant and 
the inheritor of the values and words from the Europe’s class society, John 
Henry Heinz cleverly draws on the semantics of the old world to market mass 
produced victuals in the new world. His ketchup was explicitly not marketed 
as a product for everyone, but for those that had the desire to be different and 
had the money to prove it. Sold at 12 cent a bottle, rather than the 10 cents 
that was the current running price for ketchup bottles, Heinz is an obvious 
case of what American sociologist Thorsten Veblen a few years later called 
“conspicuous consumption”, the aesthetic practice of providing oneself with 
a distinct social persona through ostentatious consumption.
III
The notion of individual quality inherent in Heinz’ slogans does not appear to allude to the notion of singularity found in the art world; the uniqueness of Heinz’ ketchup is brandished in contrast 
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to the bland uniformity of other industrial products, not as a transgression 
of the aesthetic conventions of tradition. Heinz’ audience of consumers 
was more familiar with the idea of the singularity of character than that of 
the artwork. However, another explanation presents itself, Heinz’ slogans 
reflects the realities of historical semantics, namely that the idea of moral 
qualities have a much longer and stronger conceptual tradition than those 
of artistic qualities. 
The semantic core of the second part of the motto, “character is a question 
of quality”, is traceable to the moral philosophy of the Enlightenment and 
the political conflicts between the first and the third estate. In the 18th century, 
“Quality” refers to character traits that distinguishes and elevates certain 
individuals, persons of quality, from the populace as such. In the world of 
l’ancien régime and pre-revolutionary Europe, one social distinction stood 
out against all the others, namely the one between “persons of quality”, 
and “persons of no consequence” – clichés of social identity that were just 
as current in England as in France.
According to the Enlightenment’s major work of reference, Diderot and 
d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des 
métiers, “une personne de qualité” is someone that by the power of his title 
or position exercises authority and upholds the rights belonging to him by 
right. This, the entry explicitly contrasts to those without quality, whose 
existence is of “no consequence”. This, for a modern sensibility, somewhat 
undemocratic and elitist distinction between first-rate and second-rate 
individuals, expresses the estate society’s fundamental distinction between 
nobility and ordinary people, between those whose family name, the 
synecdoche of the ancestry, warranted their quality, and those whose name 
both began and ended with themselves. The word character is hence the 
metonym for the natural order between individuals; there are those with 
character that stand out, and those without that disappear without leaving 
a trace into the faceless multitude from where they briefly emerged.
There are several entries under the entry word “qualité” in Diderot and 
d’Alembert’s encyclopedia. Noteworthy enough, none of them addresses 
issues of aesthetics or the arts (despite the fact that Diderot was not merely 
a prolific author of fiction but also a pioneer in the genre of art criticism). 
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Instead, the reader learns that qualities (plural) are constitutive of a person’s 
character and are the crucial elements of his moral habitus, whereas a 
person’s talents decide whether he or she is useful or entertaining. Quality – 
contrary to talent – is not measurable by any standards of usefulness; it is an 
internal property that manifest itself in a moral disposition that is autotelic, 
an end in itself, but also the confirmation of the values of a social hierarchy.
A few years earlier, philosopher David Hume wrote a brief meditation 
on “The Standards of Taste” raising the issue of the existence of a principle 
that could serve to confirm or condemn aesthetic verdicts. In the singular, 
the word quality appears four times in the short text. Beauty is “no quality 
in things themselves”, Hume states, it exists merely in the mind. Wit is a 
“desirable quality”, he continues, and taste is “hereditary quality”. Finally, the 
quality of beauty or defect is integral to individual perception and experience, 
as illustrated by the effects of sickness on taste perception. The taste 
judgments of sick persons are thus not only deficient, but also conditional or 
automatic. In order to claim validity, an aesthetic assessment must be free. In 
the plural, as qualities, the term occurs seven times in the short text, referring 
to the objective properties of the things perceived, like ‘soft’, ‘warm’, ‘round’, 
etc. Physical rather than aesthetic categories, they do not carry aesthetic 
verdicts. While the brief text merits a more thorough examination, what 
we shall retain is how the reasoning rests on the premises of an individual 
in possession of naturally given discerning taste. Aesthetic verdicts are true 
only as long as they are not conditioned. Aesthetic competence is the moral 
prerogative distinguishing those in possession of it by birth.
IV
Few have done more than the merchant class to disseminate the concept of quality. Ingvar Kamprad and IKEA’s “everyday quality” is in the 21st century a central part of the global retail reality. The formula expresses 
a marketing idea as simple as it is brilliant: The company guarantees that a 
given product, for instance a drawer, can be opened 50 000 times without 
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breaking. The test apparatuses installed at the IKEA stores emphasize the 
point by allowing the passing customers witness the company’s dedication 
to thorough testing procedures. Heinz’ inventive didacticism sprang from his 
understanding of the power inherent in making visible the prime quality of 
his tomato-ketchup by using a transparent container. In the world of IKEA, 
the repetitive spectacle of the drawer-pulling robot visualizes how quantity 
is quality, pedagogically demonstrating for the discerning customers the 
abstract principles of quality assurance and standardization.
Semantically complex, the IKEA concept of “everyday quality” draws its 
rhetorical power from a heteroclite range of connotations. Contrary to Heinz, 
Kamprad’s strategy was not to appeal to the individuality of the consumer, 
but instead to court the aesthetic sensitivities of the upward moving educated 
young Nordic middle class for whom egalitarianism and anti-snobbism 
where crucial components to their collective self-image. Marketing slogans 
such as the 2010 catalogue’s “We are all from Småland”, turns Swedish 
protestant provincialism into a global sub-culture egalitarian identity marker 
for young people across the globe paradoxically while tapping into much of 
the same desires for social distinction as Heinz’ ketchup.
As the case was with Heinz, IKEA’s clever advertising motto mobilizes 
another context, namely that of functional quality. While the aesthetics 
of functional quality inevitably carries with it echoes of Puritan anti-
aestheticism, it also carries with it the assuring sound of quality protocols. 
Since the end of the Second World War ISO, The International Standard 
Organization, has dedicated itself to provide international standards 
in order to ensure functional quality (i.e., technical requirements) and 
product reliability for the benefit of producers and consumers alike. It 
is against this backdrop of rationalisation of the world of commodities 
that IKEA’s concept of functional quality takes on its full meaning. At the 
same time as the company’s marketing division has been exploiting the 
cultural distinction of the consumer movements of the sixties’ anti-snob 
quality focus, at the same time emphasizing the company’s dedication to 
protocols of production, customer satisfaction, and ecological standards. 
Their annual catalogues showcase a puritan ethos of quality conscious 
consumption aestheticized as life style simulacra.
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V
What the Heinz’ and Kamprad’s examples illustrate is how aesthetic judgements have become integral to our everyday activities against the backdrop of a mixture of modern industry’s 
quality protocols and a moral subtext of social distinction. We select movies 
according to preferences, moods, and the nature of our company, drawing on 
the knowledge we might have of genres and directors and with the discerning 
customer’s knowledge that consumption also is identity construction. We 
buy decorative posters or prints because they appeal to our aesthetic sense, 
and convey a feeling of being part of “something contemporary”. We visit 
exhibitions to be pleased, educated or to change the daily routine. These 
activities originate in judgements derived from knowledge, experience, and a 
sense of aesthetic distinction. They originate in specific taste regimes marked 
by education, interests, and trends. What the movie rental, the poster, and 
the museum ticket have in common is that they are commercial objects 
that are part of a social semantic. They serve purposes as entertainment, 
beautification and, not the least, distinction.
Conventionally, the non-quantifiable nature of artistic productions is 
conceived of as integral to their singularity, their uniqueness. That good 
art contain an element of something new, never before seen or heard, a “je 
ne sais quoi”, is fundamental to the idea of aesthetic epistemology’s notion 
of quality. This requirement holds even for artistic works understood as 
a critique of aesthetic essentialism. Marcel Duchamp’s ready-mades, 
Andy Warhol’s Brillo boxes, or Daniel Buren’s striped awning canvas are 
famous examples of this critique. Here, the aesthetic gestures’ singularity 
– their context, irony, or site specificity – provide a specificity that 
transcends the uniform and eventless nature of the industrial products 
that form the material basis of the works. A corollary of this claim is that 
aesthetic quality is not merely about the object’s singular and unique 
nature, but also about a specific temporality, namely the fundamental 
openness that defines works of art as such. The aesthetic experience is an 
event, and aesthetic reflection is always after the fact. Hence, an artwork’s 
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quality is not to be anticipated, and cannot follow as the consequence of 
standardised production processes. Art schools teach skills and provide 
technical training, but not talent. Neither did their historical predecessors, 
the ateliers of the old masters, or the art academies of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.
That aesthetic quality is contingent upon the knowledge and qualifi-
cations of the audience does not necessarily mean that aesthetic judgements 
have no validity beyond their immediate contexts. While the appreciation 
of some works of art disappears with the aesthetic paradigm that brought 
them forth, others have outlived numerous aesthetic regimes and retained 
their appeal (though the nature of the appeal might have changed). 
Walter Benjamin once famously pointed out how artworks depend upon 
the technological conditions of their production and distribution. Thus, 
mechanical reproduction undermined the idea of an artwork’s uniqueness, 
what the German philosopher calls its “Einmaligkeit”. The term is often 
rendered as “uniqueness”, however the translation misses an important 
aspect of the German word, its temporality. What characterises a work of 
art is not only its singular existence in space, but also its singular existence 
in time – it cannot be copied without loss of aesthetic quality. Reproduction 
– that is the production of identical series of objects – therefore changes 
the essence of the object. Quality protocols are fundamentally intended to 
make possible serial uniformity in production. Artworks’ relations to their 
feedback into the production process must hence be fundamentally different 
from those predominant in commodity and service production spheres.
Product quality is pragmatic and property-oriented referring to more or 
less arbitrary protocols of measurement and evaluation; individual quality 
is ontological and existential, designating innate properties, they are akin 
to what, in Heinz’ words, “character is to a man”. Contingent upon external 
criteria “product quality” is a notion that necessarily implies a second 
order level, the given quality specification for a production run. The term’s 
content (its critical reference) is a function of a scale that precedes it. A 
standard is a given threshold value on the scale applied and by which it can 
be judged to be of “prime quality” (and thus distinctly different from that 
which is of secondary or tertiary quality).
111
Any concept of quality, that is of evaluation, or Wertschätzung in the 
vocabulary of German aesthetics, is necessarily marked by interest. The 
standards, scales and values that come with it are always situation specific, 
they express someone’s standards, scales and values. Any concept of quality, 
whether normative or descriptive, cannot but function within a larger 
complex of social relations, and is thus always liable to be appropriated, 
invested and subject to negotiations, and thus eminently political.
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WORK AND PLAY – THE BUILT ENVIRONMENTS 
IN TERRY GILLIAM’S BRAZIL
ABSTRACT
The article examines the meaning of space and architecture, the point 
of departure being the British cult film Brazil, directed by Terry Gilliam 
in 1985. The film appears as a satirical postmodern dystopia of a society 
that is exposed to the forces of surrealist and violent bureaucracy and 
the life of people is deeply estranged. In this world, the practices and 
conditions of work have turned nonsensical, and dreaming is the sole 
means of escape from the oppressive life in the society of control. From 
the viewpoints offered by Jacques Derrida’s and Martin Heidegger’s 
theories of architecture and living, the article clarifies the meaning 
and position of constructed milieus in Brazil: how they reflect our 
vision of work and its meaning and how imagined spaces emerge in 
the context of the film. As the author argues, a sense of fundamental 
dysfunctionality is what characterises both the environments of the 
film and the notion of contemporary life that creates them. 
In Terry Gilliam’s1 film Brazil everyday life is inextricably entangled with fantasy, and daily work, living and cityscape are presented in the light of imagination and the extraordinary. Although humorous and often 
funny and ironic, the film is not only a satire of the everyday life, but it 
also offers the spectator a deep dystopia of life in a society in which the 
individual is exposed to the mercy of bureaucracy and the force of faceless 
administration that uses its power in unanticipated and often violent ways. 
In its dystopian vision of the future, Brazil has similarities with George 
Orwell’s novel 1984 (1949).2 In this article, I examine how, in Brazil, the 
1 Terry Gilliam, the American-born British director of Brazil, has become known as one of the 
members of the Monty Python group.
2 There are obvious differences between Brazil and 1984, however; for example, the fact that 
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encounter between the realistic, the fantastic and the sinister becomes 
reflected in the environments in which the film takes place. This is done 
by considering the philosophical framework offered by the deconstructive 
notion of architecture. 
In a number of earlier studies, Brazil has been accounted for as a 
dystopia of a society where bureaucracy has taken over the human life.3 
The motivation of my interpretation is, however, rather the social analysis 
and the role of places that appear recurrently in the film. Especially 
interesting is the relation of the cinematic environments to the then 
contemporary and much debated theories of architecture, especially as 
formulated by the philosopher Jacques Derrida. I shall look at how, in 
Brazil, the modern functionality of places and architecture has yielded 
in front of the dysfunctional, merely structural importance of sites and 
buildings, which is in the focus of many postmodern and deconstructive 
theories of art and architecture. I shall shed light on elements in the film 
and its environments that appear as mutually incompatible and thus create 
a sense of displacement in modern life – in play and work.
Brazil is about the impossible encounter between dreams and reality, 
between individual urges and desires and the restrictions of the community, 
which in Brazil is represented by a totalitarian society. In this community, 
work has a crucial position and people rely intensely on machines. The 
way in which working life appears is surprisingly modern still today, more 
than 30 years after the completion of the film, even though its information 
technology is presented as an amalgamation of early twentieth century 
archival systems, pneumatic tube mail, and even data processing. What 
is shown from the perspective of a dystopia in the film has not lost its 
cutting edge, but remains as dystopic in the contemporary world as it was 
in the mid-1980s. What is even more, it seems that the prophecies of Brazil 
have become more accurate than before in our use of digital surveillance 
Brazil is missing a big brother character. Control in Brazil is more arbitrary and dispersed 
among competing departments of administration.
3 Examples of such studies are Jack Mathews’ The Battle of Brazil: Terry Gilliam v. Universal 
Pictures in the Fight to the Final Cut (1987), Bruce Krajewski’s “Post-Modernism, Allegory, and 
Hermeneutics in Brazil” (1988) and Richard A. Rogers’ “1984 to Brazil: From the Pessimism of 
Reality to the Hope of Dreams” (1990).
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and algorithmic faceless control. The film is a site of encounter for the 
meaningful and the senseless, the normal and the abnormal, the everyday, 
art and fantasy. The film’s name derives from a bossa nova song Aquarela 
do Brazil composed by Ary Barroso in 1939. A modern version of this song 
is used as a leitmotiv and it is heard repeatedly; yet it has only a vague 
connection with what takes place in the scenes where it appears. Instead, 
the Brazil theme song is likely to create a contrast with the gloomy reality 
of the film, representing the realm of dreams. 
WORK AND THE PLAY 
OF IMAGINATION IN BRAZIL
In the world depicted by the film, administration has been divided into different ministries and departments: for instance, the Department of Works, the Department of Records and the Department of Adjustment. 
Attempts at control and the ensuing careful division of work guide the 
employees’ activities. However, in Brazil their effects are often of a negative 
kind, and the life of many inhabitants turns in the course of the film into 
an uncontrollable series of incidents. This is especially the case of the 
central character of Brazil, Mr. Sam Lowry. Lowry, a relatively humble office 
worker at the Department of Records, dreams of promotion. It turns out 
to be increasingly difficult to obtain. As the difficulties at the workplace 
accumulate, the spectator may see the absurdity of the Ministry: what is 
probably intended to look like a logical division of work into Departments, 
leads to a situation that is completely the opposite. The work loses its 
significance, as it is not connected to anything else that is done in the giant 
institution. In Brazil, work only seems to mean performing one’s share in 
a machine that does not seem to function in any comprehensible manner.
Architecture and the aesthetics of place have a prominent role in the 
way Gilliam’s dystopia is brought to life: Brazil offers the spectator types of 
buildings that can be easily recognised but that have, nevertheless, turned 
into something strange and repulsive. In the nameless city where the film 
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takes place, control and processes of centralisation have taken over all the 
functions of life. People are under continual supervision, and they are 
made to work long days, with obviously no idea as to how their work is 
part of any meaningful whole – at least they cannot know about its context. 
The different departments, however, are crowded, and the offices and other 
work spaces strikingly small. The central position is occupied by the office 
building of the Department of Records. The most remarkable – and the 
most eerie – part of this building is its pompous lobby. Its ornamentation 
brings to mind Fascist sculptures, and the scale of the entire building 
appears strongly exaggerated. 
It is in the built environments of Brazil that I suggest there is a parallel 
with what is meant by the deconstructionist view on architecture. Brazil is 
contemporaneous with the heyday of postmodern and deconstructionist 
theorizing of architecture, namely the early and mid-1980s. As Jacques 
Derrida (1997, 319) has proposed, for deconstructionist thinking, 
architecture offers not only a technique, but also a possibility of thought, 
which cannot be reduced to the status of a representation of thought. In 
architecture, there may thus be undiscovered ways of thinking belonging to 
the architectural moment, to desire and to creation. In brief, architectonics 
is defined as an art of systems, and therefore as an art that is suitable for the 
rational organization of complete branches of knowledge and of structures. 
This notion does not only concern buildings but also the idea of working; 
as I see it, they are organised in a reminiscent fashion in Brazil. Or rather, it 
might be stated that they are disorganized in comparable way. 
In the following, I shall have a look at the buildings in the film as models 
of estranged living in the modern and contemporary world. 
For Immanuel Kant, ‘architectonic’ is defined as the “art of systems”. 
‘Architectonic’ refers to both the art of constructing a system of science based 
on an “idea of the whole” of the science, and to that idea itself, its “general 
delineation or outline” (Kant 1992, 590). The system is characterized by an 
organized unity, which is the end to which the parts of the science relate, 
and in which they relate to each other. At stake is thus the art of establishing 
structures. Kant’s architectonic is part of his doctrine of the faculties: pure 
and practical reason, theoretical understanding, aesthetic judgement and 
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their various modalities or powers.4 Because of his interest in structures of 
thought, Jacques Derrida’s work is concerned with “architectural” models 
and metaphors. Specifically, this means to him systems that are comparable 
to architectonic models. These systems create places and spaces, which 
have been or may be meaningful to us.
Brazil is a film in which work and bureaucracy govern the life of people. 
This suggests that there is perhaps little life outside the stifling force 
of offices. The protagonist, Sam Lowry, works as a minor officer who, by 
chance, becomes part of a series of increasingly complicated incidents. He 
attempts to escape the suffocating powers affecting his life in the dystopic 
city. Lowry finds his work consuming and pointless; the organisations of the 
society seem to work for the sake of bureaucracy only. As a character, Sam 
Lowry is not a traditional hero. However, he has the capability of dreaming 
and imagination, which in a romantic fashion takes him out of the sombre 
darkness of the city. In the course of the film, Lowry has dreams in which 
there is always bright sunshine and clear sky, something that cannot be seen 
elsewhere amidst the buildings of the cityscape. Only in his dream world 
is Lowry able to move outside the totalitarian order of his environments. 
He escapes the absurdities of life into dreams, but by doing so, he loses the 
sense of what is dream and what is reality. His pursuit of dreams does not 
lead to a better world or to beauty. Instead, such ideas prove to be mere 
illusions. In Lowry’s fate, Terry Gilliam’s harsh vision of the contemporary 
world is revealed at the end of the film: the society punishes Sam Lowry for 
something he is not guilty of, and he falls into apathy where all sensibility 
is suspended.
Brazil begins one evening on the streets of the city at Christmas time, 
“somewhere in the 20th century”, as it is announced in a caption. The first 
scenes refer to the mediatisation of reality: while TV sets in a shop window 
show advertisements, an explosion takes place in the neighbourhood. The 
TV sets continue showing their programmes in the middle of terrorist 
4 Kant explores the subject of architectonic in the third chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason’s 
“Transcendental Doctrine of Method” entitled “The Architectonic of Pure Reason”. There he 
sees it as “the doctrine of the scientific in our knowledge” or the art of making “a system out of 
a mere aggregate of knowledge” (A 832/B 860). 
117
bombings. In the Ministry of Information, an interview is made about 
terrorist attacks. Simultaneously, a fly is buzzing around in an office room. 
The office worker swats it, and the fly falls into his typewriter or computer. 
As a result of this, the name of the terrorist that is being typed – Archibald 
Tuttle – becomes Archibald Buttle because the falling fly causes a mistake 
in the typewriter. As if following the principle of structuralist semantics, 
there thus occurs a crucial difference of one phoneme that changes the 
whole meaning of the name. While the members of the innocent Buttle 
family are celebrating Christmas, they are invaded by government troops 
and Mr. Buttle is killed for being suspected guilty of terrorism. Troops make 
the family sign a paper that reads: “We do not make mistakes”. However, 
slightly later at the Department of Records, an officer called Mr. Kurtzmann 
types “Archibald Buttle”, and an ERROR announcement appears on the 
computer screen.5 Such points of departure encapsulate what takes place 
in Brazil. There occurs an unintended mistake in the system, which cannot 
be admitted, the reason being that “We do not make mistakes”. The error 
escalates into more and more irrational incidents, and the film’s irony, 
directed at the alleged omnipotence of administration, work, machines and 
armed forces, is more than obvious.
Sam Lowry escapes the absurdities of his reality by dreaming: in his 
recurrent dream, he is presented as a flying superhero resembling Icarus 
who is able to defeat both real and imaginary enemies. Sam meets a lady 
called Jill Layton, whom he saves from mythical beasts. In the end, dreams 
and reality become confused in a way that they cannot be told apart any 
longer, which leads to Lowry’s extermination. The system, however, 
survives. 
The events of the film occur in places that have turned into nightmarish 
images of themselves. What seems familiar at first sight appears to be 
strange, as there is something grotesque in the way that spaces and 
architecture are configured. Brazil turns the “normal” and the “habitual” 
5 By naming the officer with a German-sounding name, Kurtzmann, Terry Gilliam makes 
possible an association to the gravely estranged character of Captain Kurtz in Joseph Conrad’s 
novella The Heart of Darkness (1899/1902) and the subsequent film Apocalypse Now (1979) by 
Francis Ford Coppola. There exists a number of other “germanised” names in Brazil as well, 
such as Warrenn and Helpmann, an obvious nod to Nazi bureaucracy.
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into their opposites, while what appears as uncanny to our eyes becomes 
revealed as the seemingly usual state of things within the scope of the film.
Although all the functions of the society of the city in Brazil seem 
strictly organised, there prevails at the same time a constant fear among 
the workers and other inhabitants, as there are recurrent terrorist attacks 
in public spaces, workers are corrupt, and anyone may be sentenced for 
surreal crimes, whether they have really taken place or not. The film shows 
that anything may happen in its dystopic reality. One’s privacy is no longer 
guaranteed, and “government” troops are allowed to invade the homes of 
people for whatever reason. 
The plot itself appears fragmentary, despite the fact that it is 
chronological. The events are scattered in multiple sequences and 
characters at first do not seem to be related to each other in any coherent 
way, although a degree of consistency soon becomes distinguishable on the 
thematic level. One of the leading motifs of the film is terrorism, which was 
a topical issue in the Britain of the 1980s after the frequent terrorist attacks 
of the IRA in the late 1970s. In Brazil, the threat of terrorism does not come so 
much from the outside than from the inside of the society and its members. 
Although it is left fairly vague, Brazil’s terrorism seems to originate from 
anti-government resistance. The urban society also represents a world of 
competition, in which people like Lowry’s mother take recourse in absurd 
ways to keep a favourable image of themselves and to avoid the unpleasant 
reality; she escapes it by means of cosmetic surgery.
The film shows that there is a chance of injustice in every organised 
system, while systems do not represent merely order, but, even more 
than order, their functioning also includes the possibility of coincidence, 
whether lucky or unlucky. Therefore, anyone can become a victim or a 
victor in the system. 
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FROM DWELLINGS TO DECONSTRUCTED 
STRUCTURES: ARCHITECTURE IN BRAZIL
When watched from the perspective of places, the locations in Brazil play a large role in the meanings they are given and how they appear repeatedly as sites of action. The main locations 
of the film can be divided into four principal categories, namely office, city, 
Sam Lowry’s apartment house and his dreams. As I claim, they not only 
provide different frames for the action, but also show a different attitude 
towards how architecture is used and how its function is defined.
To make a contrast between the modern functionality of life and 
architecture and the postmodern dysfunctionality of which Brazil provides 
a vision, a comparison between Martin Heidegger’s and, respectively, 
Jacques Derrida’s notions of building may be drawn. In his philosophy, 
Heidegger (2001) establishes a firm link between the notions of building, 
dwelling and thinking. As he says, his “thinking about building does not 
presume to discover architectural ideas, let alone to give rules for building” 
(ibid., 143). Consequently, his theory does not view building as an art or as 
a technique of construction, but rather “it traces building back into that 
domain to which everything that is belongs.” For Heidegger, building brings 
with itself the senses of “shelter” and “dwelling”, a place for humans to live 
in and to act in a meaningful way: “We attain to dwelling, so it seems, only 
by means of building. The latter, building, has the former, dwelling, as its 
goal” (ibid.). This is to say that in Heidegger’s thought building is designed 
for a purpose. Still, it is useful to remember that not every building is a 
dwelling for Heidegger: “Bridges and hangars, stadiums and power stations 
are buildings but not dwellings; railway stations and highways, dams and 
market halls are built, but they are not dwelling places. Even so, these 
buildings are in the domain of our dwelling. … These buildings house man. 
He inhabits them and yet does not dwell in them, when to dwell means 
merely that we take shelter in them” (ibid.).
For Heidegger, dwelling and building are related as end and means 
(ibid., 144). In dwelling, he says, “something decisive is concealed”, because 
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dwelling has so far not been experienced as man’s being. Dwelling means 
even something more: it is for Heidegger the basic character of human 
being. Thus, dwelling connotes remaining and staying in place (ibid., 146–
147). Dwelling is living with things of the world: “To dwell, to be set at peace, 
means to remain at peace within the free sphere that safeguards each thing 
in its nature. The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and 
preserving. It pervades dwelling in its whole range. That range reveals 
itself to us as soon as we reflect that human being consists in dwelling and, 
indeed, dwelling in the sense of the stay of mortals on the earth” (ibid., 147).
Dwelling refers to place and location, while mathematical space has 
neither of these properties. Therefore, dwelling is always in relation to 
human existence. As Heidegger concludes, “When we speak of man and 
space, it sounds as though man stood on one side, space on the other. Yet 
space is not something that faces man. It is neither an external object nor an 
inner experience. It is not that there are men, and over and above them space; 
for when I say ‘a man’, and in saying this word think of a being who exists in 
a human manner – that is, who dwells – then by the name ‘man’ I already 
name the stay within the fourfold among things” (ibid., 154). The fourfold, 
a central aspect of dwelling in Heidegger, points to the four elements of 
earth and sky, divinities and mortals. As a double space-making, the location 
is a shelter for the fourfold or, by the same token, a house. According to 
Derrida’s interpretation, such locations shelter or house men’s lives in 
Heidegger’s theory. Thus, they establish a connection between architecture 
and habitability (Derrida 1997, 320). Things of this sort are housings, 
though not necessarily dwelling-houses in the narrower sense. This notion 
has consequences for Heidegger’s conception of building: building thus 
characterised is a distinctive letting-dwell (Heidegger 2001, 156).
Heidegger’s view emphasizes the static sense of dwelling as residing and 
building as providing housing for this purpose. From such perspective, his 
theory is in contrast with Derrida’s deconstructive theories of architecture. 
The meaning of architecture in Brazil approaches the deconstructive 
notion, in which the modernist idea of building for a specific function 
is radically put into doubt. According to the deconstructive notion, 
architecture becomes detached from the requirement of finality or a telos in 
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something outside of architecture itself (Derrida and Norris 1989, 74). It may 
be purposeful, but without being obliged to have a real practical purpose. 
Instead, architecture potentially offers sites of profound dysfunctionality as 
well as functionality. Rather than inquiring into the function of buildings, 
the deconstructive theory explores how the architectonics of organisations 
is created and in which senses architecture is able to produce systems and 
sites, which either may or may not possess any obvious significance.
For Derrida, the deconstructive notion of architecture is only concerned 
with metaphors. As he clarifies, “Deconstruction is a way of questioning 
the architectural model itself – the architectural model which is a general 
question itself, even within philosophy, the metaphor of foundations, of 
superstructures, what Kant calls ‘architectonic’ etc., as well as the concept 
of the archè… So Deconstruction means also the putting into question of 
architecture in philosophy and perhaps architecture itself” (ibid., 72). This 
tendency of examining the nature of a place and undoing its presupposed 
meanings is, as I wish to claim, at stake in the organisation of milieus in 
Brazil.
The most striking of the built environments in Brazil is the office 
building in which the protagonist, Sam Lowry, works. The office, which has 
been designed for efficient work, turns in the film to its opposite. Instead 
of efficiency and achievements, the building is a place for unworking and 
idleness, aptly described by the French expression of désœuvrement, which 
may be translated as “workless work” (cf. Nancy 1986). In the grand hall of 
the office building, sculptures and architecture oddly resemble totalitarian 
architecture. In Lowry’s department, the Department of Records, robots 
work with human beings and papers are circulated in a maze of pneumatic 
mail tubes, inspected and stamped to be validated as documents. 
In addition to Sam Lowry’s own workplace, the film displays another 
dramatic building, Information Retrieval. Lowry is relocated to work in this 
building, where he receives a new, claustrophobically cramped office room 
for himself. Oddly enough, nothing stays in order in the room, as Lowry 
has to compete for the meagre space with his co-worker, who keeps moving 
the partition wall to gain a bit more room for himself. The tools of the trade 
represent an awkward mixture of old and new technology. For example, 
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the typewriters are old-fashioned, but newer technology is combined 
with them. In the corridors of the office building, groups of workers are 
constantly swarming about as if they were guided by invisible pack leaders. 
If the purposefulness of work equipment causes doubts in the viewer, so 
do the lifts: they do not operate as one would suppose, but rather move 
on their own. Lowry would like to go up, but the lift moves down instead. 
Here, one may find a mixing of dreams and reality, in which the protagonist 
changes from a worker, subjugated by repressive working conditions, into 
the life of an action hero.
The streets of the anonymous city are an environment of transition 
in Brazil. In the streets, the milieu is best described as surrealist, and the 
buildings, inspired by historical influences, correspond to what is typically 
understood as a “postmodern” cityscape. Some of the vehicles, such as 
Lowry’s, are peculiar three-wheeled cars. The city resembles the Los 
Angeles of Blade Runner (1982): there are car crashes and fires. Despite the 
shiny façades, there is junk in the corridors of the living quarters. In their 
apartments, the residents sit apathetically in front of their TVs.
In the streets, despite the strange appearance, Christmas parades take 
place. A department store is equally recognizable as a place, but instead 
of offering a place for shopping and relaxed strolling about, there is an 
explosion. The gift that Lowry has received from an officer, Jack Lint, turns 
out to be a bomb. Accused of terrorism, Sam Lowry becomes a fugitive and 
eventually ends up captive. He is placed in something like an electric chair 
that brings to mind a scene from Stanley Kubrick’s film A Clockwork Orange 
(1971).6 In a huge concrete construction, Lowry swears his innocence of 
terrorism and other actions. 
Although Sam Lowry’s apartment plays a minor role in the film, its 
importance lies in the way it represents the surreal mentality of the city. The 
largeness of proportions visible in the office buildings also apply to Sam 
Lowry’s apartment building. The dysfunctionality of the film’s buildings 
extends to the apartment too. Lowry’s heating system malfunctions and the 
place is extremely hot and humid. Calling for help results in the visitation of 
a pair of government janitors, who only manage to leave the place in a mess of 
6 The featured building is actually a nuclear power plant in Croydon in the London area.
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exposed air ducts and cables. Before their visit, a kind of rogue maintenance 
man had arrived – yet he turns out to be the terrorist Archibald Tuttle, getting 
Lowry further suspected of involvement in terrorist schemes. 
In reality, the apartment in which he lives was filmed in the Abraxas 
House on the outskirts of Paris. The Abraxas complex is an architectonic 
experiment in the commune of Noisy-le-Grand in the eastern suburbs of 
Paris. The Spanish architect, Ricardo Bofill, designed the Abraxas House, 
or Palace of Abraxas, with the adjacent buildings, which were completed in 
1983, only a couple of years before the filming of Brazil. The nineteen-storey 
Abraxas House draws its inspiration from the theatres of Antiquity, and 
an arch built in front of the apartment buildings augments their eclectic 
theatrical style. Modern precast concrete elements and characteristics of 
the industrial style are used to create a classicist Baroque outlook complete 
with Doric, Tuscan and Art Deco inspired columns. In the Palace, the 
central building of the Abraxas, the machine aesthetics and the temple-
like construction are combined in “technological classicism” (Jencks 1984, 
159–161). To say the least, the scale of the buildings and their details is 
extravagant, and the scale of forms exceeds the measures of function and 
of proportionate ornamentation. Consequently, the ideals of contemporary 
urbanism are eroded in the buildings, among which are compromise, 
democracy and pluralism (Jencks 1988, 259). The purposes imposed upon 
postmodern architecture and the deconstructive notion of architecture 
offer a key to understanding Brazil: what happens when functionality loses 
its significance and reveals its estranged, excessive face? 
The fourth environment of Brazil is the realm of dreams. A recurrent 
dream replaces the senseless reality in which accidents happen and 
strangers intrude into the private living quarters. In dreams, Sam Lowry 
is often flying above the clouds, dressed up as Icarus, using his sword to 
fight various creatures, including a giant robot. At first, Lowry’s dreams are 
innocent daydreaming. Later, they turn more sinister and merge into reality, 
in a way that finally these spheres become inseparable. It appears that Jill, 
the lady of Lowry’s dreams, is “classified” in the eyes of bureaucracy, when 
Lowry asks about her after seeing her in a dream. This might refer to the 
idea that dreaming is forbidden in the dystopic city. The final dream of the 
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film turns into a nightmare. It takes place in a concrete building, where, 
after being taken captive, Sam Lowry is tied in a chair. He is shut out of 
reality and cannot see or hear anything, and the people around Lowry say: 
“He’s gone away from us.” The spectator realizes that Lowry’s escape from 
his oppressors is just an illusion. Yet, it is not clear at which point onwards 
everything has taken place in his imagination only.
Such places are not real but rather surreal and exist in the domain 
where architecture operates free of practical restrictions. In Derrida’s 
opinion, deconstructive architects have been deconstructing the essentials 
of tradition. They have criticized “everything that subordinated architecture 
to something else” – the value of usefulness or beauty or living, or 
architecture as “habitation”, not in order to build something else that would 
be useless, ugly or uninhabitable, but “to free architecture from all those 
external finalities, extraneous goals” (Derrida and Norris 1989, 72). This is 
not to reconstitute some pure or original architecture, but, on the contrary, 
“just to put architecture in communication with other media, other arts, 
to contaminate architecture” (ibid.). Deconstruction as a framework for 
analysing architecture means taking into special account the concept of 
metaphor itself – namely, architecture as metaphor for structures – as far 
as it involves a complicated network of philosophical propositions.
While being well aware that architecture has long been interpreted as 
dwelling – “the place where gods or people are present or gathering or living 
and so on” – Derrida nevertheless claims that architecture cannot simply be 
subordinated to those values of habitation, dwelling, sheltering the presence 
of gods and human beings (ibid., 74). With their experiments, architects 
associated with postmodernism, such as Peter Eisenman and Bernard 
Tschumi, have shown that architecture without a connection to dwelling and 
shelter is possible. As a result, Derrida states, deconstruction is not simply 
an activity or commitment on the part of the architect, but it is also “on the 
part of people who read, who look at these buildings, who enter the space, 
who move in the space, who experience the space in a different way” (ibid.). 
The architectural experience, and not “buildings” as such, would be the 
opportunity for experiencing the possibility of these inventions of a different 
architecture, one that would not be “Heideggerian”.
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THE KHÔRA AND BRAZIL’S PLACELESS PLACES 
In Brazil, the milieus present themselves as images of conventional locations. They are immediately recognizable to the spectator, and yet their dysfunctionality is more than evident: they are a kind of 
simulacra of places, which fail to fulfill their conventional employment. 
Therefore, there remains a chasm between the seeming purpose of each 
place and the sense of failure and even catastrophe that results from 
attempts at living and working in each milieu according to its “ordinary” 
meaning. As I wish to claim, the locations of Brazil are never available 
as such, but a difference between two meanings – the real-life and the 
everyday on the one hand, and the cinematic and imagined on the other 
– takes place continuously. 
For Jacques Derrida, the différance is at the same time a temporal and 
a structural notion. It includes simultaneously a presence which is always 
postponed and the place of origin, of khôra, in which the differences in 
each presence are outlined. The “origin” – the form of things – cannot be 
full presence. Rather, it exists as a trace, that is, as pure difference which 
itself does not have any definite place (Derrida 1982, 11–14). The presence 
of things is therefore characterised by its never being real: as Georges 
Didi-Huberman says (1992, 157), presence is always put into work, spaced, 
temporalised and made into traces. The sites in Brazil are like empty forms 
of places, with no evident relation to their everyday uses. If “form” has 
designated in earlier theories more or less the object itself, no matter if it 
really had an immediately recognizable form or not, such an object was still 
able to give form to other objects by the negative process of inclusion and 
imprint. In semiotic terms, form has been in relation to something that it 
is not: it has given a key for recognizing and interpreting other objects – an 
aspect of familiarity and a definition. According to Didi-Huberman, this 
semiotic notion of form is based on relations between things. Yet already in 
the Greek vocabulary associated with “form”, its scope soon became more 
complex. In Derrida’s theories, this development has come to its extreme, 
form being no longer an opposite of “content” or “matter” (ibid., 156–157).
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The places featured in Brazil remind us of well-known types of locations. 
As such, they all have a function which brings forward the plot of the film. 
Yet, as they are presented, these environments are more or less meaningless 
and non-functional with respect to how they are conceived in the everyday 
life. As places, they are highly stylized and the spectator’s imagination takes 
part in completing their role and signification in the course of the film. This 
is what changes their nature from realistic to artistic. 
On such a basis, the locations of Brazil are like empty signs; they are 
places without place, but still with a space and time of their own. In his 
essay “Art and Space”, Martin Heidegger emphasizes the ontological 
interlacement of space and time. He calls this Einräumung, “making-room”, 
while Derrida has the notions of différance and khôra (Heidegger 1973, 3–8; 
Derrida 1982, 3–27; Derrida 1993a). As I propose, both the Heideggerian 
“making-room” and the Derridean khôra imply a differing movement, 
which makes them convergent from this perspective.
Derrida, as well as Heidegger, reject the notion of space as a homo-
geneous, geometrically determinable expanse: différance and Einräumung 
must be termed temporalisation at once as they are considered spatiality. 
Heidegger gives an account of making-room and the yielding of places 
in art, space and their intertwining. In “Art and Space”, sculpture, as the 
embodiment of places, is his primary example of art (Heidegger 1973, 7). 
Derrida, in turn, refers to différance as a non-place, a place of different 
relations, or constant differing and deferring movement. In both Derrida 
and Heidegger, these notions involving the interplay between time and 
space are connected with art. 
Derrida’s concept of khôra does not mean a place (lieu) in a general sense, 
but it refers to an abysmal chiasm of time and space. Plato’s Timaeus serves 
as a point of origin for Derrida’s thinking of khôra. It is neither sensible nor 
intelligible, but belongs to a “third kind”, triton genos. Yet khôra, which is 
neither being nor nonbeing, is itself a placeless place, an abysmal gap between 
all oppositions (Derrida 1993a, 46–47).7 Such place remains without identity.
7 The khôra appears as “invisible” and is without a “sensuous” form. Thus, the khôra is an 
interval and a space between things, their material substratum. Plato, Timaeus, 48e4, 52a; cf. 
Derrida 1993a, 15ff.
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In this state of affairs, presence, such as the presence of our idea 
of an office building or a city, is characterised by its never being real: 
presence is always put into work, spaced, temporalised and made into 
traces (Didi-Huberman 1992, 157). For this reason, khôra is also beyond 
logos: only belonging to a place would grant it the truth of logos (Derrida 
1993a, 57). Derrida is thus giving a figure to an aesthetics in which the 
form of a thing, as soon as it exists, is already reproduced, with no other 
origin than the endless chain of images. The origin or the model is an 
abyss; each production is reproduction and original repetition. The 
work’s fate is to exist à part: separately from everything else (Roelens 
2000, 99).8 
In the essay “Art and Space”, Heidegger seeks a thinking of space that 
differs from the traditional conceptions of physical and technical space. In 
addition to only one kind of “objective cosmic space”, he inquires whether 
there could be other kinds of space as well, and not only “subjectively 
conditioned prefigurations and modifications” of the scientifically 
determined space. He contends that art is often held to be such a space, 
but instead of this, he is still seeking something else, not derivable from the 
physical, calculable expanse.9 
For Heidegger, one has not yet determined in what way space reigns 
throughout the work of art. What space as space would be, and in what way 
space is, are his questions. Heidegger’s key to investigating these is the notion 
of Räumen: clearing-away or clearing-space, with the intensions “to clear out” 
and “to free from wilderness”, to bring forth the “free” or “the openness for 
man’s dwelling”. Räumen implies thus the release of places and bringing forth 
of a locality, as time spatialises space, or provides space (Heidegger 1973, 5). 
In spatialisation, time and space belong together to make “space space by 
filling it up”, a notion that Heidegger already developed in Contributions to 
Philosophy (From Enowning) (1999, 134, 183f ). Making-room prepares for things 
8 To the figure of the separateness and non-reciprocal existence of the work of art, it is possible 
to see a point of comparison in Derrida’s notion of spectrality, which refers to the presence of 
absence – namely, the fact that a thing may be present to our thought and memory, although 
it is absent from us in any concrete sense. The idea of spectrality is part of Derrida’s theory of 
film and photography. See Derrida 1994; Derrida and Stiegler 2002. 
9 This idea links “Art and Space” to the over 30 years earlier Origin of the Work of Art.
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the possibility to belong to their relevant “whither” and, out of this, to each 
other – in this twofold making-room happens the yielding of place. Thus, for 
Heidegger, “Place always opens a region in which it gathers the things in their 
belonging together” (Heidegger 1973, 6).
Derrida’s khôra means pure space of differing, a place in which any 
relations between things and meanings are born. Therefore, the khôra opens 
up placeless place. To put into question the notion of pure, measurable 
space, both Derrida and Heidegger have introduced the thought of infinite 
divisibility and production of places. While Heidegger’s Einräumung refers to 
releasing places, I argue, however, that Derrida’s khôra is not a spatial notion 
as such, nor does it belong to the inside or the outside of any signification. 
Rather, the khôra appears to be their very condition, an invisible limit 
between things that makes space: it is the withdrawal [retrait] or the eclipse 
of appearing, the differential inappearance (Derrida 1993b, 53). The limit 
between the realistic presentation of places and their surreal cinematic 
renderings is what I understand to be at stake in Brazil.
In both deconstructive theory of architecture and the film Brazil there 
appears a notion of places as structures that are not concerned with values 
and purposes only, but which, even in their dysfunctionality, exist to fulfil 
a certain objective in the framework of either art or living. As Derrida 
states, “You can’t (or you shouldn’t) simply dismiss those values of dwelling, 
functionality, beauty and so on. You have to construct, so to speak, a new 
space and a new form, to shape a new way of building in which those motifs 
or values are reinscribed, having meanwhile lost their external hegemony” 
(Derrida 1989, 72). As I suggest, spatialisation and difference are the ways 
in which places are born in Brazil. They are lacking a stable essence; 
rather, the action, however out of place, gives them an identity in the film, 
although this identity is only local and ephemeral and dependent on each 
context. The unrealistic, even surreal, attributes given to each environment 
are thus different from our everyday ideas of a workplace or a department 
store, and dependent on the very context that they are surrounded by in 
each scene. Yet, despite their fictive nature and unrealistic features, they 
are recognizable enough to arouse an ominous feeling of familiarity in the 
viewer: if our world is not yet quite like this, will it be so one day?
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CONCLUSION: THE DYSFUNCTIONS OF LIFE
The film Brazil deals with fantasy, which is at the same time a terrifying reality. In addition to being a dystopia, a frightening vision of today’s reality, Brazil is a satire. With humour, irony 
and exaggeration as its means, it criticises and ridicules the structures 
of the society of the twentieth and, presciently, the twenty-first century 
alike. Its reality is distorted – and, at the same time, the film shows that it 
is impossible to escape reality. Sam Lowry dreams of another life in his 
monotonous and yet threatening world, a superman life that is immune to 
the dangers of cynicism and violence. This dreaming does not, however, 
provide an escape from the society, as he ends up in a non-functional, 
catatonic state. 
In Brazil, everyday work and its environments are both disengaged 
from their ordinary meaning. In a manner that can be described as 
postmodern, the film calls into question our presuppositions concerning 
relations between the signification of built environments and their 
rational, everyday purpose. In concrete reality, the depicted buildings are 
set pieces, façades; yet, in cinematic realism this basic fact is concealed in 
order to produce a sense of reality in the viewer. Brazil inverts this fictional 
arrangement: “realism” in the film is manifestly portrayed as being based 
on the representative or expressive dimension of buildings. Buildings and 
environments are thus primarily representations, not functional settings 
even to the fictitious characters of the film. Buildings appear as images or 
simulacra of architecture, with only arbitrary connections to what we in 
the daily life come to think of as city streets, home or workplace. In Brazil, 
architecture means something more like a subjective experience than 
realistic images of buildings: as in caricatures, the attributes of each place 
are overwhelming. In the lobbies, there is too much space; offices are too 
small, apartments too cramped and in bad condition; and factories appear 
as too dark to work in. As for other spaces, what is distinctive is the sharp 
difference that Terry Gilliam creates between the world of fantasy and 
dreams on the one hand, and the reality of work on the other. 
130
Brazil seems to break with the current idea of functionalism, which 
brings it close to the founding ideas of the deconstructive notion of 
architecture. Although this notion is neither “modern” nor “postmodern” 
according to Derrida, it is nevertheless an opposite of functionality, an 
orientation often associated with modernism. In the film, environments 
are not created to fulfil the citizens’ needs; if they do fulfil some need, it is 
for the politics of the ruling members of society. In presenting the variety of 
places and environments, imagination plays a crucial role in Brazil – while 
watching it, it is the spectator’s work to allow the free play of fantasy. 
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KaLLe puOLaKKa
DOES VALERY GERGIEV HAVE AN EVERYDAY?
ABSTRACT
Building on Thomas Leddy’s interpretation of current everyday 
aesthetics, I take a critical look at the position he terms “restrictivism,” 
concentrating especially on the work of two of its important 
representatives, Arto Haapala and Ossi Naukkarinen. I begin the 
paper by providing a glimpse of the everyday of Valery Gergiev, the 
dynamo conductor famous for his frantic lifestyle, and argue that the 
kind of everydayness of the everyday which Haapala and Naukkarinen 
place at the heart of everyday aesthetics is not as necessary and all-
encompassing a component of our everyday lives as they assume. 
Another important part of my argument is an analysis that seeks to 
uncover some important distinctions between our possible everyday 
routines. I by no means aim to question the restrictivist understanding 
of the everyday completely. However, I do believe that the picture of 
the everyday emerging from my account of Gergiev’s everyday, together 
with the outline of everyday routines I present, show restrictivism’s 
scope to be more limited than Haapala and Naukkarinen believe. 
This conclusion, in turn, clears the way for a more expansionist 
understanding of everyday aesthetics, such as the one Leddy builds on 
Dewey’s aesthetics.
Some years ago the London Symphony Orchestra (LSO) published a series of YouTube videos in which some of its members were followed for a day. One of these videos depicts a day in the life of the orchestra’s 
then chief conductor, Valery Gergiev, arguably one of the most powerful figures 
in classical music today, who is infamous for his hectic work schedule.1 The 
video begins in the arrivals terminal of Heathrow Airport, London. It shows 
Gergiev entering the terminal from the baggage claim area, after a flight from 
Düsseldorf, where he had a concert with the LSO the previous evening, with 
an assistant dragging his very minimal luggage. Gergiev explains that upon 
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fHg0EWkL73Q
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waking up in Düsseldorf he watched Australian Open on TV for a while 
before having breakfast at the hotel, after which he headed to the airport 
to catch a plane to London. Looking as if he would not have had a decent 
haircut or a proper shave in ages, and wearing a down jacket one or two 
sizes too large for him, Gergiev slips into a luxury BMW that has come to 
pick him up from Heathrow to travel to the Barbican Centre, where the 
LSO is already preparing for a rehearsal with Gergiev before the evening’s 
concert. Unsurprisingly, upon waiting for the driver to get everything 
ready, Gergiev twiddles with his cellular phone and when the car leaves 
the airport carpark he is already engaged in a conversation on the phone.
The video moves to the Barbican Centre, where the LSO is shown to 
be rehearsing Tchaikovsky’s First Symphony with Gergiev. As the piece 
was part of their recent concert tour repertoire, Gergiev divulges that there 
is no need for any in-depth rehearsal of the piece; it suffices just to get 
everyone’s musical muscles warmed up for the concert. After the concert, 
Gergiev meets some 20 people who have come to greet him backstage. This 
is something he says he does regularly after concerts. After a quick bite 
to eat, Gergiev heads toward Heathrow again to take a plane to Moscow, 
where he states he will be conducting his Mariinsky forces on the following 
day. The video ends with Gergiev dashing off from the Barbican, again in 
the backseat of the black BMW seen earlier.
The video is called “Life in a Day: Valery Gergiev.” It might, however, 
just as well have been called “The Everyday of Valery Gergiev.” The day 
the video depicts is in no way unusual to Gergiev – he actually describes 
the beginning of the day as “boring, nothing exceptional.” This is a person 
who is known to have conducted two concerts in two different continents 
on a single day and who at one point commuted between New York and St. 
Petersburg as some of us do between Helsinki and its neighboring cities.
In this paper, I use Gergiev’s life as a kind of thought experiment to test 
some of the conceptions of the everyday present in everyday aesthetics. My 
focus will be on those views that have been named “restrictivist” and which 
define the everyday in terms of factors to which we have a recurring, routine-
like relationship.2 Instead of the extraordinary moments that sometimes raise 
2 The term “restrictivism” derives from (Leddy 2015). As restrictivists Leddy names such 
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the everyday above the level of the ordinary and the mundane, restrictivists 
argue that the aesthetics of everyday life is to be found in the routines of the 
everyday and in the feelings of safety and of being “in control” their carrying 
out can engender (Haapala 2005, 52). Gergiev is admittedly a rather extreme 
example – although some of the best thought experiments, of course, are 
generally such – and it is clear that we cannot all be Gergievs; society as we 
know it would most likely collapse in that case. However, I do believe that 
a look at Gergiev’s everyday does raise some interesting concerns for the 
restrictivist position. Restrictivists believe that the structure and attitude that 
they see as essential to the everyday characterize even the lives of figures such 
as Gergiev. The everydayness of the everyday is something that we cannot 
escape from, they insist. One restrictivist, Ossi Naukkarinen, for example, 
claims that “it is difficult to even imagine a life that would be completely 
non-everyday-like” (Naukkarinen 2013, section 2). I think Gergiev’s everyday 
serves as a very good candidate for such a life.
Below, I will critically examine the restrictivist account of the every-
dayness of the everyday, with Gergiev’s life as a backdrop. My examination 
aims to show a significant weakness in the restrictivist position: 
everydayness is a far less fundamental factor of our waking life than 
restrictivists believe. I do not deny the value of the notion of everydayness 
completely, but I do believe there is no necessary reason why most of our 
waking life has to be characterized by the kind of everydayness structure 
and attitude restrictivists posit to the heart of the everyday. It is clear that 
our relationship, for example, to our everyday environment is different from 
that of a visitor’s. The restrictivists, however, overemphasize this difference. 
It is equally clear that without routines and habits human life would 
become a real drudgery; however, again, the restrictivists attach far too 
much significance on this fact. This is what I hope my examination of the 
restrictivist take on the everydayness of the everyday will show. Following 
this, I take up the other term in the notion of everyday aesthetics and show 
some problems that I believe restrictivists face on this front.
everyday aestheticians as Kevin Melchionne, Yuriko Saito, Arto Haapala, and Ossi 
Naukkarinen. Of these four, I will concentrate on the views of Haapala and Naukkarinen.
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ROUTINES AND THE EVERYDAYNESS OF THE EVERYDAY
Restrictivists essentially take the everyday to be a relational concept. It is indeed possible to list things, events, and activities around which our everyday is built. Usually this list would consist of factors 
related to our home, work, other errands, and hobbies. From the restrictivist 
point of view, this sort of list still leaves it untouched as to what makes these 
things everyday-like; that is, what constitutes their everydayness. What, 
ultimately, explains the nature of the everyday and how it differs from non-
everyday parts of human life is a particular kind of attitude and relation 
that we take toward the things and events constantly surrounding us and 
the activities we recurrently perform. Regarding the everydayness of the 
everyday, Naukkarinen writes:
The everyday attitude is colored with routines, familiarity, 
continuity, normalcy, habits, the slow process of acclimatization, 
even superficiality and a sort of half-consciousness and not with 
creative experiments, exceptions, constant questioning and change, 
analyses, and deep reflections. 
(Naukkarinen 2013, sec. 2.)
In contrast to crises and other less dramatic breaks of our lives, the 
everyday is characterized by “routines, easiness, and trust” (Naukkarinen 
2013, sec. 2; see also Naukkarinen 2017, sec. 3). Upon encountering objects 
and activities that our existing routines cannot embrace, we are no longer 
in the sphere of the everyday, though such objects and activities can, of 
course, become part of one’s everyday, once one simply manages to engage 
with them in a routine-like fashion.
Another restrictivist, Arto Haapala, also emphasizes the relational 
character of the everyday. The key notion of his account is familiarity. 
Relying on Martin Heidegger’s well-known analysis of tools, Haapala 
illuminates the everyday attitude by comparing it to nailing. While nailing, 
a skillful carpenter does not pay attention to the hammer itself, for he 
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is familiar with this tool and how it functions. The carpenter only pays 
attention to the tool when it stops working as it should. Similarly, many 
of our everyday activities from commuting, writing on the computer to 
shopping at our neighborhood grocery store are carried out with a similar 
type of inattentive smoothness. We pay attention to the fabric of our 
everyday lives only when a tear appears in it. Again, as in Naukkarinen’s 
case, the everydayness is identified with such qualities as comfort, ease, 
safety, and coziness. (See, especially, Haapala 2005.)
Though the restrictivists have analyzed the everydayness of the everyday 
with various concepts, I here take a closer look at the notion of routine.3 
This is because I believe that routines are much more variant and complex 
things than restrictivists have noticed. At the very least, the following kind 
of taxonomy between routines seems possible:
1. There are routines that we cannot really choose; these are necessitated 
by the biological character of our being. We have to carry them out to 
simply stay alive. Going to the toilet in the morning and eating are good 
examples of these sorts of routines.
2. Some routines stem from the social character of our being. Taking 
part in social life requires at least moving between different places, 
communicating, dressing, as well as meeting friends and family. Going to 
the shower and brushing one’s teeth in the morning are also routines that 
are prone to make one’s social life more prosperous.
3. Then there are routines that guarantee some minimal level of well-
being. There is, for example, no natural reason why we should clean and 
tidy our homes, but most of us tend to do that on a regular basis, because it 
makes life more pleasant.
4. Work-related routines are another group of routines. These of course 
vary considerably from work to work; my routines, unfortunately, are very 
different from Gergiev’s. Some works can also consist of very different sorts 
of routines.
3 I am somewhat wary of my use of the term “routine” below, but with it I basically mean an 
activity that is performed on a regular basis. For example, all activities that are recurrently 
related to one’s work, such as writing and reading in my case, are routines in this sense. This, 
I think corresponds, to the restrictivists’ use of the term.
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5. Hobbies are, in various ways, also tied to routines. Not only can 
hobbies be considered routines in themselves, but they may demand a 
certain set of routines to be performed. What is significant with this group 
of routines is that, even though children, for example, might be forced by 
their parents to take up a certain hobby, we are usually in a position to 
choose these routines and how we engage with them. This factor might 
also explain the value we place on our hobbies.
Routines in all these senses arguably have an important role in the 
everyday. Yet it is not clear what sense the restrictivists are referring 
to when they define everydayness in terms of routines. Naukkarinen’s 
position in particular is heavily built on a contrast between routines and 
non-routines (Naukkarinen 2013, sec. 2). However, it might be more fruitful 
to make distinctions between different sorts of routines and see how those 
function in our everyday. For example, in many cases it is possible to make a 
difference between the what and the how or the form and the content of the 
routine. The same routine can be performed in different ways at different 
times, like preparing something to eat. The content of the routine can also 
change; you do not have to cook the same meal every day. Routines in the 
first group allow very little variance in this respect – there are only so many 
ways one can go to the toilet and perform one’s daily chores and duties – 
whereas, in particular, some work-related routines can be done differently 
and these routines can also be developed in time.
One important factor to note is that some routines are merely a means to 
a further end (e.g. morning routines), while some can be ends in themselves 
(e.g. hobbies). Even those routines whose ultimate point is the achievement 
of some ulterior end can have different levels of intrinsic value (e.g. cooking, 
doing sports). All this is to say that calling something a routine does not 
necessarily tell us that much about the ultimate character of the activity in 
question, beyond the fact that it is something done recurrently.
More importantly, it is important to distinguish routines from simply 
carrying out something in a routine fashion, as nailing is performed by 
Haapala’s carpenter. Again, there is a great deal of variance between the 
routines listed above from this perspective. Some of them can indeed be 
carried out in the kind of half-conscious state of mind that Naukkarinen 
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thinks defines the everydayness of the everyday. However, in particular, 
groups 4 (work) and 5 (hobbies) may involve routines whereby the carrying 
out of which requires a very different kind of attitude, even such things as 
imagination, reflection, and inspiration. Writing an article and revising 
one’s CV to meet the guidelines of yet another application are two very 
different routines of a researcher, as is literary reading from Nordic walking 
in the case of hobbies. Doing the same things regularly does not imply 
that they are always done routinely; writing an article and literary reading 
are precisely such routines. Something similar could be said of Haapala’s 
example of nailing; it might illuminate how we carry out some of our 
routines, but it cannot apply across the board. From the fact that something 
is a routine; that is to say, that it is done daily or at least regularly, it does 
not follow that the activity is carried out without any detailed attention to 
the activity.
Another factor to note is that the routines listed above are hardly of 
equal value and play very different roles in our lives. Some of them we 
value greatly for the significance and content they bring into our life. This, 
for example, applies to many of our hobbies, as well as to the skills we have 
acquired. But the value we place on the ability to go to the toilet, in turn, 
gradually dissipates after early childhood. Again, routines turn out to be 
more complex things than restrictivists assume. Routines can have a very 
different value with respect to our everyday lives, so a mere reference to 
routines does not yet tell us that much about what the everyday is like.
Naukkarinen thinks that the everydayness of the everyday is something 
“unavoidable” (Naukkarinen 2013, sec. 6). Haapala goes even further, 
saying that “it is as unavoidable as death” (Haapala 2017, 172). At this 
point, a clarification would, however, be in order. Everydayness might be 
unavoidable in senses of routine 1), 2), 3), but it certainly is not unavoidable 
in senses 4) and 5), i.e., routines related to our work and hobbies. In fact, 
in those cases, the incapacity to look beyond one’s routines – or to think 
outside the box – is often considered a negative trait and can lead to 
depression or getting fired, or both in a worst case scenario. At another 
point, Naukkarinen writes that the everyday “is nothing very exceptional, 
strange, weird, or extraordinary” (Naukkarinen 2017, sec. 3). Perhaps. But 
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why could the everyday not be imaginative and inspirational, for example? 
Why is half-consciousness something necessarily tied to the everyday? 
Where does the necessity that most of our waking life is characterized by 
what Naukkarinen and Haapala term everydayness come from; that is to 
say, that this sort of attitude is “present all the time”? (Haapala 2017, 172).
So, what about the case of Gergiev? Though Gergiev is based in St. 
Petersburg, he very likely spends more time at airports, hotels, and foreign 
concert halls and opera houses than in his home city. Moreover, while in 
St. Petersburg, Gergiev’s base really is the Mariinsky Theatre, where he, 
besides making music, takes care of all sorts of administrative work, usually 
late into the night; it seems that his home is basically just a place for some 
(albeit very brief ) sleep. It’s very difficult to pinpoint where the everydayness 
of Gergiev’s everyday might lie. But Gergiev’s line of work makes this even 
more challenging. Besides rehearsals, he conducts some 250 concerts 
per year. One can say that conducting really is a routine of Gergiev’s life. 
However, it is certainly not something that can be done routinely in a half-
conscious state. In fact, in the YouTube video Gergiev admits that he is very 
aware of the high expectations the public has for his concerts, which set 
certain demands on him and the orchestra he is conducting. In particular, 
Gergiev explains, he has to make sure with the orchestra that the concert 
does not turn out to be “a routine business.” Concerts might indeed be 
everyday events for Gergiev, but they certainly are not everyday events in 
the everydayness sense of the term.
Haapala thinks that the everyday, as he understands it, is a ubiquitous 
phenomenon of human life. He writes: “Even the most extraordinary of 
humans… all have their normalcy, their routines, their ordinary existence, 
however extraordinary it may look in our eyes …” (Haapala 2017, 174). The 
taxonomy between different routines, however, gives new light to this claim. 
We may indeed all have our routines, but routines themselves can be less 
and more exciting and not all of them can be carried out in the same way as 
nailing. That our life is filled with routines, in other words, does not make it 
impossible for our life to be extraordinary. The concept of routine by itself 
just does not imply everydayness in the restrictivist sense.4
4 I press this point further in light of the notions of habit and function in (Puolakka 2018).
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In a more recent article, Naukkarinen admits that the everyday and the 
non-everyday are not binary opposites, but that everydayness comes in 
degrees (Naukkarinen 2017, sec. 3). These sorts of concession are, of course, 
dangerous, because they invite the slippery slope argument; if everydayness 
is in no way a necessary, all-encompassing feature of our waking lives, then 
why can the everyday not be very different from how Naukkarinen – or 
Haapala – initially portray it.
What the above taxonomy between different routines, along with the 
analysis of Gergiev’s life presented, shows is that the restrictivist idea of 
everydayness has a significantly more restricted scope than its proponents 
have assumed. It may very well form a sort of background or a safety net 
for our everyday pursuits, but, in light of the above, it is very debatable 
that it would be some kind of necessary defining character of our waking 
lives. At the very least, it seems a less interesting element of our lives than 
restrictivists have assumed.
IDENTITY IN THE EVERYDAY
One typical feature of at least some restrictivists is that they see the everyday as a very fundamental aspect of human life. Haapala, for example, thinks the everyday “constitutes our existence” (Haapala 
2017, 172). What our everyday is like determines who we are, and this of course 
can change with time. Our identity is not something that exists outside or 
prior to the everyday, but “we are the everyday” (Haapala 2017, 174).
But it is arguable that Haapala’s analysis has things backwards; it is 
not the everyday that constitutes our identity, but our identity is what, in 
general, constitutes our everyday. Our identity is expressed in and through 
our everyday dealings, routines, and actions. That at least would be 
the Aristotelian point, though instead of identity, he might use the term 
character; our character is revealed in what we do and how we do things. 
The factors that have molded us into the kinds of beings we are determine 
our everyday, not the other way around. This is, however, not to deny that 
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our everyday actions would not have an effect on our character in the long 
run. That is Aristotle’s point again; to become a virtuous person one must 
perform virtuous deeds.
Haapala’s account of the relationship between the everyday and 
identity also overlooks the fact that people can have potentialities and 
latent skills which they cannot fully use and realize in their present 
everyday contexts. Think of people who have difficulties of finding a job 
that matches their education. Especially in times of mass immigration, 
this is a frequent human experience. There are also other ways in which 
people can find that their everyday does not support their existence or 
that they cannot engage with their everyday with all their capacities. In 
such cases, it would be far too simple to just say that people’s identity is 
constituted by their everyday.
It can, of course, happen that in time people will in a way become 
stultified by their everyday, which can also lead to a change in their character. 
Nonetheless, this reinforces the Deweyan point that our experience and 
character are formed through an interaction with the environment, which 
Dewey understands in the broadest possible sense, including not only the 
natural and urban spaces that humans inhabit and encounter, but all “those 
conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic 
activities of a living being” (Dewey 1955, 13). This is not to say that humans 
would have some kind of permanent identity, but it does emphasize the 
fact to a much greater extent than Haapala’s view does – and in my view 
correctly – that a person does not enter into a new environment as a tabula 
rasa, but as constituted by what he or she has absorbed from previous 
experiences. And if the resulting interaction with the new environment 
turns out to be especially significant, that will, in turn, influence his or her 
future interactions, and so on.
It is also not clear why the things we do daily would be more constitutive 
of our identity than the things we do less frequently. For example, I think 
my habit of making some half a dozen concert trips abroad yearly defines 
my identity much more than my daily routine of having a walk after work, 
for example. I also consider myself some sort of Wagnerian, but I do not 
listen to his music daily – I am not crazy after all. (I actually think it’s good 
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to take sufficient breaks from listening to his music.)
All in all, the question of how the everyday is related to questions 
concerning human identity seems much more complex than Haapala 
realizes. As catchy as the phrase is, it cannot be summarized to the claim 
that our identity is constituted by our everyday. Many more factors have to 
be taken into account in considering the issue.
THE AESTHETICS OF EVERYDAYNESS
Naukkarinen claims that the so-called restrictivists in everyday aesthetics are also expansionists in an important respect. Aesthetic tradition, in his view, has taken the striking and the extraordinary as 
central characteristics of the aesthetic. The restrictivists meet this powerful 
tradition by trying to expand the scope of the aesthetic to include “ordinary, 
low-key, prosaic, mundane, or even trivial experiences, events, and objects” 
(Naukkarinen 2017, sec. 2). This insistence is behind the restrictivist critique 
of Dewey, the main inspiration of the expansionist approach to everyday 
aesthetics. Restrictivists do admit that our everyday can include the kinds 
of energetic experiences which Dewey dubbed aesthetic. However, as 
they are the exceptions, not the rule, an aesthetics of everyday life has to 
be framed in terms of more commonplace experiences. Though these 
experiences do not stand out from the ordinary flow of experience as 
powerfully as Deweyan aesthetic experiences, for example, do, restrictivists 
claim that many of the commonplace experiences we have in our everyday 
are, nevertheless, aesthetic in character. The feeling of coziness has been 
mentioned as one experience of this kind (Naukkarinen 2017, sec. 6).
Haapala extends Heidegger’s tool analysis to the aesthetic sphere of 
the everyday. In his view, the aesthetics of the everyday is characterized 
by a kind of trustworthiness. Just as the carpenter can rely on his tools 
and routines while nailing without paying that much conscious attention 
to the activity itself, the familiar objects and routines of our everyday life 
raise a similar experience of comfort in us. Qualitatively, the experience 
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is very different from the extraordinary experiences that attentive and 
concentrated engagements with artworks can raise. Nevertheless, it is, in 
Haapala’s view, an experience that we find pleasurable, even aesthetic. This 
is how Haapala explains his idea of the aesthetics of familiarity: 
We take pleasure in being in the surroundings we are used to, 
and fulfilling normal routines. The aesthetics of everydayness is 
exactly in the “hiding” of the extraordinary and disturbing, and 
feeling homey and in control. One could paradoxically say that the 
aesthetics of the familiar is an aesthetics of “the lacking,” the quiet 
fascination of the absence of visual, auditory, and any other kinds of 
demands from the surroundings. 
(Haapala 2005, 52.)
This account also brings the relational character of the everyday into 
view. There is no determinate limit on what can become an everyday 
object or environment in Haapala’s sense. In time, even an extraordinary 
view or artwork can turn into an everyday object and inspire the sort of 
sense of security and being in control that Haapala thinks characterizes the 
aesthetics of familiarity.
Functionality also appears in another part of Haapala’s view, which 
relates to the idea of the kind of concealed character of the aesthetics of 
everyday life. He believes that a locals’ relationship to their immediate home 
environments is very different from a stranger’s. As we become familiar 
with our everyday environment(s), we gradually take on a highly functional 
attitude toward its buildings and other sites. In this type of attitude, the surface 
qualities of the environment, in turn, move to the background of experience. 
The places of our everyday, Haapala writes, are “first and foremost, seen 
through the lenses of functionality, as tools or simple backgrounds in the 
flow of the everyday” (Haapala 2017, 180–181). Homes, offices, cafés, libraries, 
lunch places, neighborhood shops, and other everyday places are “tools for 
living.” However, once they are seen as such, Haapala argues, “the room and 
the house and the whole neighborhood disappear in their usefulness” and 
become “mere bricks in the fabric of the everyday” (Haapala 2017, 174; see also 
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Haapala 2005, 48–49). Again, we pay more direct attention to the individual 
constructs of familiar environments and their surface qualities only when a 
crack appears to this fabric.
Haapala’s analysis captures some important points about the experience 
of everyday environments. Yet his conclusions seem a little too radical. 
Haapala is, of course, talking about disappearing in a metaphorical sense, 
but even so it is arguable that he overemphasizes the effects settling down 
into an environment can have on our everyday experience. Haapala’s 
account seems to be built on a very rigid contrast, where the other end 
of the pole is represented by a person who cannot stop staring at the 
view opening up from the top of a New York skyscraper, and the other 
by someone so settled in his ways that he has become totally blind to his 
home environment. The process of familiarization is portrayed almost as a 
kind of vacuum that sucks the effects of the surface and visible qualities of 
environments – much like death according to Plato in the Phaedo dialogue: 
“must not all things at last be swallowed up in death” (Phaedo 72d).
It is true that functionality has an effect on how we experience built 
environments. However, this does not mean that the function of a building 
situated in our everyday would in a way swallow up its surface qualities. 
Rather, our experience of those qualities depends on the category under 
which the building is seen, namely, we see the building in terms of its 
function. The reason why office buildings, for example, often seem cold 
might not only be in the style of architecture, but also that the knowledge 
that they are mostly uninhabited during nights and weekends enters into 
our perception, giving our experience a sort of emptiness that we, in turn, 
do not experience while walking in a residential area.
Perhaps this might be just a question of differences in experiences, but 
many everyday aesthetic practices also suggest that the effect of the surface 
qualities of everyday objects and buildings does not fade once they have 
become part of our everyday. Haapala writes that instead of “recreational 
values,” a local puts emphasis on the “everyday functional values” of his 
environment (Haapala 2005, 44). However, this claim is hard to square with 
the fact that people can spend a considerable amount of time and money 
for finding a place to live that meets their aesthetic taste, as well as with the 
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fact that it is often the aesthetic appearance that largely determines which 
one of our neighborhood cafés becomes our Stammplatz.
Jane Forsey has interestingly argued that it is very hard to incorporate 
the design practices related to everyday objects into Haapala’s scheme. By 
uniting aesthetics with function, the point of good design is to enhance our 
experience of the everyday above the ordinary and the mundane without 
making it exceptional in the way that art can. She also questions Haapala’s 
claim that we would notice the tools of our everyday only when they break 
down. Forsey writes: “we also notice things when they work extremely well, 
when they perform their functions with an ease and grace that calls for our 
appreciation. And this is the kind of aesthetic judgment that is particular 
to design.” (Forsey 2013, 241.) What Forsey believes her analysis of the role 
of design in our everyday shows against Haapala is that the juxtaposition 
between his central notions, the strange and the familiar, should be 
softened. That is precisely my point as well.
Some objects and environments also seem more resistant to the 
causes of familiarization than others. That many classic pieces of modern 
furniture still seem fresh to us testifies to this – or think of how radical 
Hector Berlioz’s Symphonie Fantastique still seems, almost 200 years after 
it was composed. It is also far from clear that Gergiev would in no way pay 
attention to the glorious decorations and color of the great hall of the old 
Mariinsky Theatre in St. Petersburg when present there. The experience 
of conducting there must also be very different than in some other halls 
familiar to him, such as the Martti Talvela Hall of the Mikkeli Concert Hall 
Mikaeli in Finland. The concert hall might actually be thought of as a tool as 
well; it is a tool for making and experiencing music, and a well-functioning 
concert hall with great acoustics and aesthetically rewarding spaces surely 
enhances the experience for musicians and public alike. I also very much 
doubt that the experiences undergone by the musicians working in such a 
place daily and by the regular evening concertgoers would in time become 
ordinary in the mundane and low-key sense of the term. At the very least, 
experientially the end result of settling down to an exciting environment 
and to an unexciting one are not the same.
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CONCLUSION
While in this essay I have been fairly critical toward the restrictivist position, as represented by Haapala and Naukkarinen, I am not denying the value of their position completely. Their analyses 
do manage to capture some important factors of our everyday lives and life 
is likely to be markedly more chaotic in their absence. Nonetheless, this is 
nothing more than a base. Showing that our routines can be more varied 
and richer in terms of their content and how they are carried out goes a 
long way to demonstrating this. I also think this base is far less interesting 
from an aesthetic perspective than what can be built on top of it – and it is 
still debatable whether the bottom level of our everyday experience should 
be considered aesthetic at all (see, for example, Forsey 2013, 230–236; for a 
response see Naukkarinen 2017). Considering these levels equally interesting 
would be like saying of an opera performance that the stage machinery is of 
equal value than the events taking place on stage and in the pit.
All this means that there is more room for an expansionist understanding 
of everyday aesthetics. This position, whose most systematic proponent 
is Thomas Leddy, understands the aesthetic character of the everyday in 
terms of heightened experiences, such as those Dewey tries to capture with 
his rich analysis of aesthetic experience. In a recent article, Leddy has, in 
turn, approached these experiences with the concept of awe (Leddy 2015). 
It is indeed true that to keep the everyday running, we need to do some 
rather unexciting things, some of which are, moreover, not necessarily that 
pleasurable – admittedly, Gergiev might again actually be an exception here. 
Though some of us like cleaning, these things usually fall into the category 
of routines 1), 2), 3). But there is no inherent necessity why, in particular, 
everyday routines 4) and 5) could not cause the kinds of heightened 
experiences, which are at the heart of the expansionist approach, daily.
We humans indeed do have a certain sort of craving for stability and 
comfort. Even Gergiev talks about how his life is organized in the video. 
There is actually an entire team of people behind Gergiev, from managers 
to rehearsal conductors, who make his frantic lifestyle possible. In a certain 
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respect, this background forms the safety net of Gergiev’s everyday. It is 
precisely the psychological necessity we humans seem to have for stability 
and for feeling safe that the restrictivist account of everyday aesthetics 
captures well – and it is of course an interesting fact why we cherish this 
feeling in our everyday lives, but much less frequently in art. However, if 
the restrictivists believe their analyses of the everyday uncover some more 
fundamental necessities of human life, even Kantian transcendental ones, as 
some of their formulations suggest,5 then the view has some severe flaws.6
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francisca pérez-carreñO
THE AESTHETIC VALUE OF 
THE UNNOTICED 
ABSTRACT
This paper comments on a paradox that seems to be the crux of 
everyday aesthetics: the aesthetic character of the non–aesthetic. The 
‘everyday’, characterised as the routine, familiar, taken for granted, or 
just unnoticed, seems to be opposite to that marked as worth looking at, 
and aesthetically contemplating. The aim of the article is to hold that 
the unreflective consciousness of objects, environments and events in 
everyday life permits their aesthetic appreciation. The paper considers 
the role that art and memories play in bringing into consciousness that 
which was previously ‘unnoticed’.
INTRODUCTION
The aesthetics of the everyday focuses on and tries to characterise the kind of aesthetic experience we obtain from the ordinary, daily, everyday life. In particular, everyday aesthetics seems to demand 
an approach different from the approach adequate for the aesthetics of 
art and nature. Arto Haapala’s work in the field has especially endorsed 
the idea that aesthetic experience of the everyday should respect what is 
characteristic of the experience of the everyday, namely, its commonplace, 
routine, unexceptional, ordinary character. Indeed, hiding the 
inconspicuous character of daily life could lead everyday aesthetics to miss 
the point of the very object of its investigation. While for other approaches 
to everyday aesthetics the central point is – according to the title of Thomas 
Leddy’s 2012 book – the appreciation of “the extraordinary in the ordinary”, 
Haapala insists in the necessity of explaining the aesthetic experience 
of the everyday qua everyday, that is, as commonplace and familiar. For 
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Leddy calling an experience aesthetic implies separating it from precisely 
the ordinary, even if minimally, involving the objects of appreciation with 
“aura” (Leddy 2012, 127 ff.) For Haapala everyday objects and environments 
may be aesthetically appreciated in their scarcely noticed presence. 
Pointing to the unobtrusive character of the experience of everyday 
life, a problem to philosophical aesthetics immediately arises concerning 
the very concept of aesthetic experience. From Kant’s Critique of Judgment 
onwards, aesthetic experience is thought to involve a reflective judgment, a 
pleasant awareness of the collaboration of our cognitive faculties. The form 
of representation of beautiful and sublime objects provide our mind with 
the occasion of feeling the free play of the mental faculties. In contrast with 
the scientific and practical apprehension of the world, the mere form of 
the object in itself, with independence of its utility and cognitive or moral 
relevance, gives aesthetic satisfaction. Aesthetic properties are considered 
to be sensual salient properties of the object, which are identified in that 
disinterested pleasant experience.
Dewey’s pragmatist conception of aesthetic experience has been 
invoked to solve problems linked to autonomist Kantian aesthetics 
(Shusterman 2000). However, Dewey’s conception of aesthetic experience 
also represents it in contrast with everyday experience. To have an aesthetic 
experience is to have “an experience”, which, contrary to our daily 
interaction with the world, is complete, united, “self-sufficient”, and full of 
significance: “…we have an experience when the material experienced runs 
its course to fulfillment” (Dewey 1934, 37) So, both in Kantian and Deweyan 
traditions aesthetic experience is marked by its differentiation from the 
daily experience of the world. 
In this article, I will examine the aesthetic character of everyday life in 
its characteristic ordinary and commonplace experience. First, I will point 
out the ubiquity of aesthetic experience in everyday life and its very often 
irreflexive character. Second, I will point to the role that art and memories 
play bringing to consciousness what passed unnoticed when we lived it. 
Finally, I want to stress that it is not art or remembrance that aestheticizes 
everyday life, but that the everyday was aesthetic even when unnoticed.
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AESTHETIC PLEASURES AND HUMAN LIFE
Aesthetic pleasures of all kinds play an important role in our lives. We enjoy the contemplation of moon and clouds, the singing of birds, the sound of waves, attractive people, agile cats, fragrant 
flowers, colourful gardens and elegant terraces, vintage furniture, fashion, 
jewels, all kind of ornaments and decoration, and many more things that 
are, happily, not so unusual. The enjoyment of these things makes life 
better, more valuable. In general, the aesthetic quality of objects, people, 
activities and environments contributes significantly to human wellbeing 
and happiness. Although aesthetics has barely paid attention to these 
commonplace objects and activities, it is certainly possible for aesthetics 
to defend their aesthetic value as objects or phenomena which attract our 
attention by their appearance. 
We admire human beauty, for example. Some people’s appearance 
strikes us in the middle of a room full of people, walking down the 
street among the mass, or projected on the screen of a movie theatre, as 
beautiful, and marked with different kinds of beauty. There are expressive, 
sexy, mysterious, graceful, merely superficial, and other kinds of human 
beauty. In these cases, human beauty like the beauty of animals or urban 
environments can be appreciated just as art or nature are. That is, it can 
be an object of an experience that considers sensuous properties – by 
themselves or together with other relational properties – and the way they 
affect us. A person’s face may attract our attention for the way in which the 
different parts – hair, eyes, mouth, neck, shape of the head, skin colour – are 
arranged in the whole. But also, hairstyle, glasses, and clothing may attract 
us as original or elegant. Sometimes a woman strikes us for her similarity 
to a Botticelli figure, as Odette seemed the reincarnation of Zipporah to 
Swann in Swann’s Way.1 In the first case the face is contemplated as a 
natural object (to the extent that a human body can be contemplated as 
something completely natural); in the second, as an artefact, an artistic 
artefact, produced with aesthetic and other intentions; in the third case, it 
1 Swann projects on Odette his vision of Zipporah, a figure in a fresco by Botticelli in the Sistine 
Chapel: « Standing next to him, allowing her hair, which she had undone, to flow down her cheeks, 
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is a real person perceived under the influence of a fictional character. 
The aesthetics of human body may well be central for the aesthetics 
of the everyday, given the ubiquitous, fundamental and influential role 
that appreciation of human beauty and aesthetic qualities play in human 
relations and culture (Irvin 1998; Naukkarinen 2016). Moreover, human 
actions result from body movements and the appreciation of those 
movements and actions is consequently intertwined with that of the body. 
However, in the examples given above the human body is appreciated as an 
object with an aesthetic value according to the same criteria with which we 
would appreciate a beautiful object, artistic or natural. Indeed, the human 
body is a field of different types of aesthetic appreciation, relative to the 
attitude adopted by the beholder, the features taken into consideration, etc. 
A visage can be appreciated from a merely formal or sensory perspective. 
It may be more or less photogenic, well-proportioned, harmonious, etc. Or 
it can be appreciated as expressive, or suggestive of moral virtues or traits 
of character. In this case, the visage is melancholy, friendly, agreeable, 
profound, etc. The human body, and more specifically the human face, 
is probably an example of the impossibility of neatly separating sensory 
aesthetics and deep aesthetics, aesthetics of nature and of art. 
In everyday life we also have continuous contact with art: we visit 
museums, are surrounded by architecture and public art, listen to music, 
go to the movies, etc. And maybe not Botticelli, but certainly TV series 
influence the way people perceive other people and conceive human 
relations. On a daily basis, we make a lot of aesthetic decisions too: related 
to art or not: about which book to read or going to which museum, about 
clothing, haircuts, manners, hobbies, friends, etc. Some of them are of 
relevance to our entire life: where to live, with whom, etc. Aesthetic decisions 
are those in which aesthetic reasons are the most relevant, but decisions of 
other kinds incorporate aesthetic reasons too. Aesthetic reasons have more 
or less weight, depending on people, but are certainly of more relevance 
bending one leg somewhat in the position of a dancer so that without getting tired she could lean 
over the engraving, which she looked at, inclining her head, with those large eyes of hers, so tired 
and sullen when she was not animated, she struck Swann by her resemblance to the figure of 
Zipporah, Jethro’s daughter, in a fresco in the Sistine Chapel”. Marcel Proust (2001, 230–31)  
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than we want to admit. Actually, it is unlikely that the attractiveness of 
someone does not play a part in our reasons for choosing not only a sexual 
partner but also a friend, or even a colleague. So, everyday life is imbued 
with aesthetic perception, understanding, appreciation, judgment, and, 
eventually, behaviour. 
THE AESTHETICS OF EVERYDAY AS EVERYDAY
Now, important as it is to emphasise the active role of the self in aesthetic perception, understanding, appreciation, and judgment, it is also necessary to acknowledge that many of what can be 
considered aesthetic preferences, decisions and behaviour may pass 
ignored, repressed, or simply unnoticed by the self. Aesthetic motivations 
may not be acknowledged socially or by the individual, but an immense 
part of our behaviour depends on factors that are unknown to ourselves.2 
The everyday includes not only what is commonly perceived, believed or 
felt, but also all that is hidden, taken for granted, and unnoticed. In this 
sense, Highmore (2002) cites Bataille’s phrase: “the everyday … receives our 
daily inattention”, to conclude that “things become ‘everyday’ by becoming 
invisible” (Highmore 2002, 21).
Yuriko Saito approaches everyday aesthetics also by considering 
the invisibility of everyday phenomena and the lack of consciousness of 
our daily engagement with aesthetic matters. According to her, there are 
“aesthetic dimensions of our everyday life that do not result in ‘an aesthetic 
experience’” (Saito 2007, 104), meaning that even though in daily situations 
we very often react, act, and make decisions of an aesthetic character, we do 
it without necessarily having an aesthetic experience, at least if considered 
“disinterested and contemplative” (Saito 2007, 48 ff.). Saito stresses the 
unreflective character of aesthetic judgment and the action-directed, 
instead of contemplative, dimension of most of our daily life. 
Like Saito, Haapala’s account seeks to locate everyday aesthetics in the 
2 On aesthetic bias and the social discrimination of unattractive people see Irvin (2017) 
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analysis of the specific character of the everyday, namely, its everydayness. 
Strikingly Haapala defines the everyday as that which is non-aesthetically 
marked, at least from the point of view of traditional aesthetics. However, 
unlike Saito, Haapala still tries to capture the specific phenomenology 
of everyday interactions with the world. He conceives his approach as 
an “existentialist account of the phenomenon of the everyday and its 
aesthetic character” (Haapala 2005, 40). The starting point is, therefore, the 
phenomenology of everyday life, which is felt as routine, dull, automatic, 
unremarkable. However, there is a limit point in the phenomenology 
of the everyday, and it is the point at which the everyday turns invisible, 
unnoticed. The immediate consequence is that there cannot be an aesthetic 
experience of that which is not noticed. Paradoxically the aesthetics of the 
everyday life becomes the aesthetics of the non-aesthetic.
The paradox of the aesthetics of everyday life is about the appreciation 
of that which does not attract our attention, is not worth being looked at, 
or is taken for granted. How is an aesthetics of the unnoticed possible? If 
aesthetic appreciation comes from the disinterested contemplation of an 
object, how can something that is scarcely looked at, but intermingled with 
our daily goals and desires, be aesthetically appreciated? The aesthetics of 
the everyday is not about the experience of salient properties in the object 
of disinterested contemplation, but about our being in the world, Haapala 
suggests, using Heidegger’s notion in Being and Time. Consequently, 
the aesthetics of the everyday is about our engagement with objects, 
environments, other persons, and actions, which is fundamental to human 
existence. And that provides us with a sense of being at home in the world 
and with a sense of personal identity and belonging to a community, which 
characterises the aesthetic experience of the everyday. 
Haapala (2005) provides an example of the experience of place, which 
is characteristic of our daily experience of the world. A place is not just a 
location, the setting of our life; it is not only a geographical point with its own 
natural or historic “character”. A place has also personal meaning, it is related 
to our own biography, and it is “sensed” in a certain way. Basically, a place is 
strange or familiar to us, and its aesthetic character is determined by that. 
Our place, the place which we inhabit, and in which we develop our daily life 
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is made significant by our uses of it, by the meaning we give to its elements, 
by the way in which we deal with it. In turn, the place also constrains and 
structures our movements, visions, and actions. Familiarity, place, and 
everyday are interconnected: “Familiarity and everyday are the very heart of 
place” (Haapala 2005, 40). The key aesthetic notion is familiarity, which is 
how we sense the place. The elements that form part of our place are barely 
noticed, but rather taken for granted. They constitute the background in 
which daily activities take place, and also where extraordinary events might 
happen, and unexpected objects draw our attention. 
Thus, strangeness may make its way through everyday life. Indeed, a 
new building, a work of public art, a new bridge, strikes us as an intrusion 
in our place, to which we react with a sense of strangeness, first, and then 
by making aesthetic judgments about its shape, meaning or fitting in the 
place. Leddy takes it on that making something aesthetic always implies 
making it strange in a certain sense: to frame, to point it out, to highlight 
it among the rest of the objects as objects with “aura”. Dishabituation 
and estrangement were concepts bound to the theory of Avantgarde; but 
renewing and refreshing our perception, discovering hidden or overlooked 
aspects of the world, are very generally taken to be among the main values 
of art. Admittedly, “(i)n a sense of the word aesthetic, strangeness creates 
a suitable setting for aesthetic considerations” (Haapala 2005, 44). Now, 
according to Haapala, in opposition to the strangeness that characterises 
the aesthetic of art, familiarity marks everyday life. After a process of 
habituation in which the new object or environment is included in our 
routine, it becomes everyday. 
Haapala’s point is that besides the aesthetics of strangeness there is 
an aesthetics of familiarity. And that if there is to be an aesthetics of the 
everyday, it has to be an aesthetics of familiarity. In order to do justice to 
the aesthetic character of the everyday we need to take familiarity into 
account. At the same time, he suggests that the aesthetics of strangeness 
is pretty different from the aesthetics of familiarity. Something familiar is 
something towards which we have personal ties: we are attached to familiar 
things and persons, we are rooted in our place. For that reason, the aesthetic 
experience of familiar things, places, people, is personal, and cannot be 
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disinterested, detached, as the aesthetic experience required by a work of 
art, or a natural environment. The experience of the familiar retains the 
aesthetic character because it is related to pleasure and value, wellbeing 
and good life. It is sensory aesthetic in the sense that it is perceptually 
experienced, but meaningful in the sense that what gives sense to space 
and facilitates familiarity are actions, behaviours, and habits that link us to 
the environment and make it our place.
From this point of view, the paradox of the aesthetic experience of the 
unnoticed everyday may be elucidated, considering that what usually goes 
overlooked may flow into our consciousness as aesthetically valuable. The 
unnoticed enters our awareness, not as something extraordinary or strange, 
but rather dyed with familiarity. According to Haapala, from time to time we 
may take a breath on our daily ups and downs, and we can come to perceive 
aesthetically our surroundings, familiar scenes and things. Certainly, it will 
oblige us to take “some distance”, but the pleasure we will obtain “is not 
distinct from the pleasure that we obtain from the fulfilling of the daily 
routines, but dependent on them” (Haapala 2005, 51, my italics). Things are not 
“transfigured”, or experienced “with aura”, but the aesthetic experience of 
the everyday demands keeping the closeness and intimacy that the object 
possesses for us. Although we may perceive just its sensory appearance, it 
does not deprive the thing of its special meaningfulness for us. 
So, Haapala’s solution to the paradox of the unnoticed passes for 
admitting that in order to be appreciated the object has to enter the sphere 
of consciousness. And this is enough for Saito to point out that Haapala is 
still “wedded to defining aesthetic as something pleasurable” (Saito 2007, 
50). Ideal for Saito is to acknowledge and leave room for “those dimensions 
of our everyday aesthetic life that normally do not lead to a memorable, 
standout, pleasurable aesthetic experience in their normal experiential 
context” (Saito 2007, 51). That is, for Saito a feeling of familiarity still 
preserves the pleasurable character that characterises aesthetic experience 
out of daily contexts. According to her, to do justice to the everyday in its 
normal experiential context, as overlooked and unnoticed, demands that 
daily aesthetic decisions and behaviour do not involve a special feeling 
or pleasant consciousness of the object. However, aesthetic decisions 
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and behaviours in the realm of the unnoticed require also some kind of 
experience of objects, scenes, and actions.
Non-reflective consciousness seems to me the most promising way to 
understand the unnoticed character of the daily experience of objects and 
actions. First, in order to explain the – usually – successful manner in which 
we handle daily with objects and find our way in the world. And secondly, 
in order to explain how the aesthetic experience of the everyday “depends 
on” the experience of everydayness, as Haapala suggests (Haapala 2012, 51). 
Pleasure is not something added to everyday life by the aesthetic detached 
contemplation, but something that is recovered by aesthetic experience 
from our daily life.
In what follows, I want to explore what I take to be Haapala’s account of 
the aesthetic experience of everyday qua everyday. My aim is to go deeper 
into the idea of noticing the unnoticed or perceiving the overlooked, as 
the passage from non-reflective awareness to reflective awareness. So that 
when we take a step back and look at the commonplace, we may in some 
sense keep the experience we had when we were dealing with it in our daily 
routines. I assume that the psychological description of the experience of 
the everyday is that of a non-reflective awareness of the object, the action, 
the environment, or the person we experience. We are aware of the sun 
streaming through the balcony, the fragrance of freshly made coffee, or the 
wind on our face while riding the bike… even if we don’t necessarily stop 
and pay attention to them. Actually, we sometimes avoid paying attention 
to them, for whichever reasons, for instance, not to be distracted from 
other occupations. Writing on my computer I withdraw my attention from 
the stream of sunlight entering the room through the balcony, in order to 
concentrate on my paper.
Very often in daily routines, our mode of experiencing objects and 
actions is distracted. We may do several things at a time: while preparing 
sandwiches for the children’s lunch, we drink our coffee, listen to the radio, 
open the windows to ventilate the rooms, and think about a meeting in 
half an hour. Some of the things we do automatically, while some others 
require more concentration. We are not reflecting on the perception of 
objects or the action itself, but it does not mean that we are not aware of 
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the objects involved in the activity or the atmosphere around. Something 
or just coincidence may make us see more intently the object in question. 
For instance, we suddenly realise that our favourite song is being played 
on the radio, or we realize that the window needs cleaning. A positive and 
a negative aesthetic experience results in each case. However, we were 
hearing the radio and seeing the window before realising it. We might 
also retrospectively bring to mind the experience that we were having 
distractedly, without realizing that we were having it. For instance, when 
driving to the meeting the image of the dirty glass may enter our thoughts. 
And this can only happen because we saw that it was dirty before. I could 
not make the aesthetic decision to clean the windows, without having a 
displeasing experience becoming more salient in my mind.
When we stop and look at the sun illuminating the room, we may make 
an aesthetic scene of it, bringing it out of life limited by space and time and 
contemplating it sub specie aeternitatis. In this sense, we are redeeming the 
ordinary from its ordinariness. There is certainly something really lacking 
when I stop typing on my computer and contemplate the sun entering 
through the balcony. What is lacking is my own presence, my movements 
and actions inside the scene. I stop being part of the environment to 
become a beholder. And, consequently, my experience changes. However, 
there is a sense in which the experience may retain its ordinariness. The 
sunshine enters my office room every day more or less at the same time, 
illuminates the place from the same point, warming the room and giving 
it a golden light in the evenings. I enjoy it almost daily, even if only from 
time to time, especially in winter, do I reflect on it, that is, I become aware 
of my perceptions. When I do, the experience does not lose its everyday 
character. Moreover, as Haapala points out, it depends on the familiarity 
brought about by time (Haapala 2005, 51).
My point is that sunshine entering through the balcony was aesthetically 
pleasurable also when it was unnoticed, that is, non-reflectively perceived. 
It is not that the non-aesthetic features of the object are aesthetically 
experienced only once they are attentively contemplated, but rather that the 
object was from the beginning aesthetically perceived, if non-reflectively. 
There are some symptoms revealing that my activity was suffused with 
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pleasure also during the time it was routine: I didn’t realise the time passing, 
my body expressed calm and comfort, or I smiled. Equally, children playing 
don’t reflect about having fun, but they have: they jump, run and laugh. To 
the contrary, familiarity does not convert a certain ugly building in our way 
home into something beautiful. Familiarity allows us to see it daily without 
paying attention to it. We don’t perceive its ugliness constantly, but from 
time to time we are sadly disappointed by its presence. 
MEMORIES OF THE UNNOTICED
Evidence of the aesthetic experience of everyday objects, scenes and actions lies also in the fact that we can retrieve it when we come to perceive again the same objects after a time, or when we recall them, 
they are evoked by others, or represented in works of art. When years later 
we visit again a place, or smell the fragrance of a person, or have the old 
sensation of having fun or being surprised by something, that is possible 
because we once had those perceptions and sentiments. And we may now 
recall the satisfaction we got formerly from them. Our present experience 
is not as new, but it is permeated by the sense of something already lived.
Some episodes, moments, atmospheres or journeys, that in everyday 
life can pass unnoticed, moments in which we are happily, melancholically, 
or excitedly engaged, without reflecting, in an action, perception, or 
conversation, can also be brought to reflexion in memories. In the Search of 
Lost Time Proust wrote about involuntary memory and the recollection of 
moments and persons that bring us the happiness of past times. There is 
no reason to think that these recalled moments are happy only now in the 
present, due to nostalgia or idealization. Or that it is writing or literature 
that make them happy. If episodes from past times are remembered now as 
happy, it may be because they were happy then, even if then we were not 
reflexively aware. Swann liked transiting from art to life and then to art, as 
when he perceived Odette as Botticelli’s Zipporah. The taste of a madeleine 
made Marcel recollect his childhood summers at Combray: the smells in the 
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kitchen, nap time reading in bed, with the blinds closed protecting the room 
from the sun in the hottest hours of the day; all these were everyday pleasures 
of Marcel’s childhood. Certainly, it is reminiscence that brought those 
moments to reflexion and recovered them from insignificance. However, the 
content of the memories are moments really lived by the child Marcel, now 
recollected by the adult Marcel as pleasantly familiar.
I am not prepared to enter here in the epistemology of memories, but 
I want to consider a question that recurrently arises when dealing with 
memories and autobiographies. I am referring to experiential memories, 
that is, memories from the inside, or the recollection of the past from the 
first-person perspective, a recollection not only of what happened but 
of what it was like for the self to live it. The problem is the very likely 
manipulation of memories and the impossibility of the true representation 
of past times. The main reason is of course that the person has changed, 
and even if there is a serious aim at being truthful, the same things do not 
look the same or have the same significance. Time also blurs the facts: 
we mistake people for other people, years, and even the proper content 
of what happened. More to the point, there is no inner mark of the truth 
of a memory. However, no matter how frequent mistakes and conscious 
or unconscious manipulation are, there is something like remembering 
truly.
In part, the problem arises from thinking about memories as 
representations of facts that are somewhere held in reserve in the mind. 
Remembering something is considered as drawing a picture or a print out 
from the reservoir of our mind. But this is not what Marcel, the narrator of 
the Search did. He did not draw a memory from the back of his mind to write 
about it. But involuntary memories bring to his consciousness past events 
that are part of his identity and explanatory of his ways of thinking and acting 
in the present. So, in the novel, the narrator tells truly a past event from the 
first-person point of view, that is, he expresses himself sincerely, respecting 
the expressive and aesthetic character of the present experiences of the past. 
He did not take the mental and discoloured picture of an event, in order to 
revive and embellish it with literary decoration. That is, literature does not 
repair the missing parts and manipulate the less interesting ones, to build a 
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nicely written, beautifully structured whole. Instead, the value of In Search of 
Lost Time is considered to be the narration of the past from the present, and 
the exploration of memory, truth, human life, and the passing of time.
It is likely that in reading In Search of Lost Time we don’t care about the 
truth or falsity of the narrated content. That’s not my concern here, but to 
show what it would be like for a memory to regain the experience of the 
past, to evoke it. Recollection is often the private imagination of past events 
in which we more or less luckily are able to evoke the experience we had of 
them. Proust is often regarded as defending the impossibility of regaining 
the past. However, even though only involuntary memory can escape 
the traps of nostalgia, it is still possible that “truth appears and grants us 
happiness in moments of insight linked to the retrospective consideration 
of sensual experience, the ‘making strange’ of what previously had been a 
matter of assumption and ready certainty” (Stewart 2004, 114).3 
THE UNNOTICED IN ART
Following Proust’s novel, I now want to hold that for the reason already given, that we can only recognise or remember something that we had somehow experienced before, art may also be capable 
of retaining the characteristic experience of everyday life. That everyday 
life can be enjoyed, and that happiness depends much on our capacity 
to be sensitive to it has been often remarked. That art has been able to 
represent the everyday up to the most overlooked aspects of it has also 
been claimed. From different perspectives, and in a variety of art forms, 
from literature to music or painting, artists have striven to represent the 
elusive, the unnoticed, character of daily life. Artists and philosophers 
have assumed that in order to do that it is required to make the familiar 
strange. However, the Avant-garde idea that the aesthetic experience 
of art is essentially an experience of estrangement is unwarranted. 
3 Stewart makes again the point of the ‘estrangement’. However, I take it to be just one more 
occasion in which the notion is used by habit. It does not add anything to the idea that what 
was assumed before is now realized. 
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Certainly, the unnoticed, neglected, lived but not contemplated aspects 
of the everyday, are brought to contemplation and reflection by art. And, 
certainly, a work of art is a representation, and needs to be interpreted; 
it is just the opposite of daily life, which is immediately taken in. But all 
that does not imply estrangement. Art may make the familiar strange, 
and vice versa. However, it may also be the case that art represents the 
everyday, and, furthermore, that it is able to evoke what is peculiar of the 
experience of familiarity. Actually, that is the point of many works of art, 
which aim to conjure the everydayness of the everyday. 
Photography is in some sense particularly adequate to fit the task of 
representing the everyday since it makes it possible to mechanically and 
transparently represent what happens in front of the camera. That way, 
Henri Cartier-Bresson’s photographs succeeded in capturing the “right 
moment”, in which it may be said that the extraordinary appears in 
the middle of the ordinary. In Derriere la Gare Lazare (1932) a man leaps 
across the water of a puddle in the surroundings of the train station. The 
photograph captures the figure on the air and the symmetric reflection 
on the puddle. The photographer was lucky and ready to shoot the exact 
moment in which an ordinary event transforms the complete scene. 
Together with the geometric pattern of the station fence and different 
elements of the setting, human figures and architectonic elements, light 
and obscurity, movement and stillness, balance and unsteadiness are 
organized in a composition with aesthetic sense and value transforming 
the grey non-place behind the train station in a poetic urban scene of 
lights and shades, stabilities and movement. Like in other photographs 
by Cartier-Bresson, geometry and human presence, the permanence of 
the setting and the transience of actions combine in a composition that is 
visually striking.
Cartier-Bresson has very often been mentioned in relation to the 
representation of everyday life. As an artist, Cartier-Bresson “makes us 
attend to the message of reality” (Gombrich 1991, 198) and has the capacity “to 
make reality speak” (Gombrich 1991, 199). And nevertheless, Haappala writes 
about Cartier-Bresson as representative of the art “where the quotidian has 
been used as the subject-matter”, but also as an example for his scepticism 
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about the power of art of representing everydayness: “…my point is that in 
the context of art the everyday loses its everydayness: it becomes something 
extraordinary” (Haapala 2005, 51). The value of Cartier-Bresson’s art is 
not about the ordinary, but about the extraordinary in the ordinary, the 
humorous, the surprising, the unlikely in the middle of the everyday4. 
However, sometimes art not only has the everyday as subject-matter, 
but it is able to represent the everyday life qua everyday, that is, to evoke 
everyday everydayness. Photographic transparency does not warrant 
the representation of everydayness, but, in contrast, artistic opacity is 
sometimes capable of doing so. Let’s consider painting: among her pictures 
of mothers with children, Mary Cassatt’s The Child’s Bath (1891) represents 
a moment in which a woman with a girl in her lap washes the girl’s foot in 
a porcelain basin full of water. I find the painting a great example of the 
evocation of daily domesticity. However, the work is greatly pictorial, that 
is, artistically opaque. In the first place, the influence of Degas and Japanese 
prints compositions meets the eye. The proper composition underlines the 
artistry, with a superior angle that imposes the foreshortening of the pitcher 
in the foreground to the right. Secondly, there is artistry in representing the 
texture and touch of different materials, the fabric of the rugs, maybe wool, 
the silky dress, the porcelain, the water, the varnish of the furniture, and the 
wall-paper. The bourgeoise interior is luxurious and beautiful, “the well-
provided upper-middle-class bedroom or parlour, in which her curving 
body (the mother’s body) can provide shelter and sustenance” (Nochlin 
2008, 191). But, apart from the conspicuous presence of the medium – or 
maybe due to it – the painting is capable of evoking the physical contact of 
mother and child, and the intimacy of the moment. The painting achieves 
it thematising the touch. On the one hand by means of the representation 
of stuff and texture: wool, silk, water, flesh…; on the other hand, by the way 
4 The relationship between Cartier-Bresson and the everyday has usually been remarked. 
Commenting on Danto’s phrase that we respond to Cartier-Bresson photographs “in the 
fullness of our humanity”, Rubio (2016) claimed that what is at stake is “our capacity of 
seeing, in the magic of Cartier-Bresson’s photographs, the world that we see on a daily basis, 
realising that it is the same world. It is the world”. In this sense, Rubio points in the opposite 
direction of the idea that Cartier-Bresson unveils the magic in the quotidian to the idea that 
it unveils the quotidian in the magic. 
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in which the figures touch each other, the hand on the foot, the huge hand 
of the mother around her daughter’s waist, the daughter’s hand leaning on 
the mother’s knee. 
According to Linda Nochlin: “Cassatt’s mother and child images speak 
openly of the sensual fleshly delights of maternity” (Nochlin 1999, 190). 
Caresses, crossed gazes, sleepy attitudes and the children’s nudity are the 
main motives of these paintings. Understanding and appreciating them 
hinge on the capacity to recognize the pleasant experience of bathing 
toddlers, and the happiness of intimate domesticity in the everyday 
relationship with children. Beyond the aesthetic qualities of the artistic 
representation, the value of the work lies in my opinion in its capacity to 
evoke domesticity in its characteristic everydayness. 
The representation of something that has been considered charac-
teristic of everydayness also contributes to the value: the absorption of 
the figures in the domestic activity. Both mother and child stare at the 
basin, collaborating automatically in the action. They seem unaware of 
themselves and of the other, but they are attuned in their movements and 
in fulfilling their actions. Indeed, they are in comfortable control of their 
actions because they are aware of their own body and movements, and 
sensitive to the touch of the other’s body and movements. Mother and child 
are unreflectively aware of all that and of many other things – like perhaps 
the temperature of the water and of the room. 
Michael Fried has dedicated most of his writings to the topic of 
absorption in painting. But in Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before 
(2008) he deals particularly with absorption in photography and its relation 
to the everyday. In that context, he writes about Jeff Wall’s photographs 
under the insight of Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of the 
everyday. Fried aims to demonstrate “the philosophical – specifically, the 
ontological – depth of which painting is capable” (Fried 2008, 49). And 
comparing Wittgenstein with Wall about art and the everyday, he cites 
Wall: “The everyday, or the commonplace, is the most basic and richest 
artistic category. Although it seems familiar, it is always surprising and new. 
But at the same time there is an openness that permits people to recognize 
what is there in the picture, because they have already seen something like 
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it somewhere. So, the everyday is a space in which meanings accumulate, 
but it’s the pictorial realization that carries the meanings into the realm of 
the pleasurable” (Wall cited by Fried 2008, 64).
Fried pointed out that those pictures in which Wall deals more 
successfully with the everyday are those in which there are absorbed figures. 
However, contrary to what may seem the case, they are not ‘documentary’ 
photographs of people in the subway, on the streets, or looking at paintings 
in a museum, but rather fictional and pictorial photographs, where the final 
picture is the result of much posing, acting, collage and montage of hundreds 
of shots. While Morning cleaning, Mies van der Rohe Foundation, Barcelona is 
‘nearly documentary’ (because the cleaner is the real worker, doing his daily 
maintenance work in the real building), View from an apartment, which I want 
to analyse briefly, is almost completely fictional (in the sense that the scene 
is staged, and the characters are acting). A view from an apartment depicts 
the interior of an apartment with two big windows – like vedute – in the 
background, one of them looking towards the port of Vancouver. There is a 
dialectic between interior and exterior marked visually by the difference in 
light tone. Lights are already on in the apartment, and illuminate softly and 
warmly all over the room, while outside there is as yet some daylight. The 
lamps from the interior reflect on the glass. The port is full of cranes, ships, 
and industrial buildings, but there is nobody to be seen, while inside the 
apartment two young girls seem absorbed in their activities, silent. The figure 
that attracts the beholder’s gaze walks in diagonal to the foreground of the 
image, downcast eyes, holding a napkin in her hands, maybe for ironing, since 
there are at sight an ironing board and an iron, and some clothes in a basket. 
She is wearing home-clothes. The other girl lounges on a sofa browsing a 
magazine. The apartment looks relatively messy, though not chaotic, and in 
a certain way contrasts with the calm that both figures express. 
The attitude of both figures shows the lack of concern about the proper 
image and about being seen characteristic of domesticity and absorption. 
In Fried’s terms, they lack the to-be-seen-ness, which is proper of public 
social life. In this sense, everyday awareness of oneself is subject to the 
same ‘daily inattention’ we dedicate to objects. Even if it is obvious that 
the sitters are acting for the camera, the presence of a beholder is avoided, 
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oblivious of the external world as the figures are: one apparently occupied 
in her thoughts doing automatically her housework, the other distractedly 
browsing the journal. As spectators we have no access to the women’s inner 
lives. No gesture is expressive of their mind, apart from the state of self-
absorption. There is no hint that permits possible identification or empathy. 
And however, we recognize in their countenance and gestures expressive of 
nothing, in their way of moving in the room or sprawling out on the sofa, in 
the way the objects spread out in the sitting-room, the look of domesticity 
and the sense of everydayness familiar to all.
Obviously looking at paintings or photographs we adopt an external 
perspective and miss the kind of engagement proper to everyday life. And 
when we in the first-person are living the moment, we don’t realise it; at 
least up to a certain point, because as adults in a social world we are almost 
always conscious of being seen, and therefore conscious of our own image. 
Absorption is the state of mind which better represents the point in which 
we are scarcely conscious of ourselves but completely engaged in an action. 
These moments of absorption amount to an almost complete loss of self-
awareness. So, when we are absorbed in the action, we are barely conscious 
of ourselves, but if we become aware of ourselves or of being observed 
we lose this basic and spontaneous contact with the world. In order to 
aesthetically appreciate the everyday, we must – maybe just for an instant 
– switch to the third person perspective, in regard to ourselves or to others. 
We do it very often in art and life, but the role of spectator does not prevent 
us recognising the everyday in others or in ourselves. 
In conclusion, if we can aesthetically appreciate the everyday adopting a 
third person perspective on us, looking at others, in memories, or in art, it is 
because the experience of the world in those moments of daily inattention 
proper to everyday life had already an aesthetic quality. Appreciating the 
everyday in our memories, in other’s activities, or in art, is bringing to 
reflexion what was there before – overlooked and hardly noticed – without 
changing it. That is why an aesthetics of the extraordinary is not adequate 
for everyday life, but maybe it is not an accurate aesthetics of art either.5
 
5 This paper is part of the research projects “Aesthetic experience of the arts and the 
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EVERYDAY GREEN AESTHETICS
ABSTRACT
The aim of the paper is to discuss the idea of everyday green aesthetics 
conceived of as an approach that combines everyday aesthetics with 
environmental aesthetics. I contend that discovering the aesthetic 
values of everyday nature is important because it may positively 
influence people’s wellbeing. I believe that it may broaden the array of 
things they find aesthetically rewarding and foster a more respectful 
attitude toward nature. The basic issue of green everyday aesthetics 
is then to show how to aesthetically enjoy nature, so ubiquitous that 
people do not notice it or treat it as a nuisance. There are, however, 
places where everyday nature is intentionally brought to the foreground 
in order to make it an object of aesthetic experience. These spaces are 
gardens, therefore garden aesthetics, especially its version offered by 
Rosario Assunto, is discussed as an example of how everyday green 
aesthetics may be developed.
Everyday aesthetics has been a well-established field of philosophy for more than a decade.1 So has ecological aesthetics.2 These fields are not distant from each other, sharing a number of issues and 
being included in the agenda of environmental aesthetics.3 Nevertheless, 
they are studied together much less frequently than one would expect, and 
consequently the idea of everyday green aesthetics is still waiting to be fully 
developed. There are at least two reasons to do so. First, the nature that 
people most often encounter is rather plain and hence passes unnoticed 
as a neutral background for their everyday life (Marder 2013, 3 —4). Their 
aesthetic concepts, rooted mainly in their experience of art, make it hard – 
if not impossible – for them to aesthetically appreciate the exact opposite 
1 See e.g. Light 2005, Di Stefano 2017, Saito 2017.
2 On that topic see e.g. Nassauer 1997, D’Angelo 2010, Prigan and Strelow 2004, Hosey 2012.
3 See e.g. Carlson and Lintott 2008, Toadvine 2010.
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of scenic nature. As a consequence, even if everyday nature requires daily 
maintenance, it tends to be treated as unworthy of extraordinary care or 
protection which is otherwise limited to rare species or spectacular sites. 
Showing that this ‘dull’ nature deserves attention and suggesting that it 
can be appreciated may positively influence people’s wellbeing because it 
may broaden the array of things people find aesthetically rewarding. This 
consequence is backed up by another, which is at the same time the second 
reason for developing everyday green aesthetics. As Yuriko Saito rightly 
notes, aesthetic experience may play a crucial role in creating what she calls 
‘environmentally active citizenry’ (Saito 2007, 203). Thus, discovering the 
aesthetic values of everyday nature may foster a more respectful attitude 
toward nature on a day-to-day basis. As people tend to care more for what 
they like, the aim of everyday green aesthetics is to persuade them that 
there is a lot in everyday nature to be enjoyed.
Everyday nature is heterogeneous, and it spans from uncultivated 
wild areas to hyper-cultivated vertical gardens, from pleasure grounds 
to urban farms.4 Thus, if aesthetics is to successfully fulfil both of the 
aforementioned aims, it has to account for this variety. There is, however, 
an issue that seems to be of primary importance here, and which underlies 
all the possible perspectives on everyday green aesthetics. Any possible 
discussion of how different greenery may be aesthetically appreciated 
is perforce based on the assumption that such an appreciation is indeed 
an appreciation of nature, no matter the extent to which the appreciated 
nature has been influenced by human intervention (Budd 2002). Even if a 
weed sprouting from the cracks of a concrete footpath belongs to a species 
invented in a laboratory and grows because people inadvertently brought 
it there on their soles, it is reasonable to think of it in terms of nature, i.e. as 
something that is fundamentally different from human creations such as 
the concrete and the footpath. There is no point in reiterating arguments 
proving how debatable the notion of nature is. For the sake of the present 
argument, it is enough to identify nature with an animate or inanimate 
other-than-human sphere. The basic issue of green everyday aesthetics is 
then to show how to aesthetically enjoy this other-than-human nature, so 
4 On everyday nature as an artistic topic, see Spaid, 2002, 2012, 2017.
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ubiquitous that people hardly even notice it. Or if they do, they deem it a 
nuisance.
Even if everyday nature sometimes makes a noticeable impression 
— for instance, in the form of hyper-trimmed lawns in front of houses, 
shrubs pruned in fancy shapes or green walls made of hydroponically 
cultivated mosses — such a reaction expresses an aesthetic appreciation 
of the human artifice required to produce these green forms and not of 
their vegetal matter. Nature as an other-than-human sphere remains an 
invisible background for people’s activities. There are, however, places 
where everyday nature is intentionally brought to the foreground. These 
‘other spaces’ (Foucault 1986) are gardens. 
In fact, gardens are places where people living in a more and more 
urbanized world most often have an occasion to experience nature without 
leaving their daily environment. Michel Conan is right when he states in 
his introduction to the volume Contemporary Garden Aesthetics that:
[g]ardens have been more numerous and ubiquitous in 
contemporary western cities over the last fifty years than at any 
previous time in their history […]. One may say that gardening is 
one of the very few arts that has been practiced on a large scale 
by amateurs […] Gardens are places that we enjoy as part of our 
dwelling in the world. They belong to our everyday life, and they 
impinge upon it. This is true of home gardens and of public gardens 
where we withdraw for a moment of leisure during the day, or of any 
of those gardens that we enjoy as a part of our walks to work, to a 
shopping mall, or even to a museum; but it is also true of the historic 
gardens that are visited during their holidays, even though it is not 
immediately apparent that these visits belong in the same way to 
their everyday life. […] Gardens are undoubtedly about everyday life, 
at the same time that they offer moments of aesthetic enjoyment. 
(Conan 2007, 3–4.)
There is no doubt that gardens are art in the sense that they are very 
often designed and taken care of in such a way as to render the nature in 
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them spectacular and hence aesthetically appealing, e.g. through careful 
selection of flowers, cultivating prize-winning pumpkins or composing 
sophisticated views. Nevertheless, there is always a place in gardens for 
vegetation which is not that attractive and, in all likelihood, would have 
passed unnoticed, had it been experienced elsewhere. The importance of 
gardens for everyday green aesthetics lies precisely in that even unattractive 
nature gets the attention of those who cultivate gardens as well as of those 
who merely visit them. Thus, gardens may be said to be spaces where the 
epiphany of nature takes place (Cooper 2006, 129–154).
Not only do gardens allow people – as Conan writes – ‘to dwell in 
nature’ (Conan 2007, 4), but they do so in a way that is unique to gardens. 
The uniqueness stems from the sort of experience only gardens offer. 
This experience is particularly interesting for everyday green aesthetics 
as its analysis shows what an aesthetic appreciation of nature in all its 
everydayness may consist of. Because of the experience offered by gardens, 
they are also places where everyday green aesthetics can be put to practice, 
which may result in a heightened level of ‘ecological literacy’ (Orr 2011, 251–
261). In fact Wendell Berry (2012, 79) claims that there is no better way to 
get involved in caring for the environment than gardening. In other words, 
gardens are philosophical places, as Rosario Assunto (1988), an Italian 
garden philosopher (discussed below), used to say, meaning that they 
are places that favour both philosophical inquiries into the relationship 
between humankind and nature and thus leading an eco-friendly life.
Needless to say, the experience of a garden is manifold, but it is 
unanimously agreed that it has a strong aesthetic dimension which makes 
it an aesthetic experience above all. It is no wonder then that gardens have 
been recently analysed by a number of aestheticians.5 In fact, it would not 
be an exaggeration to claim that we have recently witnessed a birth – or 
a revival, if we think of its 18th-century origins – of garden aesthetics. Its 
agenda covers three main questions (Cooper 2009): how should gardens be 
aesthetically appreciated: as artworks or as natural environments? What 
do gardens mean, and what meanings may they convey as partly artificial 
and partly natural places? What is the relationship between art, i.e. human 
5 See e.g. Assunto 1988, Miller 1993, Ross 1998, Cooper 2006, Chomarat-Ruiz 2015, Salwa 2016.
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activities, and nature in gardens? 
The first two questions have received considerably more attention 
than the last one. They in fact refer to the unclear status of gardens as 
artworks, whereas the third question touches upon the ethical dimension 
of gardening. Garden aesthetics may be seen as an attempt to go beyond the 
traditional limits of aesthetics conceived of as philosophy of art. However, 
in the case of gardens the burden of tradition is surprisingly heavy because 
even if the environmental dimension of gardens has been perforce 
acknowledged, the dominant approach analyses them in terms of art-
centred aesthetics, treating them as ‘cultural objects’ (Hunt 1991) defined 
by the designs, meanings and intentions behind them. Very rarely are they 
conceived of as human created natural environments or – to use Malcolm 
Budd’s (2002, 7) term – ‘human affected nature’. The fact that gardens 
are ‘all too human’ environments makes them of rather little interest for 
environmental aestheticians who seem to take it for granted that gardens 
should be appreciated in terms of their design and not in terms of a ‘natural 
order’.6 
One of the consequences of the somewhat reductive approach that 
treats gardens as if their design were all there is to be appreciated is that 
scholarly attention is mainly paid to gardens created by artists or designers, 
while everyday gardens tend to be overlooked. If yards or garden allotments 
are discussed, they are analysed as expression of different social or political 
practices. They are also discussed as ecosystems or communities consisting 
of humans and other-than-human beings. From these perspectives, aesthetic 
experience seems very often to be irrelevant – as if these gardens could not 
offer it.7 It is, however, enough to go through a number of personal literary 
accounts of cultivating vegetables, preparing compost, weeding, etc., such 
as humorous Karel Čapek’s The Gardener’s Year (2013), more serious Michael 
Pollan’s Second Nature (1991) or Jim Nolman’s Why we Garden (1995), to 
find out that gardening implies an aesthetic experience of nature. It goes 
without saying that this sort of experience has little or nothing to do with 
6 There are exceptions, of course, e.g. Carlson 2000, 114–127; Parsons 2010, 165–175, Berleant 
2012.
7 Again, there are exceptions, e.g. Laroze 1996, Hitchings 2003, Ross 2007.
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an aesthetic experience of any art, and instead it resembles the experience 
analysed by environmental aestheticians who in one way or another claim 
that an adequate aesthetic experience of nature amounts to experiencing 
nature qua nature, i.e. as something which is not art.
It seems then that there are good reasons to go further in the direction 
suggested by environmental aesthetics, beyond an art-centred perspective. 
That is not to say that one should dismiss the fact that gardens may be 
appreciated in terms of their design, meanings or functions. Rather, it 
is tantamount to seriously considering that what is to be appreciated 
in gardens is nature. From this point of view, whether gardens may be 
approached as full-fledged works of art or not is of little importance, but 
what is crucial is the fact that they offer an aesthetic experience to their 
creators and the public as artworks do.
The idea that gardens are works of art, not so much because of their 
design or skilful maintenance but because they engender aesthetic 
experience has been developed by Assunto (1988, 1996). Even though there 
are no links between his theory and environmental aesthetics as such, and 
his philosophical idiom is totally different from the one used by Anglo-
American philosophers, their conclusions nicely supplement one another, 
especially where gardens are at stake (Salwa 2015). Assunto’s theory is 
noteworthy as it is probably one of the most systematic philosophical 
accounts of garden aesthetics. It is not devoid of highly debatable points, 
but discussing them would be beyond the scope of the present article. A 
very short summary of his thought has to suffice.
Assunto named his theory a ‘philosophy of the garden’ (filosofia del 
giardino), as his principal aim was to describe the ‘Idea of the Garden’ 
and thus to answer the question ‘what is a garden?’ At the same time his 
intentions were broader – he contended that the idea of a garden was a 
useful point of reference in environmental thinking. Following in the 
footsteps of his philosophical masters, Plato and the German romantic 
philosophers, he believed that it is possible to define the essence of garden 
and that such a definition should account for the fact that this essence, 
despite being trans-historical and trans-cultural, has only a historical 
existence i.e. it exists only through its various historical embodiments that 
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changed over the centuries following different aesthetic ideals. He claimed 
that people designed gardens in reaction to their innate need to create a 
natural environment which would correspond to their ideal of nature. 
Medieval gardens, French Baroque ones or English landscape parks were 
thus reflections of a singular idea of the garden, in the sense that they were 
supposed to be embodiments of the ideal nature. It is true that they differ, 
but it is so only because they follow different ‘garden poetics’ which are 
expressions of different ways of imagining what ideal nature is like. In 
other words, for Assunto, gardens are places which are made of real nature 
in order to present in vivo ideal nature. Thus, apart from other functions, 
gardens serve as places where real and ideal nature may and should be 
contemplated. This means that in gardens – even those which, prima facie, 
seem to epitomize human dominance over nature – art in fact is at nature’s 
service.
Describing the Idea of the Garden and its historical vicissitudes, Assunto 
offered an ontology of gardens, defining conditions that a place has to fulfil 
in order to be a garden. His definition is rather peculiar as it is at the same 
time open and closed, and it refers to objective as well as subjective factors. 
On the one hand, he claims that gardens have an essence which make them 
‘absolutely other spaces’, on the other he does not list the properties that 
a place has to have in order to be a garden. The essence of the garden is 
then not defined by the look or its economic, social or political functions. 
It is, rather, defined by the attitude with which it was designed, set up and 
with which it is cultivated and used. So, the differentia specifica of gardens 
lies in all sorts of garden practices. Having in mind its double character, 
Assunto named it esteticità (the aesthetic) and associated it with aesthetic 
experience.
He identified aesthetic experience with contemplation. As has been 
mentioned above, gardens are places where nature is contemplated 
whenever gardens are designed, cultivated or visited. In other words, 
he claimed that gardening was an art, by which he meant that gardens 
should be appreciated in the same manner in which artworks are and that 
gardening required not only technical skills but also a particular attitude. 
In both cases a contemplative approach is needed, and it results in the 
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beauty of the garden or its esteticità. Thus, a gardener cultivates nature in 
a garden in such a way as to make it beautiful, and a visitor or user of a 
garden is supposed to discover the garden’s beauty and have an experience 
of it. Contemplation does not, however, amount to an approach typical 
for a distanced observer. On the contrary, Assunto contended that people 
should always be physically and sensually engaged in gardens, and yet such 
practices should be contemplative. He simply identified contemplation 
with a disinterested attitude, i.e. an attitude which allows one to see things 
as they are and to respect them for what they are. Therefore, insofar as 
nature in a garden is contemplated, it is treated as a goal in itself, which 
means that cultivating a garden differs from cultivating a field on a farm in 
that it does not treat nature solely in instrumental terms. 
Nature in a garden may, obviously, has instrumental value, yet it must 
never be reduced to it. Gardens are places where nature turns out to have 
an inherent value which, however, does not replace its instrumental value 
but accompanies it. This is what makes gardens so different from e.g. 
urban green spaces which are ‘ecological machines’. Thus, the aesthetic 
experience of nature implied by the disinterested approach results in 
particular gardening practices which respect nature’s needs and cycles and 
it allows one to notice and appreciate them. What is more, it promotes the 
notion of people’s unity with nature and that they should not abandon 
or destroy it. In this sense, gardens are also places where people may 
contemplate themselves and their relationship with nature. 
Summing up, for Assunto, gardens are places where a sort of harmony 
between humankind and other-than-human nature is achieved, and it is 
based on a non-instrumental human approach to nature which amounts 
to an aesthetic appreciation of it while also fostering respect toward nature 
in its otherness. Gardens are considered earthly paradises and as such they 
offer an ecological ideal of what the Earth should be like.
When Assunto described gardens as artworks and gardening as art, he 
referred as much to the modern system of the arts as to the broad meaning 
of tekhnē. If we now focus on the latter, we may see that for him gardens are 
places created by human hands according to cultural ideals – they are ‘cultural 
objects’ – but one cannot focus solely on human efforts and overlook the fact 
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that they are made of nature and that they are designed in order to make 
nature itself, among other things, an object of aesthetic experience. Hence, 
gardens are places where nature is intentionally pushed to the foreground, 
experienced as a sphere that is not human and appreciated precisely for 
this. Borrowing a few expressions from Malcolm Budd, it can be said that 
gardens are places where humans cultivate, shape and organize nature in a 
particular way implied by ‘an aesthetic experience of nature as nature’ (Budd 
2002, 1–23), and that they are managed in this particular manner in order to 
make other people have an experience of this sort. As a result, in a human-
made garden people may aesthetically experience the ‘naturalness of nature’ 
(Ibid.) (or what they take to be nature’s naturalness). That does not mean that 
garden nature is not subject to human intentions; it does mean, however, that 
humans do not approach it in a purely instrumental way. Garden nature is 
intentionally designed to be the object of aesthetic experience. Otherwise 
why would anyone want to set up a garden as a garden and not as a small 
farm? And why would anyone want to enter it? Is it not the case that people 
like gardens because they like to be amidst nature, even if nature is limited to 
their yard or garden allotment?
Assunto was also a garden historian; therefore, he wrote extensively 
on historic gardens which he used as illustrations and proof of his theory. 
It is then no wonder that he believed that they were an important part of 
cultural and natural heritage worthy of protection. Yet, he claimed that in 
some respects everyday gardens were equally – if not even more – important 
because it was in them that the Idea of the Garden – in its local as well as 
global meaning – was currently kept alive in daily practices.
Esteticità, to which he devoted so much space in his writings, has little to 
do with extraordinary aesthetic qualities of gardens stemming from either 
their spectacular design or the rarity of their plants. It is rather rooted in their 
ordinariness, that is in the fact that no matter how spectacular they may be, 
they are ‘made of ’ nature which may be easily found elsewhere. The esteticità 
of gardens exists not only when one admires them as compositions, but also 
when one contemplates single flowers or leaves (which are never the same) or 
branches heavy with matured fruits, when one contemplates the autumnal 
decay of vegetal life and its rebirth in the spring, when one opens oneself to 
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various looks and moods of gardens changing with the passage of seasons; 
in other words – esteticità emerges whenever one contemplates the order, 
rhythms and cycles of nature. All this provokes a deep wonder before the 
bountiful and beautiful world to which humans belong, which they partly 
create and modify, but which is never entirely theirs.
The Assuntian Idea of the Garden is in fact the idea of a human approach 
to nature based on the aesthetic experience of nature as nature. Gardens are 
places where the human experience of nature is enriched by the addition of 
an aesthetic dimension. Assunto is well aware that cultivating a garden is a 
matter of purely practical skills and that, in many ways, cultivating a garden 
does not differ from running a farm. What, however, changes tekhnē into art 
is the attitude with which it is practiced. The same holds true for the use of 
gardens. It is then the particular human attitude that makes the epiphany 
of nature possible, and gardens foster both of them. Assunto compared the 
relationship between gardens and ‘mere’ green spaces to the relationship 
between poetry and prose. Just as poetry reveals the ‘materiality’ of 
language which remains hidden in prose, gardens unveil the esteticità of the 
world. This is their ‘aesthetic function’ (Mukařovsky 1979), which may have 
consequences reaching far beyond their boundaries. In all probability, once 
ordinary, everyday nature is aesthetically experienced and appreciated in 
a garden, it will also be noticed and appreciated elsewhere. Is not a weed 
sprouting from the cracks of a concrete footpath fascinating and beautiful 
on closer inspection – much more so than the footpath – because of how it 
looks and strives for live?
Assunto’s theory is noteworthy for, among other things, the fact that he 
developed a garden aesthetics that has a strong environmental inclination 
and may serve as an example of everyday green aesthetics. He effectively 
showed that everyday nature can and should be aesthetically experienced. 
When he stated that nature should be aesthetically experienced as nature, 
that is as something which is not human-made (even though it may be – and 
in fact is – arranged by humans), he was largely in line with environmental 
aesthetics. Furthermore, he insisted that such an experience was beneficial 
for the people as well as for their environment. He underlined that 
an aesthetic experience of nature leads to a positive appreciation of it. 
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However, an aesthetic experience of everyday nature does not amount to 
experiencing it as extraordinary, as devoid of its usual functions or effects. It 
rather consists in paying attention to it, which requires a sort of ‘bracketing 
out’ one’s utilitarian interests. Assunto’s position is then not far from Arto 
Haapala’s account of everyday aesthetics:
Although we are embedded in the structures of the everyday and 
see things most of the time through functionality, every now and 
then we take some distance from the concerns of the daily activities. 
When doing so, we do not see familiar objects surrounding us as 
strange, rather we start to enjoy their visual and auditory features. 
(Haapala 2005, 50.)
When we do so – Haapala continues – we act as the Heideggerian 
peasant who:
can from time to time sit down and set aside the needs and 
demands of the everyday, and enjoy the familiar scene—the fields, 
the sky, birdsong. 
(Ibidem, 51.) 
For Assunto, however, ‘setting aside the needs and demands of the everyday’ 
does not have to imply ‘sitting down’ since such a contemplative approach 
may perfectly well accompany daily practices. What is more, one aesthetically 
experiences not only ‘visual and auditory features’, but also relations, processes, 
etc., i.e. all the workings of nature. They are extraordinary not because they 
are unfamiliar or strange but because in all their ordinariness they may elicit 
wonder. Nothing is more reassuring than the belief that, next spring, nature 
will start its vital cycle once again as it has always done. And nothing is more 
banal than this. Yet, these natural rhythms are wonderful despite, or rather 
thanks to, their repeatability.8 Nowhere are they easier to experience than in 
gardens – every gardener knows it and so does every garden goer.
Arnold Berleant (1992, 98) compared urban planning to gardening, 
8 Cf. Di Stefano 2017, 63–72.
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which he took to be a paradigm of cultivating ‘the functional and the 
aesthetic as inseparable’. Similarly, the experience of a garden may be 
treated as a paradigm of experiencing everyday nature in such a way that 
the functional and the aesthetic go together, reinforcing each other. While 
not disqualifying the use of nature, the everyday aesthetic experience of 
nature can inhibit the possible excesses of a practical approach to it and 
consequently guarantee the preservation of both the environment and the 
human wellbeing that it bolsters. 
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Ossi nauKKarinen
FEELING (WITH) MACHINES
ABSTRACT
Computers and their networks are drastically changing our everyday 
lives. In this article, I focus on how this change affects the field of 
everyday aesthetics. I address my theme in four steps and ask: how could 
present and future developments affect, first, the creation of everyday 
aesthetic phenomena; second, aesthetic phenomena themselves; and 
third, the perception and evaluation of aesthetic phenomena? Lastly, 
if remarkable changes happen in all or some of these, how could that 
affect aesthetics as an academic discipline?
LOG IN
Computers are everywhere. The maze of laptops, phones, tablets, servers, databases, sensors, and robots, as well as the programs, algorithms and codes that run them, is becoming ubiquitous. It 
is changing our environments, working practices and lives in general so 
quickly and significantly that it is very difficult to foresee where it will 
lead us. We shop, chat, listen to music, drive our cars, write, exercise, run 
processes in factories, diagnose diseases, create weather forecasts, search 
for partners, analyze sports statistics, cook, and do practically everything 
with the help of computers, and they are getting much better than humans 
at more and more tasks. Some people install microchips in their bodies 
to monitor and control themselves with the help of computational tools, 
turning themselves into some kind of hybrid creature. There is no sign that 
this trend will change anytime soon.
How is all this changing the aesthetics of our everyday lives, and 
what will happen next? To be honest, no-one knows. This text is pure 
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speculation: an essay leaning towards the French verb essayer, from which 
the English noun is derived. I am trying to imagine some possible aspects of 
our future, things that do not yet exist but might become true. The future is 
necessarily based on the past and present, and it is not entirely open; as we 
know something about the past and present, we may also know something 
about the future that will grow out of them. Still, I do not pretend to know 
what will happen, and I only make suggestions and ask questions that may 
find their answers later. For now, we just have to settle for sketching various 
possible futures.
I muse on how computers and computational approaches are changing 
our everyday aesthetics. But when doing this, I emphasize the everyday 
aspect of my approach. I am not a computer scientist, not even an advanced 
and exceptionally active user, but a very ordinary, mid-range digital 
citizen living with various sorts of computers and software, such as Word, 
WhatsApp, Twitter, Outlook, Skype, ParkMan, Spotify, SoundCloud, 
LinkedIn, Google Maps, several online shopping channels, news portals, 
cameras, teaching tools, and others. In this, I am like most people in 
wealthy countries. On many occasions, our lives are guided by computers 
without us even knowing and noticing it. Recently, in discussions about the 
opportunities and threats presented by an advanced artificial intelligence, 
there have been two opposing extremes and everything in between: super 
robots will solve all our problems and make us their slaves … or will just 
continue both helping and harming humans, like all previous generations 
of machines have done, changing many things but not everything. In every 
scenario, however, there will be impacts on our everyday aesthetics. What 
could they be? Where could the present situation lead us to? 
I address my theme in steps and ask: how could present and future 
developments affect, first, the creation or production of everyday aesthetic 
phenomena; second, aesthetic phenomena themselves; and third, the 
perception and evaluation of aesthetic phenomena? Lastly, if remarkable 
changes happen in all or some of these, how could that affect aesthetics as 
an academic discipline?
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EVERYDAY AESTHETICS
Before sketching how computers, and the algorithms that make them tick, may change our everyday aesthetics, it is necessary to describe briefly what everyday aesthetics is.1
By everyday aesthetics, I mean the aesthetic deeds, objects, processes 
and experiences that we do, make, have and face in our everyday lives. I see 
the everyday as a relational concept. There is no list of things that would 
always be of an everyday type to everyone. Almost anything can be that to 
someone, at some point in their lives: certain kinds of clothes, food, sports, 
art, tableware, work, cars…. In addition, what is not everyday right now can 
become normal and habitual, and vice versa, meaning that the content of 
the everyday changes. True, everyday things often relate to our homes, work 
and hobbies, but what kinds of objects and events these actually include 
varies a lot. The essential characteristic of the everyday is that it is normal, 
habitual or commonplace; it is what we face repeatedly and are used to. 
Everyday things, whatever they are, can be experienced as positive, 
negative or rather neutral. The everyday can feel safe and thus positive, 
because we know it so well and can trust it; and it can be boring and gray 
for exactly the same reason. Or it can be just something we rely on and live 
through without really actively thinking about and noticing it.
Aesthetics, in everyday settings, has to do with how we experience and 
interpret such everyday things with our senses, perceptually and often 
emotionally, with our bodies, and we typically describe all this with specific 
terminology referring to this approach. We can notice the messiness of our 
home, the cool looks of someone we meet in a café, the smooth easiness of 
our daily exercise routine, the cuteness of a cat, the freshness of a fall day, the 
exotic character of a new tea variety, or the neatness of our phone. Of course, 
we often also use various kinds of tools when making aesthetic observations 
and evaluations, but I would still think that the direct bodily, sensual, and 
emotionally charged approach is typically at the heart of them. 
In everyday life, those features of things that are normal, ordinary, 
1 I have analyzed the concepts and relations of the everyday and aesthetics in more detail in 
other articles. See, for example, Naukkarinen (2013) and (2017). 
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and unsurprising can be precisely the goal that is very satisfying. For 
a businessman, a suit looks and feels good exactly because it does not 
scream and stand out, but slides smoothly into the normal daily routines 
of the surrounding culture. If we strive for something extraordinary, we 
break the everyday. This does not mean that we do not value and strive for 
exceptionally great, extraordinary things—of course we do—but they are 
exactly that, extraordinary: something that we cannot have every day.
Now, computer-based phenomena have become an essential part of 
normal daily life and its aesthetics, and they are becoming more and more 
dominant, changing the whole picture, creating a new normal.
CREATING DIGITAL EVERYDAY AESTHETICS
We all create everyday aesthetics, meaning aesthetics that we repeatedly face in our everyday lives. We cannot but do that because whatever we do or make (or decide not to do or make), 
it has its own aesthetic features that we can evaluate and discuss, if we 
want to. As a university professor, my everyday aesthetics are related to the 
things that I normally do in classes, meetings and the office: how I dress, 
talk, write, and so on. If I decided never to comb my hair, I would not create 
less everyday aesthetics in my life than someone else who spends hours on 
their hairdo. We would just produce different aesthetic results. Leading a 
life with no aesthetic deeds at all is not possible. True, one does not have to 
pay attention to them personally, but someone else always can.
In the future, too, many aspects of everyday aesthetics will be created in 
very traditional ways. We, as human beings, will still sometimes cook with fire, 
draw with a pen, wear jeans, grow roses in our gardens and play the acoustic 
guitar. In addition, animals, plants and inanimate objects and processes will 
continue to form our everyday aesthetics: things we can evaluate aesthetically 
in our everyday ways. Of course, it is highly questionable which non-human 
actors can intentionally create aesthetic products and events for us and for 
themselves, but it is possible that at least some animals, such as chimpanzees 
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and bowerbirds, can.2 In any case, intentionally or not, animals and other 
non-human actors will keep on producing things that can form part of 
everyday human aesthetics, and non-living non-artifacts, such as stones and 
traces of erosion, can also be a part of this.
However, as human beings, we now have powerful computers to help us 
create everyday aesthetic phenomena and experiences. Anyone who writes 
texts with a PC, takes photographs or shoots videos with a phone, googles 
recipes when cooking, shares GIFs through WhatsApp, updates their 
Facebook profile, monitors their pulse and other bodily functions with an 
activity tracker in order to improve their diet to look better, tweets about a great 
movie, or searches for a scenic driving route with a map app is doing exactly 
that. We constantly create computer-generated or -assisted things in and for 
our everyday lives without always even thinking about it, in ways that were not 
possible some years ago. There is no doubt that there will be more and more 
possibilities for that, and as soon as 5G and 6G are here, everything will again 
be faster. Soon, there will be augmented and virtual-reality solutions that 
most of us cannot even imagine right now, but that will be widely used on a 
daily basis. This will probably be most evident in working-life environments, 
and these are at the core of most people’s everyday lives. Everyday aesthetics 
of, for example, farmers, engineers and bus drivers can change drastically; 
farmers may work in cities, on buildings, and use computers to optimize 
hydration and fertilizer usage, taking computer-aided farming practices 
that are already used in countries such as the Netherlands to a new level; 
engineers working in factories will probably use virtual or augmented-reality 
head-seats to monitor and adjust production processes; and bus drivers will 
not drive but will become some sort of travel hosts in self-driving vehicles. 
Advanced chatbots will take over many service positions. We will also see 
completely new professions that we do not know of right now. Systematic 
forecasts about such changes have been made, the latest and broadest one 
in Finland being the publication by Risto Linturi and Pekka Kuusi (2018) for 
the Finnish Parliament, called Suomen sata uutta mahdollisuutta 2018–2037: 
2 The discussion about animal aesthetics and art can be seen as a special strand of the broader 
post-humanistic discourse, and it has been developed by, for example, David Rothenberg 
(2012).
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Yhteiskunnan toimintamallit uudistava radikaali teknologia (One hundred new 
possibilities for Finland 2018–2037: Radical technology that will renew the 
operating models of society). 
There are several layers in this. Most of us can take digital photographs 
and modify them to some extent, write texts, create web pages and PowerPoint 
presentations, order customized sneakers from a web shop, and perhaps 
sometimes design a new interior for our own home by using hardware and 
software that someone else provides. However, if we want to go further and 
create something different from just variations of off-the-shelf products, we 
have to learn to understand the possibilities and restrictions of such tools 
better, and at some stage, build and program them by ourselves. We need to 
understand how algorithms are created and what can be done with them, 
when combined with the physical machines that do what algorithms make 
them do. Without mastering this level, we cannot really understand how our 
everyday aesthetic environment is built, and we are rather helpless receivers 
of what is given to us by those who understand better. If we want to be creators 
of the digital everyday, we need skills that make this possible. Does this mean 
that everyone has to learn to code, or will there be completely new ways of 
interacting with computational machines? Will it be possible, for example, to 
program computers just by talking to them? Time will tell.
Even now, it is not just human beings, with the help of computers 
and their networks, who create our everyday digital environments and 
phenomena, but it is also computers themselves. They, to a large extent, 
create the digital bubble we live in, select the things we see, and the music we 
listen to. They are programmed to offer us newsfeeds, tweets, and shopping 
suggestions, and the more we use them, the more accurate they become; 
and using can sometimes mean just visiting a certain location with your 
phone in your pocket. In addition, such systems are becoming partly self-
learning through autonomic computing, which implies that they are also, to 
some extent, true black boxes; they take care of and develop operations and 
algorithms in such a way that no human can, in practice, follow exactly how 
they gradually change. They have initially been programmed by humans, 
but the algorithms change independently of constant human interaction. As 
the changes are partly unknown, it is also very difficult to fix problems when 
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they arise, because it is practically impossible to trace their exact cause.
Little by little, machines may also come up with completely new everyday 
aesthetic solutions, be they paintings, songs, clothes, or something else we 
cannot yet imagine. For some, even sexual acts, which can be seen as a 
special case of everyday aesthetic activities, are already partly robotized, and 
not just through internet links and pages, but in the form of actual, physical 
robots with whom one can do whatever one pleases. As their “evolution” 
goes further, such robots can be active and suggest and invent novel things, 
and not only do what the user commands (Crist 2017). Of course, for the 
time being, human beings still plan, build and program such computers and 
robots, but as soon as that is done, the computers and robots can function 
rather independently and come up with things we did not expect. Who 
would have thought that Microsoft’s Twitter bot would learn to tweet like a 
racist idiot in just one day (Read 2016)? Sooner or later, computers will start 
to plan, build and program each other much more effectively than now. In 
the worst dystopian scenarios, whether we believe them or not, some kind of 
“gray goo” consisting of an endless mass of self-replicating nano-robots will 
take over everything else. In more positive utopias, super-intelligent robots or 
biobots will live side by side with humans and both “species” will have their 
own, partly overlapping aesthetic cultures. For now, this kind of world only 
exists in science fiction novels such as Autonomous by Annelee Newitz (2017).
In fact, we already have more and more of something that is called AI 
(artificial intelligence)- generated art. Computers have been taught to paint 
pictures; carve, cut and print 3D sculptures; and compose and perform 
music. They are on stage in dance performances. Companies such as 
StoryFit and Synapsify provide software that helps analyze and create stories 
that sell. Programs and hardware are getting so good that, in many cases, 
it is quite impossible for the observer to tell whether a piece is made by a 
human hand and mind or by a computer. The most advanced cases are far 
removed from the earlier clumsy attempts to imitate human art. For example, 
the computers that Robbie Barrat has programmed to create pictures come 
up with amazingly surprising results through so-called GAN (generative 
adversarial network) processes in which competing procedures spar with 
each other rather autonomously, without much human control. Yes, again, 
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it is still humans who design these systems, but that will eventually change. 
Machines are becoming more and more independent and active, and will 
create what we and they see, hear, touch, feel and smell in our everyday 
settings, whether aesthetic, artistic, or otherwise. Most likely, not all such 
creations will resemble the aesthetic phenomena that we are now used to. 
 
DIGITAL OBJECTS AND ENVIRONMENTS
Digital everyday phenomena are not aesthetic objects in the same way as many physical objects are in our traditional thinking. On the level of our everyday perception, we have spatial and temporal 
objects like tables, cars, paintings, songs and flowers, which are rather 
stable and distinct from ourselves, and have clear limits and characteristics 
that we can see, hear, touch, and perceive in other ways. True, the stability 
and clarity of the limits are dependent on our everyday-scale approach, and 
they do not exist for some other approaches, such as the one of physics, for 
which physical objects are ever-changing, statistically analyzable processes 
with no sharp borders between them. However, we do not see tables like 
that in our daily lives, and everyday aesthetics typically operates on the 
level of a more traditional object-based approach.
This, however, does not suit the digital world. There, it is evident that 
there are lots of things that are not objects in the traditional sense of 
the word. Of course, computers, phones, tablets and other tools are also 
physical objects and can be seen as such, but in many cases they are just 
means to get access to something else. We don’t pay attention to them but to 
the things they open up: pictures, stories, songs, and recipes, which, in turn, 
are often linked to the non-digital world. In fact, the borderline between 
different layers of existence easily becomes very blurred.
In digital everyday aesthetics, the separation between the original and 
a copy, autographic and allographic, as well as spatial and temporal, works 
tend to lose their relevance. There is no such thing as the original, real 
object or work. Obviously, someone or something has created the original 
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file or algorithm at some point, with a laptop, camera or the like, but as 
soon as it is uploaded and others receive it with their gadgets, it starts to 
vary and spread potentially everywhere. Even if the algorithm behind 
various instances of, well, a “thing” on different screens or other interfaces 
remains the same (and it can alter, too), there is no way of knowing where 
and how and on what kinds of screens this “thing” will spread, how it will 
look, and to what other “things” (texts, images, sounds, hardware) it will 
be connected and when. If it is erased from one server or memory stick, 
it can exist somewhere else and start spreading again, with practically no 
time lapse. And how will this all be experienced in numerous changing 
contexts? The variations are practically endless. In principle, the same has 
always been true for recordings, books, compositions and other allographic 
art forms, but now the phenomenon is much stronger, wider, bigger, and 
more common. Everything that is digital can be copied, varied and spread 
endlessly, and this is exactly what is happening. This is on top of the 
traditional notion that even the one and the same object can be experienced 
in many ways. Now we have more variations than ever.
In addition, the difference between what is truth and what is a lie, and 
what is real and what is fictional, becomes challenging. It is becoming 
easier and easier to create fake versions of people and their activities on 
the internet. For example, when I was writing this article, by using software 
such as Face2Face and Lyrebird, it was possible to create a video in which 
a digital creature moved and talked exactly like, say, Arto Haapala, and 
the viewer could not tell that it is really “it”, not the real Arto. (When you 
read this text, such software may have a different name, and it will be 
much more advanced than the current Face2Face and Lyrebird.) For many 
people, if something looks real, it is real. In a sense, this means having an 
aesthetic relation to reality or having an aesthetic truth in a superficial 
sense: what looks and sounds like it, is it. We are already operating on the 
borderline of this when we make use of software such as Facetune, and tell 
selected stories about ourselves on LinkedIn, to appear slightly different 
than we do in our physical environments. In some cases, the fascination 
of such created identities is so strong that people also try to imitate them 
outside the internet; a contemporary version of Oscar Wilde’s notion 
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about life imitating art, and not the other way round. Cases such as Henry 
Harjusola—a well-known social media character who has openly said that 
he wants to look as good as his pictures on the internet—are extreme,3 but 
there are countless others who act in the same way in a more modest way.
In addition, this digital mesh, network, environment, system, mycelium 
or whatever name one prefers to use, easily swallows traditional objects, or 
at least some aspects of them. It is quite normal for there to be a traditional 
aesthetic object somewhere, such as one’s dog, new chair, fresh hairdo, or 
painting, but the only thing most members of their “audience” perceive of 
them is what is happening around and after their “birth” on the internet: 
pictures on Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, Snapchat and/or Twitter, 
comments about them, and links to and from them. This is also what David 
Joselit emphasizes as one of the most important features of the present art 
world, in his book After Art (2013). Most things that are seen on our screens—
sometimes repeatedly, sometimes just once, sometimes by millions of 
others, sometimes by just a few—we do not face anywhere else. It would 
be misleading to call these phenomena representations of the original or 
the authentic, even if in some sense they might be that. Using the word 
“representation” carries with it the idea that there is something that is re-
presented, something that is more valuable and true than its representative 
or trace. However, in the case of our everyday digital aesthetic phenomena, 
that is often irrelevant. Any instance of a net meme or tweet is as true or real 
as any other, and they all intertwine and pair with dozens of other things 
in an eternally changing flow, and they often come and vanish without our 
control.4 
As this happens, it is not easy to feel that some particular moment or 
instance is important and valuable, because it will be soon replaced by 
something else. Stability and feelings of attachment or devotion do not 
belong here, and it is possible that we learn to treat everything else in the 
world in a similar manner. Just think of the difference between the feeling 
that you had when you found and owned a rare vinyl record in the 1980s, 
3 One can follow Harjusola’s activities in various digital and analog versions through https://
www.instagram.com/henryharjusola/?hl=fi (downloaded 10 May 2018).
4 There are attempts to fight such endless flows of copies and variations. For example, 
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and the way in which we approach the icon of the same recording on Spotify. 
Yes, the music is the same, but the value of its carrier is entirely different; 
the former was a treasure as a physical object, the latter is one click among 
millions of others. We may learn to expect that the “real” world is like a 
click, too—again, quite as Oscar Wilde taught us that life will imitate art, 
now it will imitate our digital habits. 
Together, some digital “things” form something similar to what Timothy 
Morton (2013) calls hyperobjects. Can we really figure out what Facebook, 
Microsoft and Amazon are, and how and where they exist? If they are 
hyperobjects, they are too vast and complex to be directly and completely 
perceived. They surround and penetrate us, are everywhere and nowhere, 
like climate change and chemicalization. If we want to make use of traditional 
aesthetic concepts to analyze them, the concept of the sublime is probably the 
one that might work the best. Sublime “things” are something that we feel that 
we cannot really perceive and understand in their totality, and they evoke some 
sort of awe that is both frightening and tempting at the same time. Depending 
on how one understands this kind of experience, it might be of a Kantian type, 
finally resulting in a revelation that has to do with our own capacities as rational 
and free human beings to make sense of such overwhelming phenomena, or 
of a postmodern variety that results in a feeling closer to (charming) despair 
and anxiety in front of something uncontrollable, incomprehensible and 
enormous. In addition, there is no clear-cut answer to whether it is more 
reasonable to think that some “things”, our experiences of them, or their 
combinations are actually what we call sublime. In any case, as our digital 
environments grow bigger and more complex all the time, impacting more and 
more areas of our lives, I would not be surprised if sublime experiences also 
became more common, or even rather commonplace. How many people can 
really understand how the system works? And can those who understand it 
really control and affect it? One can live with it, but it might cause the same sort 
of respect and humility as the vast oceans and the endless cosmos.
But that is only one possibility. There are much easier cases, too, 
and sublime experiences, in their extremity, cannot really be part of our 
blockchain technology is sometimes used in digital art markets to guarantee the authenticity 
of a work. See Bailey (2017).
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everyday all the time. Most of the time, I believe, we just idly float through 
the continuous flow of data, realizing that the “objects” we face are just 
disappearing vortexes in a bottomless stream, and that they are linked to 
other ones in ways that are often difficult to understand in detail, even if we 
wanted to. All that is solid melts into data and its perceivable islets. Google 
something today, try to find it tomorrow, and it might be gone. 
All this also affects the non-digital, physical or analogical world. What 
we see and hear on the internet can make us, for example, order books and 
clothes to our homes, which means transporting them from somewhere, 
by some sort of physical means. This requires vehicles, oil and other 
materials, partly turned into kinetic energy. The computers themselves 
are also physical devices requiring materials and electricity. So, things 
happening on the internet are always necessarily also happening on a 
very true, real, physical basis. This basis is the planet we are living on. The 
materials are taken from mines, seas and forests. These, too, are someone’s 
everyday aesthetic environments. It is hard to imagine that mining and 
other activities that change environments will always change them for the 
better, aesthetically or otherwise. However, the ecological and aesthetic 
footprint of our daily digital diet is enormous; things may look good on the 
screen but be disastrous elsewhere. This complex is not an object either but 
something else, a constantly changing environment that you experience 
with all your senses, on different scales, being part of it yourself. It might 
be that, someday, a lack of materials and energy will make the present-day 
digital culture disappear, but a lot will happen before then.
It is also worth considering what kinds of things can be part of the digital 
world. What will necessarily remain outside it and why? It is not the whole 
world, in the end. We still have our analogical world and not everything, 
probably, can be computerized or seen as a set of algorithms. The current 
developments probably force us to study better where this difference 
actually lies, and at the moment, it is difficult to find a good answer. The 
deeper we drill, the more blurred the difference between physical and 
computational, human and non-human, and matter and energy becomes. 
Will anything be left outside the digital, in some respect? This sort of total 
merger is not how we experience things in our everyday lives, but will the 
192
situation change if we learn to see the world in this way? 
On another level, there are political and economic reasons for different 
datasets to include different data or digital “things”. This has nothing to 
do with ontological and existential features of data, but such inclusions 
and exclusions will still have a strong role in our everyday aesthetics. For 
example, what do Spotify or the National Library have in their files, and 
who has access to these? Who is allowed to be part of the digital world and 
its everyday aesthetics and why? For example, quite simply, if you do not 
operate in English, do you have a place in global data flows? As the giants of 
digital economy—Facebook, Google, Amazon and Apple—gain more and 
more power, whom and what will they include and exclude and where? 
Even if other big players, such as the EU, try to affect the direction of travel 
by means such as GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), no-one 
really knows how all this will develop in the coming decades. One thing is 
clear: actors such as the MyData Alliance (https://mydata.org/finland/) are 
urgently needed.
AUDIENCES AND RECEPTION
If someone or something creates digital everyday aesthetic environments, objects and “things”, who or what perceives, uses or consumes them? Who or what is their audience? Well, we are, obviously. But what are 
“we” nowadays and in the future? And is it only us? 
Natural scientists have shown that human beings are not just human 
through and through, but that we also consist of archaea, bacteria, fungi, 
viruses, and other organisms without which we would not survive. 
According to the most extreme estimations, over half of “our” cells are of 
this type (Gallagher 2018). Whatever the exact proportion, it is clear that 
we are walking combinations of various organisms, and there is no distinct 
borderline between them. I am we.
We are also growing together with computational machines, without 
which we feel that we cannot survive. In fact, there is no radical change in 
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this respect. We have been quite dependent on all kinds of technologies 
since the invention of the first tools thousands of years ago, and the 
Industrial Revolution made machines ubiquitous. Nowadays, we have 
new types of gadgets that do things that previous ones could not, but our 
dependency on machines as such is nothing new. The world as we know it 
has been technically mediated for millennia.5 
New digital technologies, combined with, for example, chemical ones 
(that are largely computationally designed), have an impact on receiving and 
evaluating (and also producing) everyday aesthetic phenomena. In some 
scenarios, not all of us will remain human beings in the sense that we are used 
to. Instead, some will become some sort of transhuman creatures who have 
much better capacities to live longer and do things more effectively, with the 
help of computers and computer-generated drugs, and instructions on how to 
live in a certain way (Harari 2016). We are already going in this direction, and 
events such as the Upgraded Life Festival http://www.upgradedlifefestival.com/ 
bring together existing companies operating in these fields. Future upgraded 
beings could see the world differently from us. If they live longer, they will 
be more experienced, and if they perceive things more accurately, they will 
probably know more. If they are more intelligent and have more memory 
space, they will be able to understand the world better, or at least differently. 
Aesthetics concepts such as beauty might mean something different to them, 
and new concepts might arise: concepts that we could not understand any 
better than bowerbirds can understand “sublime” or “romantic”. What such 
concepts could be, I don’t have the capacity to guess. This might sound utopian, 
but it is not entirely fictional. Just think how differently we understand the 
world and how we boost our capacities with computers, compared to people 
who lived two hundred years ago and used just hammers and steam machines. 
If they were transported to our time, they would not understand very much of 
what we do. There are no biological, evolutionary differences between us, and 
they would quickly learn our habits, but at first they would be completely lost 
and unable to make any sense of our everyday aesthetics. We are very different 
types of human-technology combinations than our predecessors were, and 
5 In my experience, one of the clearest books giving a historical perspective of this discussion 
is Marttinen (2018).
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there is no reason to assume that this trend will not continue.
It is also possible that, sooner or later, computers will generate aesthetic 
events and objects for each other. Even now, systems like Spotify can suggest 
music to us, although “us”, in this case, is in fact our computer profile. Spotify 
does not care whether an account is really used by Arto Haapala or another 
computer; it can suggest playlists in both cases. For now, it sounds reasonable 
to say that computers cannot be genuine audiences of aesthetic objects or 
events, even if they can create them. They cannot perceive paintings, music 
or food in the same way as human-technology combinations can, although 
they can select and choose. They cannot emotionally feel, like, prefer, have 
taste or be touched and impressed. They don’t cry, laugh or get excited. They 
are not, moreover, conscious of themselves as emotional entities, and they 
have no identity in this sense. They are not living beings, and even the most 
developed robots, such as the famous Sophia and Asimo, are still very clumsy 
in most tasks that are quite easy for humans. 
Perhaps machines are not like us right now, but it is possible that one day 
they will be. True, for now, their sensors and web crawlers only detect what 
they are programmed to detect, but as mentioned above, they are learning 
new things all the time, partly rather autonomously. When this goes even 
further, they could have an aesthetic culture of their own that could be 
wildly different from ours. They could have their own kinds of museums, 
concerts, and Ms and Mr Algorithm contests that they would evaluate and 
experience by themselves… or something completely different, for which 
they would need no human participants. And if at least some parts of all 
this were perceptible to us human beings, this would probably, again, 
change our everyday aesthetics surroundings, as well. Future computers 
will probably invent all kinds of things that people cannot. It is a different 
matter whether we could understand anything about what was going on. At 
some point, the entire human species might be gone, but such developed 
machines could continue their culture and maintain their own everyday 
aesthetics. What and how future machines could experience and feel is 
quite unclear, of course, and may remain so for us humans forever. However, 
this does not mean that such experiences could never happen. In novels 
such as Newitz’s Autonomous, robots even have something that resembles 
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the human orgasm (they “run that program again”), and they tackle similar 
emotional and cultural issues to humans, as well as others that they think 
humans cannot understand.
If we think of academic aesthetics and its audience, it might already 
be possible for a computer to write an article and send it to an e-journal, 
where another computer or robot reviews, accepts and publishes it, so 
that a third robot can find and read it. I am not sure whether there are still 
technical obstacles to this, but if there are, they will disappear in the near 
future. If the outcome is an academic article that is published in a journal 
that is listed in an academic database such as Web of Science or Scopus, 
monitored by even more computers, it will be recorded as the research 
output of a university (affecting the funding of the university) without a 
single human being ever having anything to do with it. Eventually, this may 
result in academic article factories, like academic bitcoin mills. This makes 
one wonder why we are here. Could we witness what Daniel C. Dennett 
sees as one possibility: “So practical, scientific, and aesthetic judgments 
may soon be off-loaded or outsourced to artificial agents” (Dennett 2018, 
392)? If so, then maybe “[t]he real danger, I think, is not that machines more 
intelligent than we are will usurp our role as captains of our destinies, but 
that we will over-estimate the comprehension of our latest thinking tools, 
prematurely crediting authority to them far beyond their competence” 
(Dennett 2018, 402). 
Here, too, a highly relevant question is who is allowed to have access to what 
kind of data and be the audience of what. Technically, more and more people 
(and machines) are getting easy access to more and more data. Obstacles are 
often political, legal, and economic, and they are presently tightly connected to 
ownership and copyright issues, including who can decide who can use what, 
where, and how, and how much each user should pay and to whom. 
With regard to our everyday aesthetics, here we are very close to privacy 
policies, too. Technically, it is quite easy to follow in great detail what we like, 
buy, and eat, how much we earn, where we go, whom we meet, and what we 
say. Based on this, a computer “audience” can draw a very precise picture of 
our aesthetic taste and, say, market new products to us or assume something 
about our political or sexual preferences. It is not hard to imagine a society 
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in which such profiling could also be used for discriminatory purposes, 
and something of this kind is probably happening more often than most 
of us know. Already, there are very disturbing reports, for example, from 
the Chinese province of Xinjiang, where the Uighur minority is effectively 
monitored using advanced technologies, and (aesthetic) deviations from 
the majority culture seem to be enough to lead to arrests and hard-handed 
“re-education” (Phillips 2018). We don’t typically like to let strangers into our 
physical homes to see what we do, but we don’t necessarily know who or 
what is following our digital activities in our digital “homes” and for what 
purposes. Still, our activities can say a lot about our aesthetic tastes; and 
taste, in turn, has traditionally, since Hume and Kant and even earlier, been 
seen as some sort of overall social ability that reveals something essential 
of our character. That is why it is so important to know who or what is 
monitoring and evaluating it, and to have control over one’s own profiles.
IMPACTS ON ACADEMIC AESTHETICS
With regard to the serious study of the everyday aesthetics of the contemporary and future digital world, most traditionally educated philosopher-aestheticians do not have the sort of 
literacy that would be required. In computing and engineering, people 
sometimes talk about black boxes, referring to devices whose input and 
output are known but whose inner operations are not. We do not know 
what happens inside them. Living with so-called black boxes means that our 
relation to computers and their products is largely aesthetic in a superficial 
sense. We often settle for what we perceive directly with our senses. For 
most of us, the operations that take place within a computer and its network 
is something we do not have access to or understand. Rather few users 
really understand the components of a device, what they do, how they are 
manufactured, how machine languages work, how electricity flows through 
the whole, how different programming languages differ, what algorithms 
do what, how they are coded, and so on. We know that when we click this 
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button, this or that happens, but we cannot really explain why or how. In fact, 
most things around us, digital or otherwise, are actually black boxes in most 
respects. We understand something about them but far from everything. For 
everyday purposes, this kind of aesthetic approach is quite enough.
This must change if we want to remain relevant as academic 
aestheticians who are able to analyze what others do and how the world 
around us functions. For this, we will probably need to cooperate with 
professionals from other disciplines more often than we do now.6 Then, 
a unit doing research on everyday aesthetics will be a multidisciplinary 
team, not an individual scholar in their study, as it used to be. This should 
also be considered in the education of future aestheticians. In fact, this 
approach is already being taken into account in some other fields close to 
aesthetics, such as art education. There, as described by Tomi Dufva (2018), 
even rather young children are taught, for example, how to code creatively 
so that they can express themselves through computer-based pictures. This 
requires educational teams to include people who understand education, 
human development psychology, computers, and art, at least. 
Many things evolving around us and forming our everyday aesthetics 
can be seen as a series of black boxes that just operate and push out things, 
but whose operations we do not understand. However, aestheticians, I think, 
should not settle for this. We should have at least a basic understanding of 
how computers and their networks function; what they do and what they 
cannot do. This is just as important as understanding the core features of 
oil paintings, realistic novels and classical Greek philosophy is for those 
aestheticians who focus on them. I seriously think that it is very difficult, 
or even impossible, to understand present and future everyday aesthetics 
without understanding how computer systems work.
On the other hand, this does not change the basic philosophical 
starting point of, for example, Kendall L. Walton’s classic category thinking. 
In this new situation, we should also have an idea of what kinds of things 
are characteristic of certain categories. What is possible, what impossible, 
typical, standard, non-standard, accidental, and so on, for each. What can 
6 I have started to practice this, and the first results have been published in Naukkarinen (2018) 
and Naukkarinen and Pacauskas (2018).
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we expect of the latest phone models or future VR equipment? Why? 
As new tools and networks are very complicated, and they create 
complicated cultural-technical phenomena—even if certain interfaces 
seem simple and may lure us into thinking that we have mastered them—
it is quite likely to be almost impossible for individual scholars to really 
understand what is going on. This suggests that aestheticians should 
probably be more active in building cooperation with scholars from other 
fields. Such combinations would be better equipped to understand everyday 
aesthetic phenomena. It is quite clear that these are not just technical 
issues and cannot be analyzed by, say, engineers alone, but they require 
philosophical approaches, too. However, philosophical aestheticians 
cannot manage alone either. In the best case, future scholars of aesthetics 
would be educated so that cooperation is natural for them. What this 
would mean for intake processes and degree structures of academic degree 
programs is a different matter and would require an essay of its own.
Will there be a place for traditional philosophical or humanistic 
aesthetics, done by human beings reading books, meeting in conferences 
and analyzing artworks and their general questions? I guess so. Whatever 
machines do, even if they learn to feel and develop a genuine identity 
and consciousness, as long as there are human beings, we will have our 
own approach to everything around us. We will still want to do, make and 
perceive things by ourselves, and to explain them to each other, using human 
language, using human eyes and bodies. There will still be countless things 
with which we interact and for which we don’t use computers, even if we 
could. Humans will still understand and feel the world by other means: by 
swimming, running, cooking, dancing, discussing. 
Very often, we do things in cooperation with computational machines. 
This essay has not been written by a computer. However, it has been written 
together with one, or with a whole network of them. No doubt, it would 
be completely different if we did not have computers. In that case, this 
text would not exist at all, or its theme would be quite fictional. But now, 
in the digital world, it would be even more fictional if I tried to imagine 
completely non-digital everyday aesthetics.7
7 I want to thank Johanna Laakkonen and Kasperi Mäki-Reinikka for their excellent advice 
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richard shusterman
PLEASURE, PAIN, AND THE SOMAESTHETICS OF 
ILLNESS: A QUESTION FOR EVERYDAY AESTHETICS
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the ways that somaesthetics can treat the problems 
of pain and illness that emerge in our everyday experience of life. 
Noting the evolutionary value of pain for our survival and well being, 
the paper argues that the perceptual acuity achieved through better 
somaesthetic awareness can help us minimize the damage that pain 
typically signals while also helping us better appreciate the lessons 
pain can teach us and the pleasures that can be derived from everyday 
illnesses and experiences of pain. These points are illustrated by using 
the texts of influential thinkers such as Michel de Montaigne, Edmund 
Burke, and Virginia Woolf.
I 
SOMAESTHETICS, 
THE SAUNA, AND THE SUBLIME
The project of somaesthetics has sometimes been criticized for being one-sidedly focused on pleasure, power, and successful performance because of its melioristic concern for the body and its 
health. This is a misunderstanding but one that understandably arises from 
somaesthetics’ explicit aim to make us feel better. The misunderstanding 
consists in not recognizing the double-barreled meaning of “feeling 
better” that I repeatedly emphasize in insisting that somaesthetics is about 
improving our experience and not just our external bodily appearance or 
performance. As I wrote in first introducing the experiential dimension 
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of somaesthetics, its melioristic “methods aim to make us ‘feel better’ in 
both senses of this ambiguous phrase (which reflects the ambiguity of 
the very notion of aesthetics): to make the quality of our experience more 
satisfyingly rich, but also to make our awareness of somatic experience 
more acute and perceptive.”1 In this way, the somaesthetic project embraces 
the root Baumgartian meaning and aim of aesthetics as concerned with 
improving perception, along with today’s more familiar notion of aesthetics 
as concerned with pleasures of sensory perception and beauty. 
Central to this second idea of “feeling better,” namely the ability to perceive 
our bodily feelings more accurately and clearly, is a better appreciation of 
our feelings of pain in its wide-ranging multiple modalities that include 
discomfort, stress, disability, disease, or everyday illness. In early discussions 
of somaesthetics I insisted on the crucial importance of perceiving such 
painful, discomforting, or otherwise negative feelings for somaesthetics’ 
aims of improved knowledge and improved experience. “Consciousness of 
breathing can therefore make us aware that we are angry, tense, or anxious 
when we might otherwise remain unaware of these feelings and thus more 
vulnerable to the eventual pain, misdirection, or injury they could cause. 
Similarly, an excessive but “chronic muscular contraction that…results in 
tension and pain may nonetheless go unnoticed because it has become 
habitual. As unnoticed, this chronic contraction cannot be relieved, nor can 
its resultant disability and discomfort” (S 303). Improved body awareness 
through somaesthetic training, however, can bring such feelings of excessive 
contraction “to clear attention” so that “there is a chance to modify it” before 
it results in “unhealthy consequences” and “pain” (ibid.) An improved 
perception of pain, I elsewhere argue, is essential to athletes in monitoring 
their training and performance, such as “the bodybuilder [who] needs to 
know through inner experience the difference between the aching ‘burn’ of 
effort that builds muscles from other aches which mean injury.”2
I admit, however, that my primary focus in somaesthetics has been 
1 Richard Shusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal,” first published in The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 57:3 (1999), 299–313, citation from p. 305, hereafter S. 
The paper is reprinted with some minor revisions in Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, 
Rethinking Art, 2nd. Edition (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 
2 Richard Shusterman, Performing Live: Aesthetic Alternatives for the End of Art (Ithaca: 
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directed toward pleasure and beauty whereas my discussions of the 
somaesthetics of pain and other negative somatic experiences have been 
rather meager and are very far from doing justice to the topic. In this paper, 
therefore, I want to make pain, illness, and injury the focus of somaesthetic 
inquiry while considering how they relate to everyday aesthetics. It is an 
obvious if unfortunate fact that these unwelcome experiences form part 
of the fabric of everyday life, even if they typically signal an unpleasant 
break in its smooth flow. One reason I chose to write this paper from the 
perspective of everyday aesthetics is to honor Arto Haapala, the focus 
of this Festschrift, because he has devoted significant scholarship to this 
topic and because he was the person who first introduced to the everyday 
aesthetics of Finland. 
My first visit to Finland came from Arto’s invitation. It was back in 1996 
when he was still a freshly new Professor at the University of Helsinki, and 
I was a Fulbright professor in Berlin, on leave from Temple University. We 
had never met before. Arto picked me up at the airport but then brought 
me not to my hotel but directly to his home, where after grabbing a six-pack 
of beer from the fridge, he immediately led me (with that polite but silently 
sober style of cultivated Finns) to his apartment building’s sauna and 
quietly instructed me to undress. I was too astounded to raise any questions 
or to object. And there we suddenly were, naked strangers sharing the 
experience of a hot, intimate, closed space – an aesthetic experience of a 
distinctly somatic character. Thus was I introduced to an iconic staple of 
what could be considered everyday Finnish somaesthetics, even if it is not 
for most people a daily habit or pastime. 
At that moment, however, I did not yet think of the sauna in terms of 
somaesthetics, because, back in 1995, I had not yet conceived the concept 
of somaesthetics. The first mention of that concept was in my German 
book Vor der Interpretation, published in the fall of 1996, preceding my first 
English reference to somaesthetics in Practicing Philosophy (1997).3 Now, in 
Cornell University Press, 2000), 159.
3 Richard Shusterman, Vor der Interpretation: Sprache und Erfahrung in Hermeneutik, 
Dekonstruktion und Pragmatismus (Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 1996); and Practicing Philosophy: 
Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life (New York: Routledge, 1997).
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recollecting that experience, I see that the sauna not only could serve as 
a good example of everyday Finnish somaesthetics (as opposed to some 
special art experience or special, overwhelming experience of natural 
beauty). It can also provide a useful example of a key point I would like to 
make in this essay: the intricate, intimate linking of pain and pleasure, of 
stressful discomfort and delightful relief. The stressful discomfort of the 
sauna’s excessive heat, often accompanied by somewhat painful sensations 
in breathing, sitting, and sweating, forms a necessary part of the relaxing 
relief the sauna brings. The stressful shock of the cold lake water or cold 
shower on one’s overheated body is likewise a blend of somaesthetic 
discomfort and delight. The birch-branch beating of the naked body (a 
practice belonging to Finnish traditions of sauna) is a more problematic 
case that I would not risk interpreting here, as I lack the necessary expertise. 
Whatever one’s experience with saunas, the idea of the powerfully 
intimate connection between pain and pleasure in aesthetic experience 
should be familiar to students of aesthetics, because it forms the basis of 
Edmund Burke’s theory of the sublime.4 Burke’s theory is an important 
precedent for asserting this connection while also affirming the plurality of 
pleasures.5 Burke famously distinguishes between the “positive pleasure” 
of beauty (among other positive pleasures) and what he calls “the relative 
pleasure” produced by the sublime which he dubs “Delight.” In contrast to 
positive pleasure which is entirely independent of pain, delight is a relative 
pleasure in the sense of being in some way closely related to pain or danger 
4 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 
(London: Penguin, 1998), 159. Page references hereafter to this work will appear in parentheses 
in the text with the abbreviation PE
5 In closely relating certain pleasures to pain, Burke did not however try to define them in 
terms of each other to provide a single scale of affect. Instead he affirmed the plurality or 
independent existence of positive pains and pleasures rather than regarding pain and 
pleasure as “mere relations, which can only exist as they are contrasted to each other” (PE81). 
For Burke, in other words, pleasure cannot simply be defined in terms of absence of pain 
while pain conversely as absence of pleasure. Contemporary neurological research confirms 
this view that pain and pleasure are bivalent rather than bipolar. Pain and pleasure involve 
different electromyographic changes in facial muscles, differences in cortical activation 
patterns and neural pathways, just as approach and avoidance behavior (behavioral 
correlates of pleasure and pain) are associated with different neurotransmitters and so can 
occur virtually simultaneously (thus generating conflict). See Daniel Kahnemann et al. (ed.), 
Well-being: the Foundations of Hedonic Psychology (New York: Russell Sage, 1999).
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(where danger is understood as the threat of pain). Burke defines delight 
as “the sensation which accompanies the removal of pain or danger” or 
as “the feeling which results from the ceasing or diminution of pain” or 
from “the removal or moderation of pain.” The delight of the sublime, he 
claims, is thus “a sort of tranquility shadowed with horror” which we would 
experience “upon escaping some imminent danger, or on being released 
from the severity of some cruel pain.” Although not a positive pleasure in 
the sense of independence from pain, delight is certainly experienced as 
a “pleasure” or “satisfaction” (PE 82–83). With Burke’s understanding of 
the sublime as a delight based on relief from pain or the fear of danger to 
one’s self-preservation, we can perhaps find a place for the sublime in the 
everyday aesthetics of a sauna, whose extremities of heat were meant for 
health but can provide not only pain but even, if taken too long, involve 
some risks for one’s self-preservation.
II 
THE VALUES OF PAIN AND RELATED PLEASURES
Rather than linger on my first experience with Arto and the Finnish sauna, let me turn to more troubling cases of the somaesthetics of pain and discomfort, cases of illness and injury that are essentially 
different from sauna experiences because they normally occur involuntarily 
in our everyday life, indeed against our conscious will or desire, whereas we 
normally choose, willingly, to take a sauna. The first point to make is that 
although pain is experienced as an unpleasant or negative phenomenon, 
it has an essential positive function in everyday lives, one that evolved 
from our evolutionary needs. Pain is a conscious signal that something is 
wrong in one’s body and therefore needs attention; it is a strong, disturbing 
alert that is difficult to ignore and therefore extremely effective in gaining 
our attention and spurring our efforts to seek rapid remedy. Before our 
primal ancestors knew the secrets of biology, they knew that they had 
to treat wounds and stop bleeding in order to alleviate pain. If they did 
206
not feel pain when they received a serious cut, they might have ignored 
the incident and bled to death. Pain should be seen, therefore, not as a 
merely negative aesthetic phenomenon but rather in terms of a melioristic 
framework in which its negative feeling serves as a positive force to improve 
one’s experience. Pain is, at the most basic level, an evolutionary device 
to preserve life and to improve it, despite its distressing, often agonizing 
sensations. 
Besides providing such stimulus to preserve ourselves and improve 
our situation, pain and illness instruct us in patience, discipline, and self-
control. We learn to face up to adversity and accept our infirmities precisely 
by living with them, even if we simultaneously try to remedy or overcome 
them. The pain, illnesses, and infirmities that we suffer in our everyday 
lives are, as Montaigne argued, preparations in discipline and coping for 
the inevitable decline of our powers in old age and the ultimate loss of all 
powers in death. “We are born to grow old, to grow weak, to be sick, in spite 
of all medicine. …We must learn to endure what we cannot avoid.”6 
Pain, illness, and injury can provide, he argues, a foretaste of death’s 
possible agonies and thereby help us to prepare for them. Montaigne 
believed that our intense fears of death’s agonies are largely exaggerated, 
because like most of our fears they are largely the product of the 
uncontrolled excessive workings of our imagination rather than of direct 
experience. “Many things seem to us greater in imagination than in reality,” 
he argues, noting that he was long tormented by “the thought of illnesses so 
horrible that when I came to experience them I found their pains mild and 
easy compared with my fears” (EM 268). Montaigne insists that “the most 
grievous [fears]…and troubles are those that fancy loads upon us” (EM 832), 
and our everyday experiences of illness, injury, and pain provide us tools 
for deflating our exaggerated fears of suffering, because they approximate 
in some way the presumed pains and sufferings of the coming of terminal 
illness or death, just as they also provide practice in dealing with growing 
incapacities of old age. These ordinary sufferings serve as a useful askesis 
to prepare us for more challenging torments, and they have the further 
6 Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald Frame (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958), 835, hereafter EM.
207
advantage that they come to us freely and unbidden without any effort 
on our part, whereas heroic ascetics “of past times” had to seek out “such 
troubles” to train themselves in patience and endurance “to keep their 
virtue in breath and practice” (EM 837). 
Montaigne’s appreciation of the merits and pleasures of illness and 
injury rest primarily on two examples. The first is a riding injury he 
suffered, when he and his horse were violently plowed into by a galloping 
horseman from behind, throwing Montaigne from his mount and 
rendering him temporarily unconscious and bleeding from the impact and 
the subsequent fall. Montaigne notes, however, that although he thought 
he was dying from this injury, he did not feel excruciating pain but instead 
a languid pleasure: “It seemed to me that my life was hanging only by the 
tip of my lips; and I closed my eyes in order, it seemed to me, to help push 
it out, and took pleasure in growing languid and letting myself go.” It was 
a pleasure “not only free from distress but mingled with that sweet feeling 
that people have who let themselves slide into sleep” (EM 269–270). He felt 
ready to die in this “pleasant and peaceful” condition; “it was a languor and 
an extreme weakness, without any pain” but with “infinite sweetness in this 
repose” (EM 272). Of course, Montaigne admits that once the initial hours 
of shock had passed and normal consciousness returned, he felt strong 
pains from his injuries. But his point remains that death-threatening injury 
need not be accompanied by violent pain but can instead bring a numbing 
of consciousness that has a degree of pleasure, a feeling of relaxed peace 
that comes from “letting go” of normal consciousness and its concerns.
 My second example from Montaigne suggests perhaps even more 
strongly the intimate connection of pain and pleasure in our suffering from 
illness or injury. Here the example is not a sudden and unusual accident like 
his horseback collision, but rather something from the fabric of Montaigne’s 
everyday life, his long and painful struggle with his illness of kidney stones. 
Without disregarding or minimizing the discomfort and attacks of severe 
pain he suffered from this malady, Montaigne highlights the particular 
pleasures that arise from relieving himself of the pain of a stone. 
But is there anything so sweet as that sudden change, when from extreme 
pain, by the voiding of my stone, I come to recover as if by lightning the 
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beautiful light of health, so free and so full, as happens in our sudden and 
sharpest attacks of colic? Is there anything in this pain we suffer that can 
be said to counterbalance the pleasure of such sudden improvement? How 
much more beautiful health seems to me after the illness, when they are 
so near and contiguous that I can recognize them in each other’s presence 
in their proudest array, when they vie with each other as if to oppose each 
other squarely! Just as the Stoics say that vices are brought into the world 
usefully to give value to virtue and assist it, we can say, with better reason 
and less bold conjecture, that nature has lent us pain for the honor and 
service of pleasure and painlessness. When Socrates, after being relieved of 
his irons, felt the relish of the itching that their weight had caused in his legs, 
he rejoiced to consider the close alliance between pain and pleasure, how 
they are associated by a necessary link, so that they follow and engender 
each other in turn (EM 838). 
I am not such an expert in all the varieties of pain to insist that we go 
so far as to agree with Montaigne that the pleasures of relief are always 
stronger than the pains they relieve. But we do not need to go so far in order 
to appreciate the validity of Montaigne’s essential point. That is, namely, 
that pains entail corresponding pleasures that would not exist without 
them – that there are pleasures that hover behind our sufferings and that 
we would do well to attend to them in order to bring them out more fully. 
Let me offer two examples from my own experience, which, precisely 
because they are less extreme than Montaigne’s riding accident and kidney 
stone sufferings, are perhaps more appropriately considered as belonging 
to the everyday somaesthetics of pain. 
The first concerns feelings that I typically have when ill with a mild flu. I 
typically suffer from a slight headache and vague muscle aches but my key 
symptoms are feelings of weakness, feverishness, and dizziness. So long as 
I am in bed, these sensations, though perhaps discomforting in themselves, 
give rise to vague, mild but distinctly pleasurable feelings of languor and 
muscular release that arise from my sense of weak feverishness. Such 
feelings of bodily weakness are not experienced as a frustrating impotence 
of action but rather as a liberating, peaceful release from striving. Though 
it is very hard to describe, the kind of feeling is a relaxed, lazy, dreamy 
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sensation or mood, somewhat like the pleasurable, drowsy lethargy that I 
feel when I have slept unusually long and deeply (especially in an afternoon 
siesta) and am reluctant to break out of the seductive bonds of continued 
sleep. My illness feeling of pleasurable languorous weakness, however, is 
instead not marked by drowsy dullness but rather by heightened awareness 
to my bodily sensations. The reason for this pleasurable feeling, I believe, is 
that such felt somatic weakness, by detaching the individual from the world 
of action and by its clear association with the various bodily discomforts 
or pains of illness, provides a feeling of enhanced bodily awareness that 
allows me to savor more powerfully the pleasures of languor and repose 
that this weakness generates. Illness prompts us to pay greater attention to 
our somatic feelings because they are, for the most part, more disturbing 
than usual and because our somatic incapacity or weakness distances us 
from the realm of action that usually claims our attention. Merleau-Ponty 
seems to be aware of this point, when he describes the body as “la cachette 
de la vie,” “the place where life hides away” from the world, where I retreat, 
in illness, from my interest in observing or acting in the world and thus 
“become absorbed in the experience of my body and in the solitude of 
sensations,” where I can “lose myself in some pleasure or pain, and shut 
myself up” in these somatic perceptions.7 
My second personal example involves the experiences of migraines 
that I occasionally suffer after several weeks of too much work, stress, and 
travel. The headache feels as if a heavy force were pounding and pressing 
on my brain, both from the outside and the inside, creating what might be 
described as a heavy, iron-spiked curtain or storm cloud of dark pain that 
fills my consciousness with aching pressure. By now, however, I also know 
the signs of the gradual passing or recovery from my migraines: these are 
feelings of increasing moments or waves of sensing the reduction of the 
7 Maurice Merleau–Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge, 1962), 164–165. Merleau-Ponty, however, like most philosophers, is not really 
sympathetic to reflective attention to one’s somatic feelings; he regards such attention 
as a withdrawal from the world and one’s full personhood and into an impersonal bodily 
existence that “subtends [one’s] personal one” (ibid.). For a discussion of Merleau–Ponty’s 
critique of reflection on one’s somatic perceptions or feelings, see Richard Shusterman, 
Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 49–76,
210
painful pressure, increasing moments and longer stretches of lightness, 
clarity, and relief, like increasing patches of sunlight in an overcast sky. These 
feelings are steeped in a double pleasure: on the one hand, pleasurable 
sensations of relief; on the other hand, the pleasure of anticipation that 
further and final relief is on the way. 
Let me now turn from Montaigne in sixteenth-century France to 
another great prose writer, one from twentieth-century England, in order 
to explore these ideas more fully.
III 
ENTERTAINING ENJOYMENTS 
OF EVERYDAY ILLNESS
V irginia Woolf suffered from mental illness throughout her adult life and eventually committed suicide by drowning herself in a river. But in the essay on which I focus here, “On Being Ill,” she 
concerns herself with everyday physical illnesses: fever, flu, tooth aches and 
headaches.8 The essay begins by registering both surprise and critique that 
illness has not played a larger role as a topic of literature. 
Considering how common illness is, how tremendous the spiritual 
change that it brings, how astonishing, when the lights of health go down, 
the undiscovered countries that are then disclosed, what wastes and deserts 
of the soul a slight attack of influenza brings to view, what precipices and 
lawns sprinkled with bright flowers a little rise of temperature reveals, what 
ancient and obdurate oaks are uprooted in us by the act of sickness, how 
we go down into the pit of death and feel the waters of annihilation close 
above our heads and wake thinking to find ourselves in the presence of the 
angels and the harpers when we have a tooth out and come to the surface in 
the dentist’s arm-chair and confuse his “Rinse the mouth-rinse the mouth” 
8 The essay was first published in January 1926 by T.S. Eliot in his literary journal The Criterion. 
I cite from the version published in Virginia Woolf, The Moment and Other Essays (New York: 
Harcourt and Brace, 1976); hereafter BI.
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with the greeting of the Deity stooping from the floor of Heaven to welcome 
us-when we think of this, as we are so frequently forced to think of it, it 
becomes strange indeed that illness has not taken its place with love and 
battle and jealousy among the prime themes of literature (BI 9).
Woolf acknowledges, of course, that there are exceptions to literature’s 
neglect of illness. She mentions De Quincey and Proust, and from our later 
perspective we should certainly note Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain, 
published in 1924 but not translated into English until 1927, a year after her 
essay was published. Woolf suggests that part of the reason for literature’s 
neglect of illness as a central theme “is the poverty of language” for clearly 
and vividly describing the various symptoms and dimensions of being ill. 
“English,” she complains, “has no words for [describing] the shiver and the 
headache…The merest schoolgirl, when she falls in love, has Shakespeare 
or Keats to speak her mind for her; but let a sufferer try to describe a pain 
in his head to a doctor and language at once runs dry” (BI 11).
Like Montaigne, Woolf insists that along with its discomfort and 
pain, illness brings certain benefits. Being “in the bed with influenza” can 
provide a “great experience…[of ] how the world has changed its shape; the 
tools of business grown remote; the sounds of festival become romantic like 
a merry-go-round heard across far fields; and friends have changed, some 
putting on a strange beauty, others deformed to the squatness of toads” (BI 
12). The combinatory logic of this changing of the world through illness is 
the change in our perception that shapes our world and the change that 
illness effects in shaping our perception. In terms of familiar theories of 
artistic perception and creation, illness involves a defamiliarization of our 
normal world of experience because it changes the way we perceive and deal 
with things. There are different mechanisms for this change of perception. 
Woolf does not speak of the ways certain illnesses affect the bodily senses 
so as to change our perceptions in sensorial terms: the way lupus can cause 
blurry vision or the way a bad cold or flu can rob you of your sense of taste 
and smell. Instead she focuses on the changes of perception that come from 
the psychological shift that illness brings.
A key factor of such psychological change is the release from one’s 
normal practical mentality of action and from the conventional conduct 
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that govern one’s normal active life and its communicative behavior. 
When we are bedridden with illness, we have the excuse and indeed the 
compulsion to withdraw temporarily from the rat race of normal business 
and family responsibilities in order to care for oneself; one has the excuse 
to remove one’s social masks just as one removes one’s working clothes to 
lie and linger in one’s bedclothes. This abandoning of business includes 
neglecting the normal duties of communication; we can turn off our 
computers and not consult our email messages; illness allows us to be 
responsibly irresponsible in not responding to people in ways that would 
be rude if we were healthy. As Virginia Woolf describes this change, but in 
her predigital world: “In health the genial pretence must be kept up and the 
effort renewed – to communicate, to civilise, to share, to cultivate the desert, 
educate the native, to work together by day and by night to sport. In illness 
this make-believe ceases…[and] we cease to be soldiers in the army of the 
upright; we become deserters,” so we become free to notice and dwell on 
other things than those that usually preoccupy us (BI 14). 
Here Woolf gives the example of looking at the sky, which we typically 
hardly notice and ordinarily never focus on with sustained contemplation. 
“Ordinarily to look at the sky for any length of time is impossible. Pedestrians 
would be impeded and disconcerted by a public sky-gazer. What snatches 
we get of it are mutilated by chimneys and churches” and merely “serve 
as background” to the focus of our action and perception; we are too busy 
with business or social activities to find a place to stop and look intently at 
the sky (BI 14).
When illness compels us to lie in bed, however, we are in a different 
position, both literally and figuratively. We are figuratively in a different 
position by being psychologically free of our preoccupation with the 
world of action that entails locomotion and the focusing on practical 
matters. We are thus free to contemplate the sky, just as we are also free 
to close our eyes and focus on our somatic feelings. Moreover, in being 
in one’s sick bed, one is literally in a different position than usual simply 
by having an uncustomary somatic posture for waking life. Normally in 
our waking-life sphere of practical action we are either walking, standing, 
or sitting. When we do lie down in everyday life, it is to sleep not to 
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contemplate. Bedridden with illness, however, we occupy an unusual 
somatic position for waking life – lying down. Moreover, the typical lying 
down position in bed–confined illness is usually a supine position which 
naturally leads us to gaze outward and upward – hence encouraging us 
to contemplate the sky or the trees or the birds that appear through the 
window, or indeed the paint, pictures, cobwebs of the walls and ceiling 
that enclose us and surround one’s bed. 
Moreover, by disengaging us from our bodily habits of movement, 
standing, and sitting and thus from habitual thought patterns that 
accompany these bodily habits, the supine bedridden position has some 
distinct advantages for observing not only the soma’s surroundings 
but also its inner sensations. With our sphere of external action and 
observation significantly limited, we have a better opportunity to reflect 
on what is going on in the sphere of one’s soma. Moreover, lying in bed, 
we can close our eyes to concentrate on discerning our inner somatic 
sensations without the distractions of seeing our surroundings and 
without any fear of falling. Most people, however, do not take advantage 
of this opportunity. Instead, robbed of their ordinary distractions of 
activity, the sick fill their attention with other distractions: watching 
TV, reading the newspaper, leafing through magazines, speaking on the 
phone. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with distracting oneself 
when one is ill and immobilized. I would simply add that somaesthetic 
attention to one’s bodily feelings (including the actions of breathing) can 
also be a cognitively rich source of distracting entertainment from the 
boredom of lying in bed and of simply worrying about the significance 
of one’s illness’s pains and discomfort. Somaesthetic reflection can also, 
as I suggested above, provide a way of finding pleasure in such pain and 
discomfort, even if only the pleasures of discriminating cognition. The 
somaesthetics of everyday discomfort, illness, and pain should thus not 
be characterized as a wholly negative aesthetics nor a wholly positive one 
of beauty and pleasure. It is a melioristic aesthetics, occupying the middle 
realm, as we humans do, between the brutes we think we know and the 
perfect gods we imagine.
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EPILOGUE
JOs de muL
THESE BOOTS ARE MADE FOR TALKIN’
SOME REFLECTIONS ON FINNISH MOBILE IMMOBILITY
You can’t be a Real Country unless you have a beer and an 
airline—it helps if you have some kind of a football team, or some 
nuclear weapons, but at the very least you need a beer.
Frank Zappa
ABSTRACT
On January 13–15 2005, a conference entitled Aesthetics and Mobility 
was held in Helsinki. On invitation of the organizers, Arto Haapala 
(University of Helsinki) and Ossi Naukkarinen (University of Art and 
Design Helsinki), I took part in this wonderful event. I knew Arto from 
the regular meetings of the International Association for Aesthetics 
and it was a great opportunity to get acquainted with his research 
project Aesthetics, Mobility, and Change and his international network of 
scholars. As it was my first visit to Finland, I also took the opportunity 
to get introduced to Helsinki and Finnish culture. Afterwards, I wrote 
down my impressions of the conference and my memories of the visit. 
On occasion of the Festschrift for Arto I’ve worked up these personal 
notes as a tribute to him, esteemed colleague and distant friend.
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AESTHETICS AND MOBILITY
I could have easily left my Eskimo-hat and gloves at home. Instead of minus 20 degrees, the digital thermometer in the Aleksanterinkatu in Helsinki indicates plus 7 Celsius. I was hoping for a winter wonderland, 
instead it rained incessantly. Even in this self-declared eco-paradise that is 
Finland the climate in January 2005 seems somewhat out of sorts.
Together with my Finnish host Ossi Naukkarinen and my American 
colleague Joseph Kupfer I walked from the University guest house to 
the stately main building of the University of Helsinki situated in the 
old town square. With Nokia’s headquarters almost next door, the city of 
Helsinki seems to be the perfect location for a conference on Aesthetics and 
Mobility.1 Only a few decades ago Finland was an agricultural society and 
yet it has now seen an explosive growth of mobility of people, goods and 
information. In 1960 the five million inhabitants of Finland owned less 
than half a million cars between them, while in 2005 the number of cars 
on the road has grown to five times that number. Over the same period the 
number of intercontinental flights taken annually by the Finns rose from 
0,2 to over 8 million. And Nokia transformed itself in the same period from 
an ailing producer of wellington boots to the figurehead of the Finnish 
high-tech industry. 
MOBILISATION IS GLOBALISATION
Certainly, Finland is not alone in this. Mobilisation is globalisation. Resources, consumer goods and even waste are moved to and fro all the time. The world’s population is also constantly on the move 
because of labour migration, tourism and the flow of refugees. Homo mobilis 
not just travels longer distances but also does that with greater speed. Even 
those who stay put, keep up with the fast pace of life. They keep up the pace 
1 The proceedings of this conference, edited by Arto Haapala and Ossi Naukkarinen, were 
published in 2015 as a special issue of the online journal Contemporary Aesthetics (https://
www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/journal.php?volume=13) 
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at the fitness centre, or while lounging on the sofa, zapping through dozens 
of TV channels or unlocking numerous virtual and augmented locations 
when playing computer games. And at the same time we also manage to 
exchange billions of bits of information with each other via our mobile 
phone and the internet. Is this perhaps what the German writer Ernst 
Jünger referred to in 1931 when he wrote about the ‘totale Mobilmachung’ 
of our culture?2 Undoubtedly so, but nowadays we tend to use the English 
turn of phrase: Wherever we go, we go with the flow! 
And this can also be said of the speakers at the conference. Tens of 
cultural academics and historians, architects, engineers, philosophers 
and artists have been flown in from all over the world to analyse the 
new experiences of beauty that go hand in hand with the mobilisation 
of culture. They are not the first to do so. Decades before Jünger the 
Italian futurists eulogised the beauty of mobility. In 1909 Marinetti wrote 
in his Futuristic Manifest, ‘Up until now literature has glorified pensive 
immobility. We declare that the greatness of the world has been enriched 
by a new beauty: that of speed. A racing car, its bonnet decorated with 
thick tubes that look like fire-breathing snakes  … a car with a throbbing 
engine, looking like a machine gun when it moves and more beautiful 
than the Nikè of Samotrace.’
This statement certainly did not fall on deaf ears, as speaker Filip 
Geerts makes clear in his lecture on urban utopias that in the last century 
have been projected onto aviation. In Le Corbusier’s Ville contemporaine 
pour trois millions d’ habitants from 1922, airplanes fly to and fro between 
skyscrapers, thus erasing the distinction between city and airfield. These 
dynamics not only apply to aviation, as is shown by Pasi Kolhonen who 
talks of the maelstrom of moving billboards and images that surround 
and drive the inhabitants of the metropolises of today. And Mikko Villi 
argues how mobile phones with their inbuilt cameras have created a 
new phase in the mobility of the image. In contrast to the moving images 
on the billboards, which stay fixed on the spot, the photographic image 
2 Ernst Jünger, ‘Die totale Mobilmachung’, in: Krieg und Krieger. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 
1930, 9–30. 
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released from the paper now whizz back and forth between mobile 
phones. These are fleeting images, partly because the users do not save 
them on their phone. The mobile phone transforms the photograph 
from being a lasting record to a momentary message. Five years after this 
conference Snapchat turned this transformation of photography into a 
successful business model. 
Anne Marit Waades gave a rather humorous lecture on hyper tourism, 
by referring to the TV programme Pilot Guides (www.pilotguides.com). 
We are shown an episode in which the hyperactive travel guide Ian Wright 
drags us through the tourist database of Brazil in under 10 minutes in a 
delirious vortex filled with planes, hang gliders, speed boats and race 
horses. Out of breath, we can then conclude that after such a condensation 
of time and space the real trip will be nothing but disappointing. 
The hypermobile phenomena raise a mixture of fascination and 
repulsion in the speakers and audience alike. In that sense the mobilising 
technologies are very similar to a hard drug. Perhaps it is not a coincidence 
that one talks both of ‘users’ of narcotics and of new media. For both groups 
of addicts the kick quickly wears off and the need for more grows ever 
faster. And as is the case with each addiction, the most intriguing question 
remains who or what uses who or what. 
BEER SAUNAS 
And as for traditional intoxicants, it is clear that many Finns don’t know how to restrain themselves either, as I visit the Kotiharju’s sauna together with Ossi that evening, located in one of the older 
districts of Helsinki. This is one of the last remaining traditional public 
saunas in Finland, as almost every household now has their own. Having 
got ourselves undressed in the rather dilapidated changing rooms, we 
enter a sauna with the size of a modest ballroom. In one of corners there 
is a wood-burning stove measuring a few metres tall. Everywhere on the 
wooden benches of the amphitheatre fat-bellied Finns sit quietly drinking 
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an incessant stream of Finnish beer – sold in half-litre bottles by the ticket 
seller – to stay off the dry heat. Even if only the names of the biggest drinkers 
live on, the Finnish people must have a huge collective memory.
It is impossible, however, to accuse the people of this country of excessive 
loquacity. Yet they enjoy self-mockery. The majority of Finns is able to be 
fluently silent in at least five languages, as Ossi assures us with a straight face. 
I remember the guest lectures I gave at the university a few days ago which 
had rather unsettled me. The students had looked at me with a silent gaze, 
hardly showing any inner life at all, let alone any interest in my explanation 
of the concept of ‘database-ontology’. Fortunately, the emails I received on 
my return home containing intelligent questions and commentary from 
the students reassured me that my lectures were appreciated alright, but it 
is a mystery how this reticence to talk can be squared with the success of the 
mobile phone in Finland. Or has it something to do with the vast expense 
of the Finnish countryside and its endless woods and lakes and lack of land 
lines? 
On the second day of the conference the American philosopher Joseph 
Knupfer reveals himself as a technological teetotaller. According to the 
best cultural pessimistic tradition he claims mobility technologies will 
inevitably lead to displacement. Thanks to the new means of transport and 
communication we can now go anywhere we want and at the same time be 
present anywhere we want, and yet we are nowhere any more. Detached 
from our physical contact with nature, we become estranged from each 
other and from ourselves. And not to forget the sacrifices we make because 
of mobilisation. While the world regularly grieves collectively when natural 
disasters or acts of war cause thousands of casualties, hardly anyone is aware 
of the million road traffic victims every year. This message is well received 
by many of the older Finnish participants. The younger generation at the 
conference seems to be less bothered by it, as is the case with young people 
all over the world. They don’t seem to miss spending long winter evenings 
sitting quietly round a wood-burning stove. 
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KIRKKONUMMI
Even though I am not a fanatic nature lover, the next day I am bowled over by the nature in Finland, when Markku Hakuri takes me on a trip through the forests west of Helsinki. Markku is professor 
of ‘environmental art’ at the University of Art and Design (which used to 
be located in the old Arabia ceramics factory in Helsinki) and as a visual 
artist has achieved fame with his impressive ice and fire sculptures in the 
Finnish landscape, among other things. Today he is taking me along to 
the Hvitträsk, which is a monumental villa built between 1901 and 1903 by 
the architects Herman Gesellius, Armas Lindgren and Eliel Saarinen, in 
national romantic style, located in a wonderful wooded area overlooking 
a lake near the village of Kirkkonummi. The three architects and their 
wives also designed the Jugendstil interior of the house which has been 
implemented down to the smallest detail. As we wander through this 
magnificent house, in awe of the ingenious panelling, the various dark 
pieces of furniture inlaid with several types of wood, and the stained-glass 
windows, the mobile culture suddenly seems so far away.
Afterwards Markku invites us for a late lunch in his house in a hamlet 
close to Espoo. It is three o’ clock in the afternoon and dusk is already setting 
in around the old wooden house. Inside we sit near the wood-burning 
stove and enjoy the salmon and reindeer meat while Markku and his wife 
Kaarina, who is a music teacher, tell us about the rather tempestuous love 
relationships between the six residents of the villa Hvitträsk. It reminds me 
of the films of Ingmar Bergman. Markku and Kaarina also adore his films, 
although, measured by their Finnish heart, they regard the Swedish film 
director as being a bit too frivolous. Time stands still when Kaarina takes 
out the blueberry pie out of the oven – the size of which defies any Aga – 
and despite darkness falling and the stillness all around us we quite simply 
feel happy in the Normankatu. 
The next day I become fascinated yet again by Finnish immobility 
when I visit the exposition Monitoring Visual Landscapes in Finland at 
the University of Art & Design. The photographer Tapio Heikkilä explains 
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how since 1996 he has photographed the typical Finnish landscapes 
with regular intervals documenting the changes in landscape caused by 
modernisation. Spot the differences. No matter how hard I stare at the 
series photographs of continually the same landscape, except perhaps for 
the appearance and disappearance of a lone walker or roaming reindeer, 
I cannot see any development at all. I am probably already hopelessly 
corrupted by the aesthetics of speed. More senior Finnish visitors stand in 
front of the photo’s shaking their heads, appalled by the rate at which the 
Finnish landscape seems to be disappearing. 
And yet rural and urban areas in Finland appear to develop at 
different rates. Despite the fact that Helsinki seems provincial compared 
to many other capital cities in Europe, its architecture – of which Nokia’s 
headquarters is a showcase, erected in highly modernist glass and steel 
– is hardly any different from what we see in other places. In the new, 
also hyper modern-looking Kiasma museum, with its many curves in the 
interior reminding me instantly of the Guggenheim in New York, I visit 
the exposition Love me or leave me, which gives an overview of the ‘most 
loved, much-talked about and hated’ works from its own collections. You 
can see the effect of globalisation here too; the exposition shows neatly 
the international trends and movements over the last few decades. I am 
not that impressed by the Finnish contributions to modern art brought 
together here, although there are a few exceptions. Jan-Erik Andersson’s 
The Triangle, the Square and the Circle. Meet the Fast-Food-Boat from 1988 
is a little gem. The installation consists of a floating snack bar, offering a 
very interesting menu. Behind the salesgirl a large number of pictures of 
dishes can be seen in which various icons from twentieth-century art are 
recombined. Anyone interested in Fusion Art can choose among other 
things between Malewich Flakes with Kiefer Sauce, a Keith Haring Herring 
and an A Sol leWitt Cube with Pollock dressing. Database art combined 
with an amusing mobile ontology.3 
3 For a more detailed exposition of this database ontology and its impact on art and aesthetic 
experience, see my contribution to the conference, entitled ‘From Mobile Ontologies to Mobile 
Aesthetics’ (https://contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=346) .
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HOMO MOBILIS
One of the last lectures of the conference is given by my Helsinki-based colleague Arto Haapala, whom I have known for several decades now as a co-member of the International Association for 
Aesthetics. Haapala puts the contrast between mobility enthusiasts and 
prophets of doom in perspective. He distinguishes between three forms of 
identity: place-related, cosmopolitan and nomadic. As an example of the 
place-related type of identity Haapala refers to his grandmother, who – like 
my own grandmother – has not practically ever left the village in which 
she was born, during her entire life, let alone been abroad. Just like a tree 
in a forest she was rooted to her ‘spot’ and surrounded by familiar things. 
Whoever moves house is confronted with a new environment and needs to 
try and get settled, to find her or his way again. 
In the mobile culture, where work and holidays keep us on the move 
all the time, this ‘feeling for being in a place’ starts to erode. The new form 
of identity related to this, and inspired by thinkers such as Deleuze, is 
called nomadic. However, according to Haapala, the name is not justified in 
most cases. People have an insatiable longing to create a familiar place for 
themselves. The modern-day Homo mobilis manages to do this by making 
sure that every environment looks the same. This explains the success of 
global hotel chains, fast-food restaurants and coffee shops such as Hilton, 
McDonalds and Starbucks. They are not very attractive buildings nor is the 
food or coffee particularly amazing (to put it mildly), but they offer a much-
needed familiarity to the cosmopolitan citizen when he is abroad. Many 
travel companies offer tourists a similarly familiar environment, whereby 
they can go on excursions sampling exotic culture in small doses and are 
led by an experienced tour guide. 
The popularity of the mobile phone, which stores our favourite 
music, offers personalised displays and ringtones and ‘virtual residence’ 
technologies, can also be explained by this ‘longing for home’, as it allows 
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us to access our personal documents and photos, no matter where we are. 
Such mobile technologies create a virtual home around us. Such bubbles 
allow us to move and stay put at the same time. Perhaps that is the reason 
why the immobile Finns have become so hooked on mobile technology. 
They have been caught up in a mobile immobility. 
I focus again on Haapala. He finishes his argument by saying that being 
nomadic means being able to move about without having a home. Only 
a few manage to do that. Because even the most nomadic of people keep 
coming back to the same places. Perhaps that is a good thing. 
It is 4.30 a.m. when my phone alarm wakes me. In two hours’ time I 
will fly back to the Netherlands. While I am waiting for the taxi that will 
take me to the airport, the weather seems to have turned. The icy wind is 
carrying the first snowflakes to Vironkatu. It’s still dark and the streets are 
deserted. I am longing for home.
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